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Abstract
Humanitarian intervention is generally defined as coercive militaiy action by one state against
a foreign state with the express purpose ofhalting or preventing massive hurnan rights atrocities in an
emergency situation. This idea is usually framed within the discourse ofcosmopolitanism. The reason
we often associate the notion ofhumanitarian intervention with that ofcosmopolitanism is because of
the assumption that a universal legal and moral order can and should include an international legal
capacity for military force. But the paradigm of humanitarian intervention includes some important
presuppositions, without which, the idea loses its force, both on an abstract philosophical level, and on
a practical moral one. My work consists in an effort to unravel some ofthe deeply ingrained
assumptions made within the humanitarian intervention paradigm, but with an aim to maintain, uphold
and develop the notion of cosmopolitanism. The purpose ofthis thesis, then, is to illustrate that there is
a firndamental rncompatibility with the idea ofhumanitarian intervention and cosmopolitanism.
To show the incompatibility with humanitarian intervention and cosrnopolitanism, I begin by
chalienging the main arguments used to legitimize humanitarian intervention. While this part of the
work addresses some of the main daims for legitimacy. much effort is put into unraveling the myths
behind the moral case for humanitarian intervention. Because the force of the arguments supporting
humanitarian intervention are primarily moral, my work iliustrates the weakness in that position by
challenging the way that we look at foreign conflicts, and especially the way we interpret our role in
foreign conflict. Exposing the kinds of assumptions we make when assessing regional conflicts in
foreign places unsettles ideas about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. This is the first step
in showing the incompatibility ofhumanitarian intervention with cosmopoiitanism.
The second step is to challenge some ofthe important assumptions we make about
cosmopolitanism. I argue that the idea ofcosmopoiitanism, if it is flot to be hijacked for imperial
purposes, must be abie to withstand the demands ofpatriotism in what I have framed as a
‘cosmopolitan patriotism’. The reason for this is that I see this route as the orily one which can allay
legitimate fears that cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention in practice can only resuit in global
despotism and cultural annihilation. By making the demands ofthe cosmopolitan iess stringent, and
more open to the needs and realities ofcitizens ofboth local and the global communities, I account for
a cosmopolitanism which is inclusive, plural, and responsible. I argue that while the current model of
humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan frame encourages military action. it paradoxically
encourages citizen passivity. This in effect, contradicts and undermines the goals of cosmopolitanism.
Framed in this way, I show that the underlying reason that humanitarian intervention is
incompatible with cosmopoiitanism is because ultimateiy it subverts the goals of the cosmopolitan,
whicb is to build a safer world, protect the plurality ofits diverse citizens. and engage in the common
project ofthe advancement ofhumanity. While I maintain the core principles ofthe cosmopolitan
project, to build a more secure and stable place for ail citizens ofthe world, I argue that this project
should flot, and cannot reptace international law and its core principles ofsovereign equality, territorial
integrity and domestic jurisdiction. We must frame cosmopolitanism in terms of a revised, updated
legal international order which is based on a concepmal shift in the way we have framed not only
regional conflicts, but our relationship to them. This conceptual shifi upsets any comfort we may have
found in humanitarian intervention as a method ofprotecting human tife, but it is a necessary shifi if
we are tu make any effective efforts in the contribution of global peace, security and stability.
10 Key Words:
Humanitarian intervention, cosmopolitanism, philosophy, political science, ethics, sovereignty,
patriotism, legitimacy, legality, media
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Résume
Une intervention humanitaire est généralement définie comme étant une action
militaire imposée par un état souverain envers un autre, avec l’objectif de stopper ou prévenir
une catastrophe humaine, et ce, dans une situation considérée comme urgente. Cette
définition est généralement acceptée conm-ie étant une composante intégrale du concept du
cosmopolitisme. L’association entre les deux concepts est courante, puisque l’on accepte
communément que l’existence d’une loi et d’une morale universelle peuvent et doivent
inclure l’utilisation d’une force militaire. Pourtant, les paradigmes d’une intervention
humanitaire contiennent des présomptions qui, sans celles-ci, ne peuvent soutenir d’un point
de vue philosophique, et même selon une approche morale, une telle action. Notre
dissertation vise donc à extraire certaines présomptions rarement remises en question, dans le
but de maintenir et d’approfondir la nation du cosmopolitisme. Notre visée est de démontrer
l’incompatibilité qui existe entre les concepts de l’intervention humanitaire et le concept de
cosmopolitisme.
Afin d’établir l’incompatibilité des concepts de l’intervention humanitaire et du
cosmopolitisme, nous remettons en question les arguments qui, légitimement, permettent les
interventions humanitaires. Notre effort est principalement dirigé vers la reconsidération des
mythes et croyances qui soutiennent une morale d’intervention. Puisque les thèses qui sont en
faveur d’une intervention humanitaire découlent principalement de préceptes moraux, nous
devons revisiter les façons de percevoir les conflits internationaux et les rôles de chacun dans
de telles situations. Une démonstration des présomptions existantes lors de conflits régionaux
permet de revisiter la justification d’une intervention humanitaire.
Il est important aussi de revoir certaines présuppositions qui règnent sur le cosmopolitisme.
La notion de ‘cosmopolitisme patriotique’ est un concept que nous avons développé afin
d’aborder les craintes qui existent face à un cosmopolitisme interventionniste qui risque de
mener vers un despotisme global et une dévastation culturelle. Nous démontrons qu’une
approche moins contraignante, plus inclusive et plurielle du cosmopolitisme permettrait de
mieux subvenir aux besoins et à la réalité des citoyens. Nous concédons que le présent
modèle de l’intervention humanitaire non seulement incite les actions militaires, mais elle
encourage aussi la passivité des citoyens; les conséquences contredisent le but même du
cosmopolitisme.
Notre approche permet donc de stipuler que le concept d’intervention humanitaire est
incompatible avec la notion de cosmopolitisme puisqu’il mine les desseins de ce dernier, soit
la construction d’un monde meilleur, ouvert à la diversité des populations humaines. Bien que
notre dissertation remette en question plusieurs éléments du cosmopolitisme, elle ne prétend
en aucun cas remplacer les lois internationales. Nous encourageons plutôt une refonde des
législations internationales vis-à-vis les conflits régionaux et la relation des différents états
face à ceux-ci. Le défi est de permettre une vision nouvelle, inconfortable soit-elle, de
l’intervention humanitaire, dans le but de contribuer à la paix mondiale, à un monde plus
sécuritaire et plus stable.
10 mots clés:
intervention humanitaire, cosmopolitisme, philosophie, politique, éthique, souveraineté,
patriotisme, légitimité, légalité, média
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Introduction: A Context for the Problem of Cosmopolitanism and
Humanitarian Intervention:
In 1945, state representatives from throughout the world came together to
develop and sign the United Nations Charter which made a daim and promise
that “we the people” are “determined”
--to save succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar, which twice
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and...
AND FOR THESE ENDS
--to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as
good neighbors, and
--to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
--to ensure, by the acceptance ofprinciples and the institution of
methods, that armed force shah not be used, save in the common
interest,. (emphasis added).
Today, almost ail nation states are signatories to this declaration,
promising to maintain peace and security, and to suppress acts of aggression and
other breaches ofpeace. If ever there was an expression of a ‘common morality’,
universal and absolute and even necessary for our continued survival as a species,
it is thus declared in these words. In post WWII, this document was devised
expressing the abhorrence of what human beings of the world suffered and wished
neyer to repeat or endure again. This document, in the form ofthe UN Charter is
essentially an anti-war document, repeating what past attempts tried to do2—that
is to condemn recourse to war. If there can be a single expression for a global
will or desire shared throughout the world, timeless and truly universal, it surely
must be the will to live in peace—that is to say, without war, without constant
threat of death and destruction. This document is not just a set of articles, but an
‘Charter of the United Nations—Preamble, http://www.un.org/aboutunlcharter/
2 For instance, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, also cafled the Pact of Paris, was a momentous
attempt in eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. It was part ofa series of
peacekeeping efforts post-WWI.
expression of a collective will, and in that sense it is the essence of
cosmopolitanism. There is a sense in which we have failed that goal. Beyond
just a ‘sense’, there is a tremendous amount of evidence that illustrates how we
have failed that goal and today’s attempts to develop a ‘cosmopolitan law’ which
includes the developing ideas for humanitarian interventions, as well as its
younger sibling, the ResponsibiÏir-i’ to Pro tect, (or, R2P as it is abbreviated) are
expressions ofhow to fulfiul that will to live in peace and security where we have
previously failed. My work consists of an effort to deconstruct some of the
assumptions made about this new avenue toward global peace and security, but
within a cosmopolitan frame, maintaining cosmopolitan aspirations. It ïs an
attempt to show that while we have failed in our efforts to establish peace and
security, we have failed not because there was something fundamentally amiss
with the principles to maintain peace and security set out post WWII, but rather
with our implementation of them. The present route we are taking with the
development of the projects ofhumanitarian intervention and R2P is the route I
see most innocuously as incapable of guaranteeing human security and more
seriously as potentially destructive ofboth human lives and cosmopolitan values.
Today, the idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is used synonymously with human rights,
and together, they provide the normative frame for ‘humanitarian intervention’.
But what this interpretation of cosmopolitanism refers to makes vast assumptions
which I aim to challenge, and I argue that ‘cosmopolitanism’ as it is being used
today is flot ofien truly representative of its essence and meaning. This is the
avenue from which I will begin to unearth the underlying, and flot necessarily
well-founded, assumptions about cosmopolitanism.
While ideas about (and a variety of manifestations of) humanitarian
interventions have aiways existed, recent academic discourse lias contextualized
the newest conception ofthis idea within a ‘cosmopolitan’ frame. What
motivates an analysis of this emerging normative frame is that interventions are
being described as ‘cosmopolitan’. Reference to cosmopolitan humanitarian
interventions must be comprised of cosmopolitan Ïaw which exists in a
cosmopolitan world, where cosmopolitan militaries will enforce their rules3.
Central to any understanding of a cosmopolitan law enforcement, then, is flot only
a clear and explicit articulation of what this cosmopolitanism refers to, but also a
consensus about il, or at least some common ground, because if concrete military
action is going to be taken on the basis of an idea, we had better have a clear and
concrete definition about that idea. At this point, any reference to a cosmopolitan
normative frame, from which a cosmopolitan rule oflaw emerges makes vast and
unfounded assumptions both about what cosmopolitanism is, and about how it
should be enforced (something at this point referred to as hurnanitarian
intervention, articulated more precisely in the ICISS4 document R2P). My
conception ofcosmopolitanism does not advance the project ofhumanitarian
These ideas are generally found in the work Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for
Humanitarian Intervention”, in Alternatives, 29 no.1 (2004); Loarraine Elliott and Graeme
Cheesman, “Cosmopolitan ethics and militaries as ‘forces for good” in forcesfor Good:
Cosmopoliran Mulitaries in the 21$t Centu’y (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); or,
“Cosmopolitan theory, militaries, and the deployment of force”, (Department of International
Relations. RSPAS, Canberra: Australian National University, 2002); or, Mary Kaldor New and
Old Wars: Organized violence in a global era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
““The Responsibility to Protect” is a report written by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty or ICISS. This can be retrieved at ffieir website: iciss
ciise.gc.ca
n
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intervention and I will show how humanitarian interventionists make some of the
mistakes some contemporary cosmopolitans make. I will show how the project of
humanitarian intervention undermines the goals ofwhat I consider to 5e a more
viable position on cosmopolitanism—one that achieves the spirit ofits definition:
plurality, inclusion, and equality. Further, I will show how our collective attempts
at the legal realization of this cosmopolitan vision is best expressed in
international law as it has been developed, especially post WWII, and flot through
what I would interpret as ad hoc or rogue law, currently developed outside the
parameters of international law and the ethics of international law in order to
legitimate and legalize its de facto immorality and illegality. The question is
fundamentally, which model serves us better in terms of its ability to protect
world citizens and ensure global peace: the post WWII, Westphalian model, or
what is refened to as the new ‘cosmopolitan world order’, including the
legalization and moral justification for the project ofhumanitarian intervention
(or, HI)? Which model is most likely to betray us in ternis of its ability to ensure
peace? Which is more susceptible to abuse? I will argue that the post WWII,
Westphalian model serves us Setter in terms ofachieving global peace and
security, and that, while both models are susceptible to abuse, conceptions of
humanitarian intervention are more likely to be abused, their danger deeper and
greater than the current model of the inviolability of state sovereignty and non-
intervention.
Catherine Lu, who currently writes on humanitarian intervention, and who
is motivated by a cosmopolitan ftamework, maintains a position typical ofthe
4
kind of moral discourse surrounding the debate. She argues that we cannot reject
humanitarian intervention just because it is vulnerabie to corruption: ail gencrai
norms or principles are subject to corruption.5 Do we, by extension, she asks,
abandon ail possibilities of normative frames within which we buiid ethical mies
and principles? It has been argued that whiie the concept ofhumanitarian
intervention is susceptible to abuse, the kinds of atrocities inflicted with the
protection of sovereign inmmnity are far graver. While I concede that the
principie of state sovereiguty and its corollary, the duty of non intervention can be
(and indeed, are) seriousiy abused, the question I pose, and what motivates this
work is an analysis about which model serves us better, or at least which model is
the less dangerous ofthe two. The answer may depend on who is being asked,
i.e., a perspective afforded by one’s experience in the world, which is determined
to a great degree on where a person is situated in the world. A Middle-Eastem
intellectual may be more critical ofthe project ofhumanitarian intervention where
a New York academic might be more comfortable with the idea. The fact that the
answer depends on the situation ofthe person being asked reveals something
about the cosmopoÏitan assumptions made by interventionists. Those assumptions
have to do not with having common ideas about justice and law, but rather about
the specificities ofthose ideas, and more seriously, how to implement them.
I will bring into the analysis the fact that the while the term ‘sovereiguty’
gets tossed around throughout this discourse in opposition with ‘intervention’
(humanitarian), it is a bit of a misnomer in the sense that there is no reai and strict
Catherine Lu. Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private (New York:
Paigrave McMillan, 2007) 7.
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sovereignty , pnmanÏy and especially for weaker states: the international
community yields tremendous influence on regional conflicts prior to, during and
afler those conflicts have ended. This wili 5e a particularly important part ofmy
analysis and a point of contention in my work because the narrative of
humanitarian intervention is often limited to an analysis which begins and ends
with regional conflicts while failing to address the importance of the foie of the
international community. In revealing the greater picture, I will challenge the
frame upon which humanitarian intervention discourse relies and rests.
The rule governing international relations until recently has been the
principle of non-intervention. According to Adam Roberts6, it has flot failed us as
an ordering principle of international relations and it lias some ment both
practicaily and morally which should not 5e dismissed iightly: it provides clean
rules for limiting the use of force and for reducing the risk of war between states;
and it can hait territorial or impenial aspirations. Accordingly, the principle lias
appeal at botli the realist and the liberal level, althougli for different reasons.
Inherent in tlie concept is the idea ofrespecting foreign societies and respecting
different ways of ordering them, such as their religious, economic and political
systems. Although much debate and discussion lias ensued about weakening tlie
structure or principle of non-intervention, it stiil lias not quite entered the realm of
legality. I will offer a detailed analysis of the daims for legitimacy of
humanitarjan intervention in the next section in which I unearth the meaning and
assumptions within the concept. While strict adherence to the principle of non-
6 Adam Roberts, “The Road to Heu: A Critique ofHumanitarian Intervention”, in Harvard
International Review 16, no.1 (FaIl, 1993): 10.
6
intervention has failed on many occasions for a number ofreasons, only one of
which appeals to humanitarianism, there is something of a reticence in the field of
international relations theory to abandon this principle altogether. That reticence
must be considered and weighed in the philosophical discussion about it.
International covenants. like the United Nations Charter consistently prohibit the
use of force by one state or a group of states in foreign territory. The legal norm
of non-intervention has been reafflrmed repeatedly in declarations such the 1965
Declaration on Intervention7 and the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.8 Yet
the glaring weakness ofthe principle of non-intervention is painfully obvious:
when appeals to the moral conscience of the world strike at the heart of our
humanity, to what do we appeal, if not swifi military force? This is by no means
an easy question to address, and yet it is implicit in any critique ofhumanitarian
intervention. Any critique ofhumanitanan intervention must account for the
growing consent in political, philosophical and international relations theory for
the right to intervene when massive human rights abuses are carried out by the
very govermTlents that are supposed to protect their citizens. To that end, I will
offer a framework for a conceptual shifi in our understanding of humanitarian
Resolution 2131: 21 Dec., 1965 “Reaffirming the principle ofnon-interventïon,[...]Recognizing
that full observance ofthe principle ofthe non-intervention ofStates in the internai and extemal
affairs ofother States is essential to the fiulfiulment ofthe purposes and principles ofthe United
Nations[. . .]Considering that armed intervention is synonymous with aggression[. .]Considering
fiarther that direct intervention, subversion and ail forms of indirect intervention are contrary to
these principles and consequently, constitute a violation ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations,
Mindful that violation of the principle of non-intervention poses a threat to the independence.
freedom[.
. .],particulariy those which have freed themselves from coionialism, and can pose a
serious threat to the maintenance ofpeace.. No State lias the riglit to intervene, directiy or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internai or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently, armed intervention and ail other fonris ofinterference[.. .]are condemned”,
(emphasis added).
Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendiy
Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter ofthe United Nations:
October 24, 1970.
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intervention which will help us expand our comprehension of the normative frame
such that it will challenge our drive to advocate humanitarian intervention, and
firther, it will direct us in our collective aspiration to work toward global peace.
But first, by deconstructing the layers upon which HI theory exists, and by
revealing ils assumptions, I hope to show that indeed it is this particular mode!
which is an inferior one to the principle of non-intervention, and that what we
should do as a global community is work to repair what failed us in the post
WWII effort, that is, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention,
develop and ftirther them to accommodate the challenges of the 21st century,
rather than surrender them in the face of mounting pressure.
I will show that there are several problems with humanitarian intervention,
not the least of which is the application ofit. By identifying these problems, as
well as exposing the assumptions inherent in the term ‘humanitarian intervention’,
I will show how humanitarian interventions are incompatible with cosmopolitan
ideals. In order to contextualize this daim, I begin with a definition and historical
context ofhumanitarian intervention, afier which I map out some ofthe
justifications for legitimacy, and I offer a critical account of each ofthem. Then I
will offer an analysis of what it means to refer to a cosmopolitan frame to which I
then I apply the theory ofhumanitarian intervention. What seems, at first glance,
contradictory about my daim i5 that on the one hand I uphold a principle,
cosmopolitanism, which the practice ofhumanitarian intervention seeks to
achieve, at least in theory, but then I reject the development ofhumanitarian
intervention as a mechanism for achieving that goal. Afier revealing the
8
assumptions behind, and the contradictions within, the idea of humanitarian
intervention, and afier elaboratïng on the possibilities ofmeaning behind
cosmopolitanism, it will flot at ail seem contradictory to reject humanitarian
intervention while upholding cosmopolitan aspirations.
Where post WWII law, developed with the explicit intention of
safeguarding “succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar, which twice in our
lifetime bas brought untoid sorrow to mankind”9 details with precision what is
legally and morally permitted, reference to ‘cosmopolitan law’ suffers from a lack
ofnecessary precision, because amongst other things, cosmopoÏitanism is stiil a
moral idea, the substantive quality of which is being debated. William Smith
struggies with the ambiguity of applying a cosmopolitan military solution when
there still exists uncertainty about the meaning of the terni ‘cosmopolitan’. As he
puts it “a synthesis of positions is unlikeÏy and, more importantïy. undesirable;
rather different critical approaches can reveal different problems and
inconsistencies in the way ‘the ethical’ is being framed”.’° The terms we refer to
are ideas, conceptions being developed and furthered, but the law they advance
requires military force which is a concrete action, aiways resuiting in death and
destruction, as is the nature of war.1’ While this discussion continues in academic
circles, its concrete repercussions can be devastating, as we see in Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq. The morally urgent question demands that we determine if
the world is a safer, better place since we have developed this idea of so-called
Charter of the United Nations, Preamble.
‘° Wiiliam Smith, “Anticipating a Cosmopolitan future”, in International Potitics (44) 2007: 77.
For a fuuler analysis of the unpredictabiÏity of war and its devastating consequences, see Cari
von Ciausewitz, On War, tians. Michaei Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 577-6i0.
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‘cosmopolitanism law’ enforced by military action. Current trends require us to
reexamine the way we see sovereignty in terms of its ability to protect the citizens
of this world from further war, and that reexamination aims to weaken the
inviolability of state sovereignty with the intention of creating a safer, better
world: a cosmopolitan world. But before we abandon the Westphalian idea as
well as UN Charter declarations upholding the inviolability of state sovereignty
and the Paris Pact condemning recourse to war, let us be extremely critical and
precise about what we mean when we talk about humanitarian interventions
within a cosmopolitan frame. In the interests ofdoing good—a moral urge
derived from cosmopolitan-minded citizens ofthe world who genuinely believe in
the potential of humanitarian intervention and R2P to reduce the amount of
human suffering in the world—we may be advancing a principle and law which is
vuinerable to the gravest violations ofhuman rights, perverting our ultimate goals
for human freedom, safety and security.
In order to challenge humanitarian intervention from a cosmopolitan
frame, will construct my arguments in the following way: First I will challenge
the inherent structural biases and cosmopolitan assumptions within the definition
ofhumanitarian intervention. This leads me to expose many ofthe assumptions
we make about cosmopolitanism itself, and I argue that ofien what we actually
mean when we invoke that term is the universalization of a Western conception
and standard, to which we fundamentally believe should be a adhered to by ah.
This, I argue, is flot cosmopohitanism, but something which resonates more with
coloniahism, including the perspectives, assumptions and biases of the stronger,
10
few, rather than the cosmopolitan whole. I criticize the implementation of
policies derived from this vision for its tendency toward Western assumptions
about its own superiority, and one of those policies is ‘humanitarian intervention’.
My argument is that many current cosmopolitans mistakenly pit their
vision against patriotic ones, which they see as narrow, irrational and exclusive. I
stress the point that patriotic (commonly referred to in its negative connotation,
‘nationalism’) is usually attributed to other, non-Western states, while
‘cosmopolitanism’ tends to be expressed by Westerners to mean Western values
that should be adopted by ail. I argue that far from narrow, irrational and
exclusive, patriots make the best cosmopolitans and that cosmopolitanism,
unchecked by a set of standards to which the patriot is subject, can retard the route
toward human growth, development and flourishing. Ultimately, the
cosmopolitan subverts her own goals by denying her patriotic roots because ofthe
fact that serious neglect in the attention, care and commitment to the local is a
necessary part of informing the global.
The problem with our competing conceptions of cosmopolitanism relate to
and are deeply intertwined with the problem ofhumanitarian intervention, and
this is at the heart ofmy argument. In advancing humanitarian intervention, the
cosmopolitan subverts her own goals. I argue that instead we have to reexamine
the narrative frame within which we understand flot only ourselves, as
cosmopolitans, but that we must also reexamine what interventionism really
means. Finally, what I put forward is that humanitarian intervention within a
cosmopolitan frame only makes sense within a narrative context where Western
11
values are simultaneously advanced unchallenged as the most appropriate,
progressive and universal. To add to the problem, these unchallenged values
being advanced are applied inconsistently. This means that we only apply our
Western conception ofhuman rights at particular times for specific reasons,
neither of which have anything to do with the substantive quality of human rights
at ail. Instead, I challenge the Western reader to engage in a conceptual shifi in
our understanding of our role in the ensuing death and destruction which we
normally attribute to dictators of rogue states. My argument consists ofa firm
beliefthat only in the context of us and them—that is, a Manichean conception of
good and evil, does the frame for humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan
frame work. My argument will finally show that the essence of cosmopolitanism
must include, at the very least in theory, the possibility for human flourishing for
ail members ofhumanity in the plurality ofways that different people envision
that, and flot just one particular vision articulated and implemented by the
powerful few.
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C Chanter I:
Ihe Definition and Historical Context for Humanitarian Intervention:
Humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan frame is developed
under some assumptions about flot only what humanitarian intervention is, but
about what cosmopolitanism is as weil. Those assumptions are related in
important ways. Because humanitarian intervention is interpreted slightly
differentiy according to the context, and because those slight variations couid be
significant in the analysis ofthis investigation, I will offer a precise definition of
how it is generally used by academics within this discourse. From that definition,
I wiÏl offer a thorough reading of what the idea ofhumanitanan intervention
entails, reveal some of the assumptions inherent in the idea, and critique it both on
a practicai and theoretical level. What will follow is an analysis ofboth what
cosmopoiitanism is not, as well as what general principles are common to ail
definitions of cosmopolitanism from which we can derive a general understanding
of it, especialiy in the context of humanitarian intervention theory. That
discussion will frame the context for how to treat the relationship between
humanitarian intervention and cosmopoiitanism. Afier showing why
humanitarian intervention as a theory subverts the goals of cosmopolitanism, I
will offer an analysis ofhow a conceptual shifi in our understanding of
international relations could help direct us toward the achievement of global
peace and security.
To begin with, humanitarian intervention is defined by the Danisli Institute
of International Affairs in the following way:
1—,
Ii
coercive action by states invoiving the use of armed force in
another state wiffiout the consent of its government, with or
without authorization from the United Nations Security
Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a hait
gross and massive violations ofhuman rights or international
humanitarian iaw.’2
John Vincent frames it even more broadly when lie defines humanitarian
intervention as
that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a
group of states or an international organizatÏon which
interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another
state. . . it is not necessarily iawful or uniawfui, but it does
break a conventional pattern of international relations.’3
Both refer to the quality ofthe action being ‘coercive’, although Vincent did flot
frame it in terms of a humanitarian crisis. Although some scholars, like
Ramsbothan and Woodhouse argue that within ail the possibilities and meanings
ofhumanitarian intervention, military action is only one ofthem’4, most experts
in this field identify two main characteristics which define humanitarian
interventions: the fact of a humanitarian crisis and the necessity for military force.
Scholars like Wheeler, Walzer, Pogge, Finnemore and Lepard who insist upon
developing this notion as an international legal norm limit its use to ‘supreme
humanitarian emergencies’.15 In that sense it is the “humanitarian exception” to
12 Hurnanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (Copenhagen: Danish Instiflite of
International Affafrs, 1999) 11.
‘ RI. Vincent, Non-Intervention and international order (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974)
13. The legahty of a humanitarian intervention normally refers to whether it fias been sanctioned
by the United Nations. Mihtary actions can be legal or illegal, legitimate or iHegitimate, ofien in
combination depending on the justification used. While there is no iegai provision made for the
use of mihtary force to protect human rights, Chapter XII of the UN Charter allows for military
action to ensure peace and international security. As such, scholars have argued that maintaining
peace and international security must be enforced by protecting human rights. There is no
universal consensus on this argument. I will deveiop the idea of the status of legality and
iegitirnacy in Chapter III.
4 Ohver Ramsbothan, and Tom Woodhouse, Httmanitarian Intervention in Contemporaiy
Conflict: A Reconceptualization (London: Polity Press, 1996) xii-xiii.
Nicholas Wheeler uses this reference throughout Saving Strangers: Hurnanitarian Intervention
in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); See aiso how Michael Walzer
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the legal norm of non-intervention.16 AÏthough it seems that something like a
‘supreme humanitarian emergency’ would be clear and obvious to everyone, for
some reason it is flot aiways clear, and that, among other things, will cause us
some problems.
Among its conceptual obscurities are both the way ‘intervention’ and the
way ‘humanitarian’ are flot only interpreted, but invoked. The troubling question
is to construe how the term “humanitarian” is to be understood in the context of
military action. Quite simply,
What on earth does the word “humanitarian” mean, and does it
accurately describe anything beyond the original supposed
motive of an action? How does such a motive translate into
actual policies to transform a situation? Does it make sense to
cali an intervention in a country “humanitarian” when the
troops involved may have to fight and kiil those who, for
whatever reasons, seek to obstmct them? Or when the troops
involved fail to provide what the inhabitants most desperately
need—especially in terms of security?’7
Among its assumptions is that military force can 5e used for humanitarian
purposes in four ways: in its original motives; its stated purposes; its methods of
operation; and its actual results.’8 My critique ofhumanitarian intervention will
include an analysis ofthe problem of ‘original motive’ and ‘stated purpose’ (as
distinguished from ‘intent’). Included in my analysis will 5e consideration for
treats this idea in Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argïtment with Historical Illusions, 2 Edition
(New York: Basic Books, 1992); and also Thomas Pogge, “Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention:
Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can Work” in Hïtmanitarian Intervention, NOMOS 47, eds.,
Teny Nardin and Melissa Williams (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 157-177;
Martha fiimemore and Kathryn Silddnk, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization 52, no 4 (Autumn, 1998). 887-917; and also see Brian Lepard,
Rethinldng Humanitarian Intervention (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2002).
16 Alex Bellamy, “Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy ofhumanitarian intervention” in
the Journal ofMilita.’y Ethics 3, no. 3 (November, 2004): 216.
‘ Roberts, Adam. “The Road to Heli: A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention”, Harvard
International Review 16, no. 1 (FaÏl,1993): 13.
18 Ibid., 10.
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C ‘methods ofoperation’ and ‘actual resuits’ which deal with the empiricai
ramifications ofhumanitarian military actions. Ail this will be developed
beginning with an analysis ofthe umbrella idea ofjust-war theory, within which
humanitarian intervention finds its historical roots.
Humanitarian intervention is not, by any means, a new idea. Hugo
Grotius,’9 Emer de Vattei,2° Samuel Pufendorf ail participated in the articulation
ofthe conditions under which requests for miiitary intervention could be made of
foreign states from oppressed subjects ofthe state in times ofhumanitarian crisis.
Grotius worked toward a normative frame in which the standards for just war
couid be regulated. During the 19th century, a policy was developed in Europe
specifically dealing with the policies ofthe Ottoman Empire. It was at this time
that a comprehensive doctrine ofhumanitarian intervention evolved which
provided a moral justification for the interventions of European powers on the
territory ofthe Ottoman Empire, and this moral justification led to a legal basis
upon which these interventions were flot just legitimate (in terms of moral
justificatory force) but legal as well. Until the First World War the majority of
legal experts condoned the use ofhumanitarian intervention as a legitimate
justification for war. In relative terms, it is only recently that the twin principles
of state sovereignty and non-intervention have been developed, and that was a
result ofthe Kellogg-Briand Pact (or the Paris Pact) of 192$, condemning war as
19 For a review ofhumanitarian intervention in its historical context, refer to the works ofHugo
Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (De jure belli acpacis) trans. A.C. Campbell (Kitchener:
Batoche Books, 2001).
20 AIso see Peter Pavel Remec, The Position ofthe individual in international lrnv according to
Grotius and Vattel (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960) 250.
2! Also see Samuel von Pufendorf The Political Writings ofSamuel Pifendorf trans. Michael J.
Seidier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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C a recourse for resolving disputes, upheld again in the United Nations Chaer, and
then yet again in the 1965 and 1970 UN Declarations cited above.
The Treaty of Westphalia dates the concept of state sovereignty a bit
further along in history with its ratification in 1648 ending both the Thirty Years’
War and the Eighty Years’ War. Foundational to our understanding ofthe debate
between human rights and state sovereignty, we must examine the historical and
philosophical consequences of Westphalia in a world that challenges its principles
in terms ofnot only its relevancy but also its morality. The debate is
characterized as one between the ordering principie of Westphalia and the post
Westphalia conception prioritizing human rights before state sovereignty.
Richard Falk identifies the plethora ofmeanings for ‘Westphalia’ contextualizing
the idea and its impact by identifying four components integral to it: Westphalia is
characterized as an event, an idea, a process, and a normative score sheet.22 The
event of Westphalia refers to the peace settlement, which flot only ended the
Thirty Years war, but aiso created a structural frame for world order and for the
establishment ofpeace. As an idea, Westphalia refers to the character of full
equality and participatory membership of ail states based on territorial integrity.
In terms ofprocess, Westphalia refers to the changing character of states in the
past 350 years since the treaty was negotiated, in order to consider the impact of
colonialism and decolonization, the advent ofweapons of mass destruction, the
establishment of international institutions, and the rise of globalization, inciuding
market forces. Finally, the normative score sheet refers to the success and failure
22 Richard Falk, “Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post Westphalia” in The Journal ofEthics:
An International Philosophical Review 6, no. 4 (2002): 312.
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of such a system to ensure peace, or shield governments from being accountable
for human rights abuses.23
David Chandier, a critic ofhumanitarian intervention, sees Westphalia as,
not the beginning of state sovereignty guaranteeing equality among states, but
sovereignty granted to only the most powerful states, leaving the weaker ones
with no protection against imperial powers. His criticism ofhumanitarian
intervention stems from what he sees as flot as the triumph of international justice
over the traditional daims of sovereignty, but rather the threat of sovereign
equality that is at risk. He explains in more detail:
It is, in other words, not sovereignty itself but sovereïgn
equaÏity—the recognition ofthe tegal parity ofnation-states,
i-egardless oftheir weaÏth orpower—which is being rargeted
the by new interventionists. Yet such equahty lias been the
constitutive principle of the entfre ftamework of existing
international law and of ail attempts, fragiie as they may be, to
estabhsh the ruie of ‘right’ over ‘might’ in regulating inter
state affairs.24 (emphasis added).
Chandier points out that while the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 recognized
secular rights as distinct from the religious daims ofthe Papacy, affording to
states no other power beyond that ofthe sovereign, this formai recognition ofthe
principle of territorial sovereignty extended only to the major powers. Because
sovereignty was limited to the great powers, with no regulating international law,
sovereign states were not bound by any agreements except for the voluntary ones
made between them. This, in effect, set the conditions for colonialism. While
Westphalia guaranteed the sovereignty of major powers, it failed to protect
smaller states. With the growth and maturation of international iaw, especially
23 Ibid., 312.
24 David Chandier, “Internationai Justice” The New LeJi Review 6, (Nov-Dec, 2000): 55.
1$
post WWII, the idea of sovereignty extended to ail states, ensuring equality
between them. ChandÏer makes the point that the new interventionists are flot
challenging sovereignty per se, but rather sovereign equaÏity with the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention because the policy will in effect only be applicable to
weaker states This, in effect, challenges the principle of equality flot only in
practice, but in theory as weil. This fact of inequality is fundamental to our
understanding of the international legal and political frame within which
humanitarian intervention seeks to find its place. Our full appreciation ofthis
inequality may do one oftwo things (or maybe both): first, it will reveal
something crucial to our understanding ofhow we view global international
relations in terms ofour actual commitment to plurality and equality; or it will
mirror our genuine assumptions about superiority vis à vis the rest of the world. It
may tum out that interventionists genuinely believe that some states are better off
running and policing the rest ofthe world. If this is the case, then interventionists
must face the challenge of framing their goals within cosmopolitan aspirations,
for cosmopolitanism in this sense really means imperialism, loyal to its Roman
origins, but problematic in terms of its universal appeal to the equal moral worth
of ah human beings.
To put the project ofhumanitarian intervention in opposition with the
principle of non-intervention in its recent historical context, two things must be
kept in mmd: the first thing is that the United States made every effort afier the
Second World War to deem any military action on foreign sou an act of
aggression, and punishable by law. Their role in the Nuremberg Trials focused
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primarily on ‘aggression as a war crime’ and they were quite explicit in flot only
defining it, but making it the supreme international crime, under which ail other
war crimes fail. Furthermore, they were instrumental in making this supreme
international crime punishable by law, bringing forward the project of
international justice for war criminals. Jonathon Bass notes that while we tend to
think of the Nuremberg Trials as motivated by our utmost honor at the atrocities
committed during the Holocaust, the focus, especially on the part ofthe leading
force for international justice, the United States, was flot the Holocaust itself, and
the atrocities that occurred during it, but rather the international crime of
aggression.25 That is to say that both the American’s involvement in the war, and
the ensuing effort to bring forth justice was primarily motivated by the
criminalization of aggression (or, the violation ofthe principle of non-
intervention). In effect, the American contribution to the Nuremberg Triais
helped estabuish and solidify what was customary law: that is, that the supreme
crime is the crime against peace, and that was defined as the “planning,
preparation, initiation and waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties”.26 The second thing to remember is that it was this
principie ofmiiitary intervention, indeed of ‘humanitarian’ intervention, which
Hitler used to justify lis aggressions. Because of this, the principle of non-
25 Jonathan Bass, Stay tue Hand of Vengeance (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000),
148.
26 Dominic MacGoldrick, Inc Donnelly, and Peter J. Rowe, eds., The Permanent International
Criminat Court: Legal and Poticy Issues (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004)
126. This quote is part cf an amendment made in Article VII(a) of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal to classify aggression flot as a crime ofwar, but rather a crime against thepeace,
which eventually became known as the ‘supreme international crime’.
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C intervention, and the legal and moral condemnation of force on forei sou was
implemented as foundational for a peaceful legal order.
This sets the foundation for the definition and historical context for
humanitarian military intervention. Having defined humanitarian intervention
primarily in ternis ofits motivation brings us to the first ofits problems: the
problem of motive. Much ofthe current literature on the debate about
humanitarian intervention has addressed the problem of motivation. b make the
challenge harder, I separate the issues into the following categories: the issue of
whose motivation we refer to when we talk about ‘motivation’, the issue of
motivation versus intention, the issue ofjudging the outcome as opposed to the
motive, and the issue ofrights versus duty. I do this in order to cÏarify the
problem, to reveal where the challenge has been met, and to illustrate where the
discourse has not adequately addressed the problem.
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Chapter II: Humanitarian Intervention and the Problem of Motive, Intention
and Inconsistency:
In this chapter, I will isolate and address the problem of motive as one of
the key challenges to humanitarian intervention. The first and foremost
complexity of the problem with humanitarian intervention stems directly from its
definition as a coercive military action for the purpose of ending massive human
rights abuses. The problem of motive poses serious problems to the concept of
humanitarian intervention because explicit in its definition is its express purpose,
which speaks to its motives. But to unravel the complexities ofwhat that means,
there are several interwoven issues that need to be separated and defined
precisely. The second problem ofhumanitarian intervention will be to deal with
how it derives its legitimacy. However, before launching into the problem of
legitimacy, I will need to address flot only what the problem of motive is but more
importantly how to understand the different issues implicit in it. I will separate
and deal with each ofthe issues in the following way:
1. 1 will identify whose motives we are referring to when we analyze the
problem of motive with a view to show that the “we” ofien expressed
conflates too many divergent interests.
2. I will distinguish motive from intent, beginning with traditional just
war theory. In the same section, I will include an analysis ofmixed
motives and the problem ofinconsistency. Here I will explore how a
number of authors defend mixed motives, drawing on the
motive/intention distinction, and from it I will show how a defense for
the inconsistency ofhumanitarian interventions is defended in the
literature.
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3. I will illustrate how some authors deal with the problem ofmixed
motives using the outcomes-oriented approach.
4. Finally, I will give an account ofthe problem ofthe right to inteiwene
versus the duty to intervene, and I will show how this poses a problem
for the problem of inconsistency.
Dealing with these issues is a precursor to the larger issues of legitimacy.
Afier addressing some preliminary problems set up by the problem of motive, I
can delve into the larger issue of legitimacy which will set the context for an
analysis ofhow the idea of cosmopolitanism plays into the problem of
intervention.
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II-i: Whose motives constitute the ‘we’?:
The first issue refers to the distinction between the advocates of
humanitarian interventions (like academics in the field ofpolitical philosophy)
and those who implement them (like top level politicians). Further, there are a
number of different players at the international scale above and beyond state
leaders. In our contemporary understanding of liberal democracies we tend to see
our govemments as representing the will ofthe people, at least in theory. But that
is too simple, and it leaves out too many fine particularities. In one sense, the
difference between the people and the governments of the people may seem
irrelevant; however the distinction is important if only for practical or
epistemological reasons. First, we have access to our own motivations in ways
that are distinctly different when it cornes to assessing our politician’s motives,
and this is not a trivial point in the debate about humanitarian intervention. In
other words, we do flot have access to the motivations of those who are making
concrete decisions about how, when, and why to solve (or try to solve) a regional
conflict with the use of force. Second, when we assess regional confticts as
individual members of a Western liberal democracy, we are flot weighing other,
greater, geo-political, economical, and strategic ramifications ofthose conflicts.
Humanitarian atrocities speak to us at a guttural level, our response is intuitively
emotional, hence genuine compassion tends to motivate citizens of the world
(cosmopolitans) who urge their governments to act in a military capacity. But
oflen we speak in terms ofwhat “we” should do and for what reasons, as though
that will is immediately and effortlessly, transported to the agents representing us.
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C In making this distinction, I insist on upholding the integrity of the motivations of
advocates ofhumanitarian intervention, and I neyer doubt their genuine concem
for humanity, but I caution those advocates to question those in a position to
implement these policies. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of those who are
able to implement those policies, flot the genuine intentions ofthe people whose
moral urge is to save humanity. But even that is too crude, too simplistic a
division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and I do flot think that it fairly portrays the
gradation away from or toward genuinely altruistic motivations. Finally, there is
the fact of differing levels of interested parties when it cornes to regional conflicts
and the weight their interests carry against their motivations. We must distinguish
who it is we refer to when we speak of “our” motivations for humanitarian
interventions. further, il is necessary to define, or at least have a mechanism to
distinguish between flot only politician’s motivations, but the different levels of
politicians, as well as non-govemmental interests, like corporate ones. And
finally, we need to understand how these interests get weighed and valued when
assessing the problem of motive.
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II-ii: Motive Versus Intention:
The second issue, that of motive versus intention, refers to the distinction
made by some authors between the motive of an action and the purpose of an
action. Humanitarian intervention is defined as coercive military action “for the
purpose ofpreventing or putting to a hait gross and massive violations ofhuman
rights or international humanitarian law”.27 The definition of the doctrine is
entirely dependent upon ils purpose. It derives its iegitimacy from the purpose of
its action. If this purpose did flot exist, the action in itself wouid be aggression,
and by customary law, as weil as the specific stipulations of the UN Charter, flot
only strictiy illegal, but unjustifiable, and therefore illegitimate. So if the oniy
thing separating a military action from the illegaiity and immoraiity of aggression
is the purpose for which the action has been launched (humanitarian), precise and
detailed attention must be given to it. Specifically, the problem of motive refers
to the fact that if interventionists cannot show what their govemment’s real
purpose or motive is, they cannot make daims for Ïegitimacy of the action. This
gives rise to the problem of motive.
The route to dealing with this probiem is to map out just-war theory. This
approach has historicai roots in St. Augustine’s writings as eariy as the
5th
century. St Augustine introduced a criterion to justify the waging of war on the
basis ofjust cause and intention. According to Christian moral theory, the
justness of an action could be judged by evaluating the driving intention. The
‘just war tradition’ lays out the foundation to what can be used, and indeed is
used, as a modei for humanitarian intervention. This tradition treats war as a
27 Humanitarian Intervention, DUPI, 11.
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necessary evil, with strict requirements as to what are considered just reasons for
going into war, or,jus ad bellum. These requirements are that war can be
declared only under the following conditions:
1. Itis alastresort.
2. It is launched with the right intention.
3. It is for ajust cause.
4. It has a reasonable hope ofsuccess.
5. It is used with means proportioned to its envisioned ends.
6. It is order by the right authorities.
The defense against aggression has great moral force when framed in terms of
defending oneseif against violent attack any way possible. But humanitarian
intervention posed a challenge to the traditional jus ad betium, which quickly
found its way into the frame of necessary evil by appealing to the moral force of
the analogous state which intervenes in a private home to protect a child from an
abusive family. Humanitarian intervention, then, finds its home injus ad beÏÏum
by grounding a defense in the rescue ofpeople who are flot in a position to help
themseÏves. The ‘rescue’ mission is on beha1fof for the purpose of’, helping ‘the
other’, and therefore, can find a home injust war theory, where there is just cause,
it is motivated by right intention, and it is a last resort.
Motive, then, is the only justification for the morality (the legitimacy of
the action) and by extension the legality ofthe action, making it, therefore, a
crucial piece of information. However, it is a crucial piece of information we, as
citizens supporting or criticizing our govemments for their action, do not have
access to. ‘Motive’ is essentially a private thing. The implication is that we
require govemments to make decisions on the basis of something essentially
private, to which we have no access, and we require them to make those decisions
27
C on the basis of something manifestly moral as opposed to something legal. This
becomes a tricky issue in terms of interpretation. Or, as GentiÏi put it SO well,
“Whether or not it is necessary for the justice of a war that the leader have a good
motive [...] is a matter for theologians”.28 It is flot so much that govemments
cannot take morality into consideration when they act, but rather that once we
enter the debate about the right thing to do, we open up a quagmire of
interpretation and analysis from which no easy, or even perhaps correct answer
will emerge. And yet, this is the criteria upon which we define the terms of
foreign military intervention.
Grotius made an important distinction, however, between intention and
just cause. Richard Bellamy also addresses this problem by separating motive
from intention—something he says philosophers have up until now mistakenly
collapsed.29 They can be different in the sense that one has self-interested
motives, but publicly declares particular intentions which serve as public goals.
Bellamy treats the problem as such, and I will include his contribution to the
distinction as well. I will frame the problem in terms of ‘mixed motives’, and that
will be addressed shortly. By separating motive from intention, Bellamy
addresses two problems for interventionists: in the first case, he bypasses the
problem ofthe inaccessibility of motive. Motives, he says, are subjective and can
be easily disguised. This is distinguished from public intentions which he daims
we can evaluate with at least more precision than motives. Bellamy explains that
“although evaluating intentions is a far from exact science, it is possible to
2$ Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)1, IV, paragraph 4$.
29 Alex Bellamy, “Motives, outcomes, intent and the Iegitimacy of humanitarian intervention”
Journal ofliutitaiy Ethics 3, no. 3 (November, 2004): 222.
2$
achieve at least a proximate view by analyzing justifications, alternative
explanations, and the strategies employed”.3° This allows for the possibility of
‘mixed motives’: while governrnents may have their own self-interested motives
for singling out a particular region for intervention, as long as the publicly
declared intention passes public scrutiny, it does not really matter what motivates
the action. By separating the essentially private motive from the explicitly public
intention, Bellamy allows for the inaccessibility of motive in that the motive
becomes irrelevant. By elevating the status of intention as primarily important
and by putting it in the realm of public scrntiny, Bellamy resolves the problem of
motive. Like Gentili, he agrees that assessing the motives of statesmen is a
subject for theologians, or presumably those who have access to divine
knowledge. The rest of us can measure and weigh the public intention against the
action taken and assess the truth or falsity ofthe statesman’s daim for legitimacy
using discernable and concrete criteria. In offering this as a solution, I will show
how Bellamy also deals with the problem ofinconsistency. I will therefore
include an analysis ofhow Bellamy deals with inconsistency within the reaim of
the problem of motive.
The second ofthe two problems Bellamy sets out to resolve with lis
motive/intention distinction is then, the problem of inconsistency. Govemments
have been criticized for intervening in some places where human rights abuses are
prevalent, but not in others, where the situation might be worse. One ofthe
explanations for the inconsistency of governments to intervene militarily in the
human rights abuses of some places and not others is that having mixed motives is
30 Ibid., 224.
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not only acceptable, it might even be considered morally required. Citizens who
fail to adhere to the idea of a cosmopolitan impartiality when it cornes to putting
the lives of their soldiers at risk might demand, justifiably so, that they want their
interests served as well as serving the interests ofhurnanity before they participate
in a military intervention. And indeed it would make a stronger case for an
intervening govemment for why they should be conducting a military operation in
a foreign land which is flot attacking them if they could provide alist of good self
interested reasons, as well as altruistic intentions in the process. In that sense,
public declarations about self-interested motives may enter the sphere of
discourse. ‘Mixed motives’ is therefore notonly a fact, but a generally
unproblematic one for most people. Stiil, this only applies to the publicly
declared intentions. There remain the private motives, to which we have no
access. However the same rules apply as with mixed motives: as long as the
undeclared motive does not interfere with the shared and public intention, we can
allow for them. In this way we can separate the (private) motive and the (public)
intention. The motive remains essentially private, and the intention becomes the
public declaration—the public promise, as it were. The problem of inconsistency
is addressed by the fact that just because governments have a right to intervene
and save people from distress, they stiil are not required to. There is no
conelating duty to intervene. They can choose, according to their own needs, in
which cases they will and will flot intervene to spare a population from human
rights abuses. R seems heartless, (perhaps because in a very real sense it is
heartless), but it remains a fact that just because a state might feel morally obliged
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to intervene, no such legal or moral duty3’ exists where they must intervene.
Later I will show how and why this is a problem.
Anthony Ellis is another author who believes that it is a misconception to
require that a state has no self-interest when intervening in another state for
‘humanitarian’ reasons, and that up until now, it has wrongly been put forth that a
state must flot have any self-interest when intervening for ‘humanitarian’
reasons.32 He does not see a problem with being both self-interested and helpful at
the same time. Ellis argues that we judge the action and flot the agent acting. He
makes a distinction between intention and motivation by way of an analogy: if a
person intervenes to help a child from being bullied, that action is right and
should 5e encouraged, even if the motivation for helping the chuld was to impress
a girifriend. This has some appeal on a micro level, but if we look at states acting
on an international level, then the stakes become much higher. Motivation is
much more serious than impressing a girifriend. Geopolitical, economic, and
military interests are not only powerful and compelling forces, but they may
determine the intention, thereby inventing the intention. For example, if the
stakes are high enough, a bad situation can be played up, exaggerated, or even
created in order to justify otherwise illegal military action, or, ‘aggression’. The
risk is that the importance ofthe motive outweighs the intention. Ellis is right
31 While the ICISS document, “The Responsibility to Protect” suggests that there may be times
when militaty intervention is a moral duty, it is flot, and for practical purposes cannot 5e a legal
obligation or duty. The question of when military intervention is a moral duty is then subject to
interpretation.
32 Ellis is refen-ing to arguments put forth by Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck in
International Law and the Ue ofForce. Beyond the UN Charter Faradigm (London: Routledge,
1993), 94, and Sean D Murphy also argues that a humanitarian intervention must beprimarily
motivated by humanitarian concem in Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an
Evolving World Order (Philadelphia, PA: University ofPennsylvania Press, 1996), 15.
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C when he daims that “there is littie hope that in the foreseeable mre states
intervene wholly or even primarily out ofhumanitarian motives”.33 If we create
this action-agent distinction, rendering motive as trivial as impressing a girifriend,
we risk the grave injustice ofnot only inconsistency and hypocrisy, but also the
greater danger of brutality in the name ofhumamty.
We could best resolve the conceptual problem if we can determine
whether an act can be both self-interested and altruistic at the same time. If
‘altruistic’ is defined as exclusively other-directed interests and intentions, then
they are flot simultaneously possible. More precisely, however, we must
determine whether an act can be both good for the actor and for the recipient of
the action. On a micro level, this is not only conceptually possible, but practicaÏly
preferable. One is most successful and efficient when one is able to both help
oneselfand others with the same action. A deep analysis of motivation is almost
banal. The question is whether it is possible to transfer this micro idea on a macro
level. Chris Brown daims that we indeed can. He confronts the realist critics by
suggesting that they create a false problem when they daim that “once reference
is made to national interests “morality” cannot be accommodated.”34 What makes
the relationship so conceptually different that we cannot apply the same principle
to international relations? It is flot simply the gravity ofthe motivation that
differentiates individual moral persons from international moral persons. One
problem has to do with what was pointed out earlier—that is, it has to do with
Anthony Ellis, “War, Revolution, and Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian
Intervention, ed. Aleksandar Jokic New York: Broadview Press, 2003), 18.
Brown, Chris, “Selective humanitarianism: in defense of inconsistency” in Ethics and foreign
Intervention, eds., Deen K. Chatteijee and Don E. Scheid (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 39.
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(Z whose motivations we are considering. We have to establish whose interests are
at play when important decisions like the military intervention in a sovereign state
are being made. It is necessary to make a distinction between the politician’s
motives, the will ofthe people, and non-govemmental interests like corporate
ones. The more we put “motivation” under the microscope, the further away and
vaguer the notion of”humanitarian intention” becomes.
But, as Fuis suggests, does it matter if the motivation is wrong, just as
long as the act ïtselfis right? My response is that there is a conceptual problem
with the word “humanitarian” pinned to “intervention” because that syntactical
order defines the both the motivation and intention of the action in the sense that
the former must influence the latter, and if it does then that makes the motivation
primary, the intention secondary. In other words, I reject Bellamy’s strict
separation of motive and intention because ofthe influential relationship ofthe
former onto the latter. If the ‘intention’ is humanitarian at heart, then it must be
primary. If we refer to the definitions provided for humanitarian intervention we
see that ail include in their premise that the action is intended for humanitarian
reasons. The (self-interested) motivation can then only be secondary, like a
positive side effect. In terms ofthe weight of motivation, compare the triviality of
a person wanting to impress someone, and decisions that wiÏÏ have miÏitary,
economic, political, and environmental ramifications. Ellis’ analogy loses
credibility when framed in light of global politics. If the motivation carnes
within it powerful and global interests, it can neyer seriously be treated as an
afier-thought, or as secondary. And if it takes precedence to the action deemed
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C humanitarian, then is no longer primarily humanitarian, but rather secondarily
humanitarian (or thirdly, or fourthly, or perhaps flot at ail humanitarian). It would
be more appropriate then, to say that a military intervention is taking place, with
consequences, which may or may flot be humanitarian. (The outcomes-oriented
approach will try to deal with the problem using this as a frame, and it will
introduce new challenges). However, we cannot cail it “humanitarian” if the
‘human’ element ofthe analysis serves as an afier-thought. Then it is cailed war.
The tools we need to frame a conceptual understanding of this kind ofmilitary
intervention are to distinguish between what, if anything, constitutes legitimate or
justified violence.
Mark Stem offers another perspective. He argues that wars are launched
one way or another, and those wars are justîfied publicly, even when the
justifications are false. He argues that in light ofthis fact, it is better for a self
interested intervention to be called “humanitarian” than what it is usuaiiy called—
namely, “seif-defense”. While he admits there is a danger of abuse in that states
wili launch wars they cali humanitarian that they would have launched regardless
ofhumanitarian concems, he does not see this as a problem. It is unfortunate
when states launch ‘bad wars’, but this reality continues to be a fact whether
under the auspices of ‘humanitarian’ goals or not. Stem suggests, like Bellamy,
that by calling interventions ‘humanitarian’, the intervening state has piedged to
help the citizens ofthat state, and however hypocritical this may sound, they are
not only bound by that pledge, but this public declaration may moderate their
behavior in the intervened state. Interventions for reasons of ‘seif-defense’
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(J (however contrived that defense may be) are flot bound by any such obligations.
He believes that a declaration ofhumanitarian intention will be enforced upon the
state by other states in that it is a public promise for which the intervening state
can be held accountable.35 Stem makes this daim, and it seems reasonable, but
there is no evidence to suggest that it is true. While compelling, there is little or
no actual responsibility to fulfiul that promise and ftirther, nowhere to tum to
when states fail to keep their public promise. for example, the utter devastation
in the former Yugoslavia during the 78-day military campaign testifies to the lack
of accountability of that public promise. According to Human Rights Watch
reports, humanitarian violations could have been avoided or reduced if the United
States had not used depleted uranium and cluster bombs, and if they had avoided
bombing bridges by day, civilian convoys, villages, hospitals, and most famously,
the radio station employed by civilians. Amnesty International declared that the
flying ofNATO’s 38 000 sorties 15 000 feet above ground to protect its aircrafts
and pilots, made adherence to international law “virtually impossible”.36 It does
flot appear that the U.S. declaration for a humanitarian war compelled them to
“moderate” their behavior as Stem suggests. There is a practical problem with
waiting until the military action is over to assess it. According to Stein’s
argument, because a public declaration has been made, there will be
accountability, but the question remains as to who will hold intervening states
accountable for their actions. In an ideal world, something like the 1CC could be
Mark Stem, “Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention” Social Phitosophy and Policy
Foundation 21, no. 1 (Jan. 2004): 34.
36 Marjorie Cohn, “The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo” in Lessons ofKosovo: The
Dangers ofHumanitarian Intervention, ed., Meksandar Jokic (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003)
121.
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C a mechanism through which such accountability wiÏl 5e held, but given that the
U.S., the state most likely to be the intervening force, has not ratified the Rome
Stamte of the 1CC, there is littie likelihood that they would ever be held
accountable for their actions. The ICTY is another example ofwhere an
international legal body refused to consider charges of war crimes according to its
own rules, and the reason they gave was because they were ‘satisfied’ with NATO
reports regarding their conduct during the war. Or as Jamie Shea, NATO
spokesperson has claimed, NATO are the fflends ofthe ICTY.37 Again, this
leaves littie hope for impartial international justice and accountability for the
investigation of war crimes. The public needs to be assured that there are better
mechanisms for public accountability.
Until this point, I have shown how Bellamy (in the tradition of Grotius and
Gentili) Ellis, Stem, and Brown have ah tried to deal with both mixed motives and
inconsistency. While they have each taken steps in an effort to resolve these
problems, I have tried to show how the answers do not resolve the problems in
their entirety, but rather they deal with parts ofthe problem. Another approach,
advocated by Prado, and most forcefully argued by Wheeler, has been to do away
with the motive/intention problemldistinction altogether and simply look at the
resuits ofthe intervention. Ibis is referred to as the ‘outcomes oriented’
approach, and I will address it next. It too will reveal some deep problems with
accountability. I will argue that the outcomes-oriented approach does nothing to
Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Se/Determination, and
Intervention (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Lexington Books: 2003), 265.
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advance the cause for humanitarian intervention because of some of the
irresolvable challenges with accountability.
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C) II-iii: Mixed Motives and the Outcomes Oriented Approach:
Eiizabeth Prado makes an even bolder daim when she asserts that flot oniy
is it unnecessary for the motives of a state to be altruistic (that is, humanitarian,
or, other-directed) it is in factpreferable to be motivated by national self-interest
(that is, non humanitarian motives). She daims that non-humanitarian motives
play an important role in the selection ofthe means and strategies for intervention,
and that self-jnterested interventions are more successful than aitruistic
interventions for this very reason. Her case example is East Timor where in 1999
an Australian ied intervention successfiully ended 25 years of brutal human rights
abuses, making possible the independence of East Timor on May 20, 2002. Her
daim is that non-humanitarian motives are stronger than humanitarian ones (if
they exist at ail) and that because these non-humanitarian motives are stronger,
they determine the risk, cost and commitment a state is wiiling to take, thereby
determining the outcome. (This wiil be considered and criticized further with
Wheeler’ s outcome-oriented approach). However, the Australian intervention
differs from most other examples of ‘humanitarian intervention’ not only by its
success, but by some criticai conditions without which Australia would flot have
acted. Those conditions are ta) that there be a Security Council Mandate, (b) that
the deployment be a short-term one, (c) that the force should have a strong
regionai component, (d) and (what I view as the condition which distinguishes it
from other interventions) that the operation must have the consent of Indonesia.38
The fact that Australia had the consent of Indonesia puts this case in an entirely
Elizabeth Prado, “Humanitarian Intervention: Successful outcomes without humanitarian
motives? hidonesia, Australia and intervention in East Timor” (PhD diss., Department of
Govemment, University of Essex, Political Studies Association, 2004), 7.
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(J different category, and perhaps does flot qualify it as ‘humanitarian intervention’.
Most definitions of ‘humanitarian intervention’ specify coercive action, as
opposed to cooperative action.
What Prado’s argument successfully shows is that when a state has self
interest, it is more likely that its mission wiÏl be successful because the state is
willing to commit itselffinancially and otherwise to the project. It may be that in
the case of East Timor there were humanitarian ramifications, but nothing in ber
argument shows that there needed to be any positive humanitarian results
necessariïy. By lier own depiction ofthe situation, Australia had enjoyed good
relations with the Indonesian govemment at the expense ofhundreds ofthousands
of the East Timorese. When it became strategically important for them to act in
favour of the East Timorese, they did so. This case cannot serve as a model for
the validity or necessity of humanitarian interventions in international relations.
This example shows how in one case there were positive outcomes to self
interested intervention that was intemationally sanctioned, regionaÏly enacted and
domestically supported both by the states intervening and the state being
intervened. While Prado supports humanitarian intervention that is in fact self
interested intervention with positive humanitarian benefits, she ends lier paper
with an observation about the ensuing negotiations between Australia and East
Timor for sharing maritime resources: “. . .humanitarianism ends where self
interest starts”.39 Her closing remarks invalidate her initial daim that an
intervention can be (or rather preferably be) self-interested if it is to have a
positive humanitarian outcome.
Ibid, 21.
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(E’ In his book Saving Strangers40, Nicholas Wheeler makes the demands for
humanitarian intervention much less stringent. Similar to Prado’s example, he
argues there is no need for a humanitarian motivation as long as there is a
humanitarian outcome, bypassing ail the problems reiated to epistemological
uncertainty, the weighing, accounting for, or finaliy deciaring of motive.
Following the just-war tradition, Wheeler sets up the conditions for which a
humanitarian intervention is required namely, “supreme international
emergency”, the exhaustion of ail peaceful methods ofresolution; the mie of
proportionality; and a strong expectation that the intervention will lead to a
positive humanitarian outcome.41 The motivation is really irrelevant, and to show
this, Wheeler analyses the few cases of intervention that did occur during the Cold
War period, during which period international disapproval for intervention
dominated the political scene: India’s intervention in East Pakistan; Tanzania’s
intervention in Uganda; and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia. With the
exception of Vietnam, which partly used humanitarian justifications for their
invasion, none ofthese military actions invoked the use of ‘humanitanan
intervention, yet Wheeler argues, ail ofthem had humanitarian outcomes.
Yherefore, he concludes, we should look primarily at humanitarian outcomes, and
flot to intentions when we judge the military action.
Like Stem, he believes that words matter: the public declaration (intent)
espousing human rights principles act like a promise. That promise contains
within it a public guarantee against brutal aggression and for humanitarian relief.
40 Wheeler, 21-52.
Ibid., 33-37.
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It requires that governments act within a normative frarne for the purpose of
advancing the goals ofhuman rights. But this is to simplify the political,
economic and social context of, as well as the cause ofthe humanitarian crisis. If
the problem is ftamed only in terms ofhuman rights, it creates the problem of
isolating the conflict primarily in terms of only a human rights crisis, and not a
crisis within a greater political context. The failure to appreciate the conflict in its
entirety will directly impact the success or failure ofthe project, and also the
sustainability of the peace instilled by force. Violent resurgence is likely if a
greater analysis ofthe problem was flot made prior to the conflict, and that
requires implicating the international players in the scene. If we were to bypass
motive or intent altogether, and look toward a positive-outcome approach, it
seems we would have littie to go in terms ofpredicting its success or failure. This
is to say nothing ofthe problem of defining what a positive humanitarian outcome
is, or what one cails a failed one. This critique of the whole project of
humanitarian intervention suggests that failed humanitarian intervention is de
facto ‘aggression’. That has ftmndarnentally important ramifications for
international law. The problem is that when motive and intent are no longer
necessary to defend, and no humanitarian outcome is apparent, the intervening
state might in fact be an aggressor, but if so, we need a viable mechanism for that
act of aggression to be punishable in international law. This is what Kant cails the
hardest problem ofwho will be the ruler ofthe nilers. The question is about
whether we can expect a fair and impartial international court to scrutinize the
military actions ofintervening forces afier an intervention is complete. The
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(Z’ evidence suggests that a belief in the impartiality toward intervening powers at the
international level is hopelessly najve. One ofthejustifications given by David
Scheffer (US lawyer and ambassador at large for war crimes) for the refusai ofthe
United States to ratify the Rome Statue is this:
The illogical consequence.. . will be to limit severely those
lawful, but highly controversial and inherently risky,
interventions that the advocates of human rights and world
peace so desperately seek from the United States and other
military powers. There will be significant new legal and
political risks in such interventions, which up to this point
have been mostly shielded from politically motivated
charges.42
In one sense, Scheffer is very right: he daims that we cannot expect the United
States to launch into ‘highiy controversial’ interventions if it is going to be subject
to international law, but on the other hand, lie says, the world demands oftlie
United States do just that. This is a serious problem for interventionists to handie.
On the one hand they want to maintain the integrity of international law and
order, but on the other, ffiey need to make exceptions wlien they deem them
appropriate. However, whule Scheffer daims that the interventions would 5e
‘legai’, it is really only the intervening states who wouid decide wlien those
exceptions wouid be legal. Hence, there is no mechanism for the accountability
for the intervening states. This makes the outcomes-oriented approach
fundamentally flawed.
Further, and most importantly, the further away from humanitarian the
motives, are, the Iess likely intervening states will be equipped to deal with the
very liard problem of post-war transition, in terms of enabling the state to recover
42 David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminat Court: National Sectirity and
International Law, eds, Sarah B. Sewail and Cari Kaysen (Maryiand:Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 2000) 12, 19.
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(J ftom the devastation ofwar and to stand on its own in the international
community. Unless the intervening state plans to act as an occupying force, the
job of state rebuilding is a costly and complicated one. It seems to me that there
would have to be a strong humanitarian motive to want to be involved in that
endeavor. Finally, what remains an important point of contention in Wheeler’ s
argument is the problem ofhow to deal with interventions which did not yield a
humanitarian outcome. The f egal questions pertains to whether interventions that
are shown to have no humanitarian resuits are failed interventions or acts of
aggression, and then the further question would be what the status ofthose two
things are in international law. International law must have a clear response to
this othenvise we have no mechanism for making aggressors accountable for
failed interventions or for acts of aggression. As it stands, international law cannot
even accommodate the very act of a declared ‘humanitarian intervention’, much
less failed interventions. furthermore, the status of ‘aggression’ is stiil being
debated: that problem is flot deait with because ‘humanitarian’ interventions can
be interpreted to sound too much like aggression when we try to define them.
Having touched upon some of the fundamental problems with the
mofive/intention distinction, the problem ofmixed motives and inconsistency, and
finally the possibility of an outcomes-oriented approach, I will mm to the greater
underlying problem ofinconsistency which is ftamed in terms ofrights and
duties. With this, I will conclude the chapter on the problem of motive, intention
and inconsistency. I will then continue with the problems with daims to
legitimacy.
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c:’ II-iv: Rights versus Duties and the Inconceivability of Inconsistency:
While Kant poses a challenge to the use of force within a conceptual
frame, and while international law may pose a challenge on legal grounds, is there
a moral defense for hurnanitarian intervention which is neither conceptual nor
legal at heart? In other words, are there good moral reasons why one must
intervene on humanitarian grounds, despite its conceptual or legal difficulties and
inconsistencies?
Let us begin by framing the question in terms ofwhat the moral force is
behind hurnanitarian intervention. This is to ask what demands it makes, and
what daims those demands have on us. I want to address what makes the idea of
humanitarian intervention so morally compelling that one wants to err on the side
of military action rather than on the side of inaction. Rwanda immediately comes
to mmd. The moral force lies in the desire to stop evil wherever and whenever we
corne across it, despite legal, conceptual or territorial boundaries. Once the moral
force behind the daim is established, we must address this: is humanitarian
intervention a right then, or a duty? Coady makes that distinction when he daims
that there may be a right without a duty, meaning that it would be morally
permissible to intervene but not obligatory. He makes the distinction by noticing
that while discussions about intervention have to do primarily with permissibility
(legality) of an action, at some point they must also include the duty to act,
otherwise the argument of consistency could neyer be applied. That argument of
consistency refers to the charge that if there were real humanitarian concems, then
we camot ignore remote, geo-politically unimportant parts ofthe planet, while
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focusing on other more strategically relevant places. If we believe in the moral
force behind the daim to humanitarian intervention, it is no longer morally
possible, even conceptually coherent to continue to accept the response of ‘mixed
motives’ to justify the intervention in one place, but not in another. The moral
force ofthe argument does not accommodate mixed motives in the way
governments need us to accept.
Jovan Babic makes an interesting and compelling daim when he states
that a right to inteiwene must mean a duty to intervene.43 His argument is as
follows: the ‘right’ to intervene is not the same as its ‘justification’. Every state
has a justification for wanting to intervene in another. A justification is simply
the reasons why one has interest in an intervention. Not to have a justification for
intervening in a state would be the same as flot having a reason to intervene, and
that is inconceivable. What distinguishes a ‘right’ to intervene from having a
justification to intervene has to do with the moral justificability of an intervention.
However there is a danger of collapsing the moral with the legal. There are good
moral reasons to ensure that law is flot conflated with morality:
These reasons provide that whatever law amounts to, it ought to be “our
law”, i.e., it ought to give expression to a free democratic will ofsome
people who are seif-goveming (and flot subjugated under foreign rule
without its consent). An “excess of morality,” particularly if this
“excess” finds its expression in law, leads to the road toward
fiindamentalism and totalitarianism because the “replacement” cf law
by morality is a process that may lead to the elimination of law.44
Further, Babic distinguishes two kinds ofrights: the kind that one lias and may
forsake freely, and the kind that is bound by duty. In the former case, one may
u Jovan Babic, “foreign Armed Intervention: Between Justified Aid and Illegal Violence” in
Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues (New York: Broadview Press, 2003)
50.
‘ Ibid., 50.
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C have a right to sign this contract, or to apply for that position, but one chooses flot
to sign or appÏy. The latter deals with the “right” to intervention:
This right, if it is one, would flot 5e one that could
freely be forsaken, for it would flot be aprirnafacie
riglit, but a right based on a sort of exception: the
priorprimafacie prohibition ofprecisely the sort of
action that is here claimed as a “right”, i.e., the
principled prohibition of intervention.4
Put differently, if one has a right to do something otherwise prohibited, then one
has flot only a nght, by means of the justification for the exception, but a
concurrent duty to exercise that right. This is exemplified in the case of a child
being assaulted by someone. We flot only have the right to restrain the aggressor,
violentÏy if need be, but we have the duty to do so. The exception to the case,
(that is, the justification for the exception) provides the concurrent duty. If we
have a right to humanitarian intervention, we have also a duty based on the
antecedent general primafacie duty ofnonintervention. Therefore the kind of
right entitled to an intervening state is flot the regular ldnd ofright (which can be
exercised or not) but rather that in a concrete case, there is compelling reason to
act in an otherwise unjustified way. Since discourse on ‘humanitarian
intervention’ has been so difficuit to defend in terms ofwhether a state could
justify having a ‘right’ to enter coercively in a foreign state, the new doctrine
replacing some of the problems with the old puts the emphasis not on ‘rights to’
but ‘responsibility of, and that can be found in the newer, revised version of
‘humanitarian intervention’ doctrines, the responsibility to protect. This solves
the problem ofjustifying military intervention on the one hand, but it creates a
whole slew of other problems, because now there is no defense for inconsistency.
ibid., 50.
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And yet, whule we can make recommendations that states act in times of
humanitarian crisis, we cannot demand of states that they must act to protect
foreign citizens.
If the right to intervention exists in cases where appalling hurnan rights
abuses are systernatic, and that right is accompanied by the duty to intervene, then
the 1990’s were fraught with neglected duties: Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kurdistan,
Burma, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sudan, Burundi and Angola. If duties
accompany rights, and if we are consistent in our duties, we must act wherever
and whenever we corne across human rights violations.
Chris Brown defends inconsistency in a number ofways. The most
conventional responses are that we cannot right every wrong, and that even if we
could, far frorn creating the conditions for peace and stability threats to global
unrest and chaos would be irnrninent. Taken one at a time, is it an adequate
charge to say that if we cannot act in every place we cannot act in any place?
Would that flot be the same as saying if we cannot arrest every criminal, we
should flot arrest any? The analogy does not hold because the law (exemplified
on a micro-level) is applied universally (to all citizens of a state) and the
application of the law sometimes fails as is the case when a criminal successfully
evades the law. A failure in the system means that we tried and failed. Rwanda,
Tibet, Kurdistan are flot moral failures of the United Nations, as Kofi Anan has
repeatedly claimed (specifically about Rwanda). They were neyer (humanitarian)
concems. There were other concems, but flot humanitarian ones. failure implies
that sornething was attempted, and that something failed. failure is what happens
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(J when the police officer chases the criminal and the criminal out-runs him. On a
global scale, not only were the police neyer chasing the bad guys, they were
sometimes running with them. As I will show, international organizations are not
only guilty of flot acting in times of crisis, but sometimes, they are implicated in
the conftict. This shakes the foundation of our frame for humanitarian
intervention in that we tend to understand conflicts only in terms of clear, distinct
divisions between us and them. The Iack of concem for humanity is perhaps what
is meant by a ‘moral failure’, but the gravity ofthe injustice stems flot only from
the absence of anything near humanitarian concern, but also from political and
economic decisions which fail to prioritize human rights, and definitively not
from the absence ofmilitary action. This idea will be further explored in “The
Narrative Frame” where I make the daim, and map out the ways in which the
international comrnunity is guilty flot of inaction in Rwanda, but of the wrong
kind of action.
The second response that if we could act on every human rights violation
in the world, global disorder and uniest would resuit is a valid one. But it points
to the method ofresolving dispute rather than the idea that human rights
violations must 5e addressed consistently. As Iris Young points out, humanitarian
intervention should not only mean military intervention, primarily because the
military operation usually causes more destruction than it prevents.46 There are
other, more effective ways of encouraging cooperation in a global context. I say
‘effective’ because the report card for stability and success ofmilitary operations
‘ Iris Marion Young, “Violence Against Power: Critical Ihoughts on Military Intervention” in
Ethics and foreign Intervention, 252.
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C is poor. Young draws on Arendt to form an important distinction between power
and violence,47 ofien mistakenly collapsed by politicians. The inability to act on
humanitarian crises consistently because ofthe chaos it would create does flot
attest to lack of a moral requirement for the prevention or cessation ofhuman
rights violations, but rather to the means by which that prevention is being
enacted.
Brown develops furthers his defense of inconsistency in humanitarian
interventions by arguing that consistency is not “as prevalent in moral reasoning
as might be expected.”48 He rejects rule-based moral theories like those
advocated by Kantians and utilitarians. Instead, he makes an argument for the use
of an Aristotelean approach which is an agent-centred morality emphasizing the
cultivation of one’s facilities for making moral judgments. The problem is that
the ‘agent’ Brown is referring to is the government ofa state. In this sense, we
must treat the government as a moral agent in an Aristotelean manner. I am flot
sure that ‘people as moral agents’ and ‘states as moral agents’ is analogous. It is
not in the raison d ‘etre for govemments to be cultivating their facility for making
moral judgments. Their job is much more crude, the fine edges of moral thought
blunted by vulgar concems like power, territory, economy. Governments are not
instruments for refinement. Their job, assigued to them by their electorates, is to
organize the affairs ofthe state domestically and abroad in their own national
interests. (And if they could get that right we should be well satisfied). Now it
may be argued that the electorate cails on their government to concem themselves
Ibïd, 253-266.
48 Brown, 41.
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C with the condition of citizens in other countries, and to act on behalfofpeople
who cannot act for themselves. This is flot only conceivable, but a fact reflected
in the demands made by the people. The fact of inconsistency however points in
a government’ s inability (either for lack of will or lack of ability) to act on behaif
of foreign nationals. Brown defends the inconsistency with the following two
analogies. One refers to the inconsistency ofmaking some harmful substances
illegal (cannabis, heroin, and cocaine) whule others are legal (tobacco, and
alcohol). He argues that all ofthe mentioned substances are harmful, and yet only
a few, arbitrarily chosen are actuaÏly illegal. The other example he refers to is the
purchase of self-created newspapers for the profit ofhomeless people. He argues
that we make arbitrary decisions about from whom to buy the newspapers when
and why, when there are fourteen homeless people on any given trip from A to 3.
I think both examples are weak and do not illustrate clearly the gravity of dealing
with human rights abuses globally.
In the first example, the harmful substances listed are not necessarily
parallel and Brown does not even really attempt to show that they are. But, if one
could argue successfully that cannabis is no more harmful than cigarettes or
(excessive) alcohol (and many people do argue this) it does not follow that the
decision to keep it an illegal substance is inconsistent. Instead, one could show
that there are political motivations keeping marijuana illegal (a strong, voting
‘religious right’ may withhold support from any govemment that would legalize
it). Others have argued that there are economic interests in keeping marijuana
illegal. In any case, those decisions may be as poÏitically motivated, and self
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(J’ interested as are the decisions to intervene in one state as opposed to another. The
inconsistency is flot arbitrary, but rather deliberate. This is important in assessing
human rights abuses.
The second example is a poor one because a person who decides to help
the homeless by buying a newspaper from them may find the sheer number of
people in need overwhelming, and in this sense arbitrarily chooses one over
another. Wben a state chooses to intervene in one case rather than another, the
decision is flot arbitrary in the same way one arbitrarily gives money to one
person instead of another. It is calculated. One does not calculate the benefits to
oneselfwhen purchasing a paper from this homeless person instead ofthat one
because it will flot be in any way more or less beneficial for one to do so. The
decision to help is a universal one, but how to apply that help may 5e selective, or
even arbitrary because ofthe constraints put on the person helping. States are
also constrained, but they are constrained in different ways. Those ways are
important because they include national interest.
To answer the original question, ‘what is the moral force behind
humanitarian military intervention?’, it is a human desire to stop evil wherever
and whenever we come across it, at least to the best of our ability.
Interventionists believe that military interventions are one viable way ofdoing
just that. Some argue from the point of view that military interventions should be
primarily humanitarian in motive and others argue that as long as the job is done,
it does not really matter what the motive was. No one has argued that
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(J humanitarian interventions have neyer occurred without any national interest,
whether that interest was primary or secondary.
What is immediate to my mmd is the lack oftransparency that we cannot
help recognize and be bothered by. Rarely, if ever, are govemments transparent
about what their other self-motivated interests are. If we don’t understand, or we
don’t have access to the ulterior motives, we are unable to evaluate the action as
one that is justifiable or not because our only criterion is based solely upon the
public declaration or intent. In this case, we have no criteria upon which we can
we judge the miiitary intervention if in some vague way we ail know that there
must be some other interest in intervention, but at the same time, we cannot
determine the content ofthat interest. Tony Blair famously said about the Kosovo
intervention, that this is a war “flot for teffltory, but for values”. The fact is we
camiot evaluate something that daims its Ïegitimacy from one thing, but is acting
on another, perhaps more powerful impulse when we do not know what that
impulse is. At best, we can speculate about what that interest can be, but that is
hardly sufficient to evaluate the moral Ïegitimacy of the intervention.
The problem of motive tries to unravel some of the problems inherent in
the concept ofhumanitarian intervention with a view to determining its
legitimacy. The crux ofthe matter is whether the idea ofhumanitarian
intervention can be justified, and if it can be, then it must be legitimate.
Fundamentally, then, is the question of legitimacy. The next chapter will focus
specifically on many of the problems implicit in the daims to legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention, with a view to challenge those daims.
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Chapter III:
The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention:
The definition of humanitarian intervention demands that several tightly
woven together issues and assumptions be unraveled. The first one I want to
address is the legitimacy ofthe action as opposed to its legality. A distinction is
made between legal and legitimate military action justified in the name of
humanitarianism. The 1999 Kosovo intervention, for example, is strictly
speaking illegal, yet many authors argue for its legitimacy. The notion of
legitimacy refers to whether the action can be morally or politically justified, or
whether it can bejustified on the basis of general legal principles. Afier I
delineate a thorough critique ofthe legitimacy ofhumanitarian intervention, J will
challenge our understanding of the kind of cosmopolitanism which accommodates
the project ofhumanitarian intervention. In so doing, I will offer a ftesh
perspective of cosmopolitanism which cannot advance such a view.
Today, as we rewrite international law, and as we change the way we
think about sovereignty, there is a danger that acts of aggression are becoming
institutionally decriminalized.49 However, the emerging consensus seems to be
that when military intervention is legitimate (if not, at this point, legal) then it is
justifled in ternis of a humanitarian crisis and therefore gets its name:
humanitarian, claiming its legitimacy directly from its intention. The general shifi
in international law aims to replace the model ofstate sovereiguty and territorial
For a thorough critique of the destruction of former Yugoslavia as an example of the
decriminalization of aggression see “Yugoslavia Dismantled and International Law” by Tiphaine
Dickson and Aieksandar Jokic in International Journalfor rhe Sernioties ofLaw 19. no. 4.
(December 2006): 339-346f 8).
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C integrity with a ‘higher’ law—that is, a cosmopolitan one. Michael
contextualizes this shifi in law and this challenge to traditional state sovereignty
(ensuring both equality amongst states as weIl as the principle of non
intervention) by claiming that while these rights belong to states, they derive their
legitimacy from the rights ofindividuals. Walzer quotes John Westlake in a paper
pubÏished in 1914, saying that “The duties and rights ofstates are nothing more
than the duties and rights ofthe men who compose them”.5° This understanding
forms the basis of legitimacy for what wiii later be promoted as humanitarian
military interventions within a cosmopolitan world order, or mie of law.
The debate about the legitimacy ofhumanitarian intervention is roughly
characterized as one between pluraiists thinkers, like Robert Jackson,51 or
solidarists, like Teson52and Linklater.53 On the one hand, pluralists argue that
because there is no, and there caimot be, any international agreement about what
would constitute humanitarian interventions, the best ordering principle of
international relations must 5e the principle of non-intervention. Solidarists, on
the other hand, believe that there already exist global ethical and legal values
which permit humanitarian interventions in extreme cases. Where pluralists argue
that sovereiguty is the only protection weak states have against strong ones,
Walzer, 53.
SI For a perspective which adheres neither to the amorality of realists, nor necessarily to the
universalïsm of cosmopolitanism, see Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a
World ofstates (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 2000. Instead, Jackson develops the notion of
a ‘global covenant’ characterized by antipatemalism, normative pluralism, and the principle of non
intervention and state sovereignty.
2 For a thorough defense of the use of military force for humanitarian emergencies, see Femando
Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquhy into Law and Morality, 7nd Edition (Transnational
Publishers: Irvington, New York, 1997).
For a perspective “unapologetically universalistic” see Andrew Linidater, The Transformation
ofPolitical Communitv (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 199$). The central purpose 0f
this book is to show “to reaffu-m the cosmopolitan critique ofthe sovereign states system and to
defend the widening ofthe moral boundaries ofpolitical communities”, (2).
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(J solidarists believe that there is agreement in the international community about
what a humanitarian emergency consists of, and upon that basis we can build a
case for intervention, even without the Security Council approval that would give
the action legitimacy. WhiÏe pÏuralists believe that intervention is both illegal and
illegitimate because it goes against the foundational nomis of international
society, solidarists believe in an international society wherein states agree upon a
basic set ofrules in developing and enforcing international law.
One criterion used to determine the legitimacy of an action can be, for
example, the respectability and legitimacy of countries involved in an action.
Jurgen Habermas points to the illegitimacy ofthe 2003 Iraq action because ofthe
inclusion ofnon-democratic, rights-violating regimes within the 2003 US-lcd
coalition, whereas he believed the Western unification on the Kosovo crisis added
legitimacy to that action, despite some of the problems that the intervention
highlighted.54 Legitimacy can be derived, in part, from evaluating the record of
the countries involved in the action. Habermas criticizes the US-lcd invasion of
Iraq for dividing the West (liberal-democratic societies), for practicing aggressive
unilaterialism, and for ignoring the strong opposition of its allies.5 Other criteria
include an assessment ofhow the procedure was carried out, whether protocol or
Jurgen Habennas, “Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Borders between Legality and
Morality,” trans., S. Meyer and W. Sclieurerman, Constellations 6, no. 3 (1999): 268. Wbfle
Habermas supported to NATO intervention in Kosovo, claiming that what was at stake was the
upholding of basic human rights against the possibility of etbnic cleansing, he was simultaneously
critical of it: chief among his concems were the lack of genuine negotiation prior to tlie
intervention, lack of humanitarian concem by using high altitude bombing during the campaign,
the destabilizing effects on surrounding regions, and most seriously, the lack of UN Security
Council authority. Nonetheless, lie believed that given the majority of support for the movement
to support human rights in an imperfect world justified the intervention.
Jurgen Habermas, “Interpreting the Eau ofa Moment,” trans., M. Pensky, Constellations 10, no.
3 (2003): 3 64-370.
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conditions surrounding formai agreements were respected; whether the military
action was supported by a considerable number of recognized international
organizations; and finally whether the action was deemed necessary and
proportionate. Much ofthe current discussion around humanitarian intervention
does flot address its legality, per se, rather, it address the legitimacy of these
actions and the conclusions reached will profoundly affect future legal changes.
This adds to the urgency of legal, political and philosophical scholars to
understand and assess the legitimacy ofhumanitarian intervention as it becomes
the political force behind changes in international law. $till, legitimacy refers to
degree in the sense that there is no final authority on its evaluation. Conclusions
drawn are challenged as are those challenges. In general we can refer to what is
widely or commonly accepted as legitimate, whereas legality is more precise. It
too, involves interpretation, but is able to refer to definitive principles and to draw
conclusions on that basis. What arguments for the ‘legitimacy’ ofhumanitarian
intervention do is try to push its way into the legal circle by providing moral,
political or philosophical justifications for its adoption, to which the international
community responds by accepting or rejecting its daims (in general) and more
specifically by the International Court ofJustice. Their acceptance or rejection
forms the basis for the evolution of customary law.
The justifications for legitimacy ofhumanitarian interventions cari thus be
summarized into seven types.56 Afier delineating each ofthem, I will respond to
their daims for legitimacy. They are: (1) ‘Just Warfare’, or moral necessity; (2)
As delineated by the Danish Instimte of International Affafrs, but elaborated on by my own
interpretation of current literature on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention (Copenhagen,
DUPI, 1999) 99-101.
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(J the necessity of extreme cases to preserve practical and moral legitimacy of
international law; (3) the lesser evil principle—Emergency Rule; (4) the de facto
integrity of the core of state sovereignty; (5) the deterrence principle; (6) the only
response to Security Council paralysis; (7) the enforcement ofhigh regional
standards. Bach justification will be explained and subsequently critiqued. I will
approach the seven daims to legitimacy, as delineated by the Danish Institute of
International Affairs, in the following way:
1. I will illustrate the moral case for humanitarian intervention according to
the first, and I what I think is the most important daim to legitimacy, the
‘just-warfare’, or ‘moral necessity’ daim. I deal with this daim in two
separate parts:
(a) I will challenge the daims to just-warfare or moral necessity by
examining what I cail the problem of the narrative frame;
(b) I will further challenge the daims to just-warfare or moral
necessity by examining what I cali determining the dimension of
evil, or media and knowledge;
2. Then, having dealt with what I see as the frame or foundation of the
problem of legitimacy, I go through the remaining smaller daims to
legitimacy, which deal with particular issues rather than the foundational
daims, defining and challenging each as I go along: they are
(a) the preservation of the practical and moral legitimacy of
international law;
(b) the lesser-evil principle—emergency rule;
(c) the de-facto integrity of the core of state sovereignty;
57
(d) the deterrence principle;
(e) the only response to Security Council paralysis;
(f) the enforcement ofhigh regional standards.
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III-i: Critiguing Legithnacy: The ‘just-warfare’ or ‘moral necessity’
argument:
The Moral Case for Humanitarian Intervention:
While I will address ail of the daims to legitimacy, I must dedicate the
bulk ofmy response to the daim for ‘just war’. It is the foundational beliefupon
which well-intentioned cosmopolitans advance the principle of intervention. for
that reason, this daim is the most serious and requires the most attention. ‘Just
warfare’ or ‘moral necessity’ is at the crux ofjustifications for humanitarian
intervention, the one most commonly used and discussed among concemed
citizens, and scrutinized by academics. It appeals to Vitoria, Grotius, Gentili,
Vattel, and other early modem European moralists who contributed to the
foundations of international law and who argue for beÏlumjïtstum on
humanitarian grounds. Today we hear these sentiments evoked from the likes of
Tony Blair to Kofi Annan. Many academics arguing for intervention are
compelled and motivated by a genuine concem for, as well as a deep commitment
to members ofhumanity who suffer greatly at the hands of brutal dictators. The
justification for humanitarian intervention on humanitarian grounds is most
forcefully advanced by human rights activists like human rights lawyer Geofftey
Robertson as we see in this quote:
The past has been a matter ofpleading with tyrants, writing
letters and sending missions to beg them not to act cruelly.
That will flot be necessary if there is a possibility that they can
be deterred, by threats ofhumanitarian or UN intervention or
with nemesis in the form of the International Criminal Court.57
Robertson is explicit in his rejection ofthe ‘legal’ question in lieu of
legitimacy. The new standard to which we should apply international legal
Geoffi-ey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggiefor Global Justice (New York:
New Press, 2000), 453.
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C justifications for humanitarian intervention will flot be to law, but rather to “the
dimension of evil”.58 The moral force is about valuing human life above ail other
considerations. It is the force behind the shifi from the duty of non-intervention
to the responsibility to protect. It appeals to our innermost sense ofhumanity and
it is thus contextualized in ‘cosmopolitan’ terms. It is precisely these human
values to which Tony Blair appealed when he calÏed the 1999 Kosovo
intervention “a fight, flot for territory, but for values”59. Despite how cynically
we look upon politicians, people are compelled by these words, and our sense of
humanity is startled, awoken. If we look to academic scholars to add validity to
this daim, we need not go further than fernando Teson, an advocate of
humanitarian intervention without a political agenda. He argues, as does Walzer,
that rights of states are derived from human rights, that indeed, state rights are
human rights, and therefore when human rights are abused on a massive scale,
war is morailyjustified—that is, militai-y intervention on httmanitarian groïtnds is
morally justifled. This moral urge is illustrated by UN Secretary of State Kofi
Annan when he says that “if we have situations where there are gross violations
and systematic violations ofhuman rights, we cannot stand back and do
nothing”.6° What is illuminating is the way that this daim is made, because
within such a frame, one cannot imagine any other response, except a swifl
military one. The daim made by Kofi Annan, and any other number of advocates
ofhumanitarian intervention, require ofits audience is a definitive approval for
Ibid., 444.
Tony Blair, “Doctrine cf the International Cornmunity,” Speech to the Economic Club, Chicago
Hilton (April 22, 1999) www.fco.gov.uklnews/speechtextasp?23 16.
60 Kofi Annan, news interview cited from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/intemationalljuly
dec99/annan1 0-18 .htrnl
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C military action, thereby giving our govemments flot only ajustification
(legitimization) ofmilitary intervention, but amoral demand to act. Indeed, the
interventions ofthe last fifieen years have been portrayed as having been
reluctantly acquiesced to by reticent govemments, who, upon the moral demands
ofthe international community have flnally complied to act. This brings me to
my first critique of ‘just-warfare’ and the ‘moral necessity’ ofmilitary action. It
is a critique ofthe ‘narrative frame’—that is to say, the way in which we
understand the context within which the problem is expressed. In this critique, I
will argue, alongside scholars like Anne Orford, that the problem with
humanitarian intervention begins primarily with the context within which it is
deflned. This is to say that the picture given to us by the likes ofTony Blair, Kofi
Anan, Fernando Teson, Geoffery Roberts and especially Samantha Power compel
us without any moral doubt, to encourage military intervention swiftly, forcefully,
resolvedly. But the picture painted by these politicians, and scholars neglect some
crucial parts of the picture. This is why I call the problem, borrowing from
Orford, the problem ofthe ‘narrative frame’. In this section, I will expose what I
think is the greater picture, and in so doing, I will challenge the foundations upon
which that frarne rests, making the problem for interventionists harder, the
solution to regional violence more complex, and thereby exposing the problem
with the precision it needs. This precision makes the problem harder for
interventionists because the picture it presents does not accommodate bold and
morally righteous military action. It demands more care, less force and the
weight ofresponsibility to shift slightly towards the West so that more, not less,
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C are responsible for regional violence. This ctique hopes to expose ail, flot just
the few, who are implicated in the violence, and when that happens, it is flot as
easy to pretend to be the heroic saviors ofthe distant, foreign other. It exposes us
as the “strange liberators”61 as Gregory Elich aptly names us, that we are, and
what it should do above and beyond ail, is to require cosmopolitans to reexamine
both the global frame within which regionai violence occurs, and also our
solutions to those problems.
6! The titie of this book “Strange Liberators” is borrowed from a speech Martin Luther King made
called “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break the Silence” at Riverside Church in New York City on
April 4, 1967. For a devastating account ofhow U.S. actions mn contrary to their words, see
Gregory Elich, Strange Liberators: Mititarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit ofProfit (Coral Springs,
Florida: Llumina Press, 2006).
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III-ii: The Problem of the Narrative Frame:
To address the ‘just warfare’ or, ‘moral necessity’ argument I must begin
with the depiction ofhumanitarian intervention. It is crucial to begin with the
context of the problem, including what presuppositions lie within that context.
More importantly, I will look at where in the timeline the problem is presented. I
will refer to it as ‘the frame’ or the ‘narrative’ and I will expose why it is
problematic. Especially moving is Anne Orford’s depiction ofhow she struggles
with the problem ofhumanitarian intervention in a deeply human and
compassionate way. Here she is describing her moral angst and confusion as
someone critical ofmilitary intervention, but moved by the horrors projected from
her television screen:
It showed images oflittie boys, who, the story told us, were in
fact members ofrebel groups, forced by the rebels to conduct
raids and atrocities, and drugged to enable them to do so. The
images we saw were ofrebel soldiers dressed in fatigues. In
one scene one armed soldier stood on the leg ofa naked child
of about ten in a truck, while the child screamed in terror.
Other soldiers stood around. The child was clearly terrified.
It was a horrific scene. In another image, a skinny littie boy
sat on the ground in front of a building, crying. He was being
interrogated by soldiers. I turned off the TV and went to look
at my sleeping baby boy. I ffiought back to the discussion
with my friend and decided that I have no right and no power
to make any argument at ah about these matters. There is no
alternative.62
Afier the initial horror of the scenes settled, Orford began to think again about
conditions that made those images possible, and the effect on her. She refers to
John Berger in his essay ‘Photographs ofAgony’ in which Berger explains what
effect photographs of agony are supposed to have on us. We are struck by images
62 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use offorce in
International Law (New York, Cambridge International Press, 2003) 30.
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C rendeng us powerless, and that powerlessness translates into a desperate urge to
do something—anything. It may mean sending money to a relief organization, or
in the case of war, urging our govemments to send military forces to stop the
horrific conditions, images ofwhich we have been subjected to through the
media. But Berger urges us to think about the conditions which made the
photographs possible: the condition is the relationship between our powerlessness
and our lack of ability to participate democratically in the decisions our
govemments make. I will develop my argument on the basis on that
understanding.
Advocates of intervention, including journalists and academics, portray
conflict zones in relatively simplistic terms. Tensions in a region emerge, the
world ‘stands by’ because they do not care, or because the conflict is too
complicated, or because it is flot in their interest to intervene, or because there is a
paralysis in the Security Council. Then, as the violence escalates and reporters
come back with graphic images ofcruelty, the moral conscience ofthe citizens of
the world pressure our Western, powerful (but reticent) govemments to finally
‘act’. Yhe liberators are the democratic leaders ofthe world, powerful, good and
just (or at least when genuinely acting on our behaif). Our Western governments
are depicted as the reticent actors in humanitarian catastrophes, (Bosnia) or they
are portrayed as altogether absent from the scenes ofhumanitarian disaster
(Rwanda). They are either criticized for either not prioritizing human rights or for
not prioritizing human rights enough. When military action is taken, it is assumed
that the force ofthe moral conscience of the world was so profound, it compelled
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C govemments to act. Or, as Cathene Lu put it in response to why we intervened
in Kosovo and flot in Rwanda, we (Canadians and other Westemers) went through
a soul-searching experience, and we were morally transformed by the
humanitarian failure in Rwanda.63 In ail humanitarian narratives, two
assumptions frame the context. First, the humanitarian crisis is portrayed as
‘other’—not just foreign, but distinctiy separate from, and having nothing to do
with, potentially intervening states. Secondly, the passivity of the intervening
state is either implicitiy or explicitly understood. That passivity is shaken when
the moral conscience ofthe world compels their governments into military action.
Having set that narrative with those two basic assumptions, I will expose some of
the realities behind those assumptions in order to unsettie them.
Illustrating humanitarian crisis at its worst encourages the assumption that
humanitarian catastrophes happen as the world ‘stands by’, instead ofrevealing
the responsibiÏity ofthose very powers who are in a position to intervene (without
military force) before the crisis emerged. At the heart of the humanitarian
intervention narrative is that the principles of state sovereignty and non
intervention have failed us. We passively stood by while atrocities of genocide
occurred during the Cold War period. The narrative maintains that powerful
nations, like the United States, were impotent to take action because of CoId War
politics.
This frame neglects important empirical facts which may influence the
way we understand the theory, frame and narrative ofhumanitarian intervention.
63 Cathenne Lu, “Why Kosovo and flot Darfur?” Panel discussion humanitarian intervention, held
at McGill University in the Moot Court on Feb. 5tI, 2007.
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C Framed as ‘passive’ and ‘standing by’ is a deceitful porayal ofreal politics
before humanitarian crises occur. If we understand the powerful (intervening)
forces as a party to, and complicit in, acts of genocide, then the frame for
humanitarian intervention is distorted: our moral response less clear. The
assumptions we make in this humanitarian intervention narrative is that causes of
conflict stem from within the states, and are usually attributed to ethnic, religious
or tribal tensions, exploited by ruthless political leaders and culminating in
genocidal violence.64 While ‘the international community’ are perceived as the
advocates ofpeace, security and democracy, we really only mean the most
powerful western nations when we refer to them. Samantha Power, among others
advocates flot only the right of the most powerful to act unilaterally when failed
states go astray, but she argues that we have a moral obligation to do so.65 Power,
with a long list of others, is among those who portray the West as being absent
from places where genocidal murder is rampant until and unless it intervenes as
the heroic saviors. Adam Roberts reminds us that the urge to act using military
force in an area of conflict requires us to simplify the conftict and its solution in
order that we can grasp it, but also to feel that we can contribute in some
meaningful way to its resolution. He says this urge
[...]reflects the natural desfre to do something in the face of
disaster, and a tendency to forget that in ail these cases the
disaster has been man-made and requfres changes in
institutions, even sometimes in the structure of states and their
boundaries. The absence ofanyprecise idea as to what kind
64 Femando Teson, in bis seminal work, Humanitarian Intervention: A Legal and Moral Inquiiy,
frames the context lilce this, and then develops bis argument for the necessity of humanitarian
intervention on the basis of these cases. Anne Orford offers the challenge tbat in Reading
Humanitarian Intervention..
65 Samantha Power, A Froblemfrom Heu: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic
Books, 2002), 512-516.
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of state or political structures might resolve the crisis resuits in
the fudge-outcorne of endless repetition of the world
“humanitarian,” with which no one wants to quarrel.66
I will use two empirical cases to demonstrate the ways in which the West
(liberal-democratic societies) are portrayed as passively standing by as horrors
occur: in one case, we become the heroic saviors and in the other, we fail
humanity. In both cases we understand ourselves as politically neutral and
innocent of the causes of conflict. I will challenge the reader to ask what it means
to interventionists if the foreign policy of intervening states prior to, and during
the conffict, makes them accessories to war crimes and cuiprits in genocide. Seen
in this light, I will argue that this profoundly changes our status in terms of our
responsibility to protect as understood by advocates ofmilitary intervention. This
is not to say that we have no responsibility, but it is to make the even bolder daim
that we have been playing an active role in the explosion ofthose conflicts ah
along, rendering our role of the heroic liberators incoherent and untenable. By
taking a step back in the narrative frame, and in enlarging our world view within
that frame, we will be challenged to find more tenable ways, legal and safer, to
deal with regional conflicts. I will use Yugoslavia and Rwanda as just two
examples to demonstrate this problem. What we conclude about the justificability
of the Kosovo action has important ramifications because that intervention paves
the way for the legitimacy of further humanitarian interventions. As Bellamy
notes, “Since Kosovo there has been growing evidence of a shifi towards the
66 Roberts,13.
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acknowledgment of a limited right ofunauthorized humanitarian intervention in
cases of massive human suffering.”67
The Kosovo intervention, while controversial, was regarded as necessary
and just by at least some important thinkers, like Jurgen Habermas, Femando
Teson, and Sean Murphy. human rights activists like Geoffrey Robertson and
Kenneth Roth; the rnajority ofjoumalists, and even celebrities such as Bono, as
well as popular writers like Susan Sontag. Perhaps more critical ofthe action
were questions about its implementation and procedure, among other things. But
in general, the backdrop of the conflict was that in Bosnia a campaign of ethnic
cleansing set the stage for what would happen next if action was not taken in
Kosovo.
To understand why such a consensus emerged, we need to examine the
narrative frame witbin which that particular story emerged. By looking at the
narrative we can corne to a more thorough understanding of how consensus is
manufactured on a global scale. An analysis ofthe role of the media will follow
in the next section, but for now, I will focus on the context of the consensus for
military action. What happened in the Baikans that would inspire a cali for
military force by some of the same people who would have been the first to
protest against Vietnam? What was different and compelling about this situation?
By offering a portrayal ofhow liberal-dernocracies understood the conflict, it
becomes apparent why support for military force was prevalent. After illustrating
our general understanding, I will reveal some important assumptions about how
67 Alex Bellamy, “Motives, outcomes, intent and the Iegitimacy ofhurnanitarian intervention”
Journal of Military Ethics 3, no. 3 (November, 2004): 218.
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(J we constrned that conftict. This will serve as our tempiate for understanding not
only for the Baikans, but for the way we view conflicts in general. I wiii extract
some pattems ofus/them, good/bad into which we fail, uncritically, when we
assess regionai conflicts from afar. Diana Johnstone, in her criticai examination
ofthe Balkan crisis, begins by offering how the conflict was generaiiy depicted.
The rest of her book challenges the accuracy of each of these daims. My purpose
is to show how general principies are derived from particular narratives upon
which many ofthe assumptions interventionists make are drawn. Ail narratives
which cail for humanitarian intervention foliow the sarne generai pattem. This is
a depiction of one example relevant not only in terms of its histoncai proximity to
our discourse, but more importantiy, to its legal ramifications from which the
paradigm of international iaw has since shified.
Yugosiavia, Johnstone begins, is described as a “prison ofpeopies where
the Serbs oppressed ail the others”.68 This provides the context for a regional
conflict, ethnic in origin, something distinctly foreign, without the interference of
other (Western-democracies, or international organizations). It immediately sets
up the conflict by naming the oppressors and their victims from a particuiar
Western world view. This is the first part of the humanitarian narrative which
will be chailenged. Further, Johnstone goes on to describe the events, as
portrayed in the West as such:
It was destroyed by the rise of an evil leader. Siobodan Milosevic,
who set out to create a “Greater Serbia” by elirninating other peoples
in a process called “ethnic cleansing”. Those other peoples sought to
68 Diana Johnstone, fools’ C’rusade: YugosÏavia, NATO ana’ Western Detusions New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2002), 4. fora thorough and alternative reading ofthe Bailcan crisis, see
Susan Woodward ‘s, Baïkan Tragedy: chaos ana’ Dissolution Afler the Cola’ War (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1995).
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escape, by creating thefr own independent states. The Yugoslav
anny, actually Serbian, invaded ffiern. In Bosnia, the invading Serbs
tried to drive out the Muslims, who wanted to perpetuate an
exemplary multi-etimic society. The Serb ethnic cleansing killed
200,000 unanned Muslims while the international community looked
on anti even prevented Muslims from arming in seif-defense. At
Srebrenica, the United Nations allowed the Serbs to commit
genocide.69
This sets up the good/evil, Manichean dichotomy, easier to comprehend, at the
expense of the complexity of regional conflict. In the narrative, it is necessary to
have an ‘evil leader’. Reference to Hitler helps in the sense that post WWII we
have a place in our moral imaginations with which to fil a picture of ultimate
evil. Most importanfiy, the context ofthe narrative is framed within a good/evii,
actionlinaction paradigm. The reader will notice that “the international
comrnunity looked on”. This assumption will be challenged. further, and most
importantly for this analysis,
Only US. bombing forced Milosevic to corne to the negotiating
table at Dayton. The resulting agreement brought peace anti
democracy to muhi-ethnic Bosnia. However, the international
community had failed to save the Albanian majority in Kosovo from
apartheid.7°
The leaders of Western, democratic societies, and later we will see the
international community implicit in that meaning, are negotiating for the good of
the international community, and for the good of rogue states; they preserve and
prioritize human rights; and their efforts can bring peace and stability when they
act. Inaction cari only resuit in human rights abuses. This sets the context for
what wiii happen next, the 78-day humanitarian bombing campaigu, the
iegitimacy of which wili profoundly affect international law and norms.
Johnstone depicts how we understood that justification, and this is crucial because
69 Johnstone, 5.
° Ibid, 5.
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C many of the people who would have protested the Vietnam War found themselves
on side with the 1999 Kosovo intervention. Understanding the justification is
crucial to this critique:
In 1998 Madeleine Albright wamed that NATO must intenrene to
keep Milosevic from “doing in Kosovo what he could no longer
get away with in Bosnia”. In Januaiy 1999 Serbian security
forces massacred defenseless civilians in the Kosovo village of
Racak, awakening the NATO governments to the need to act to
stop genocide. Afier the turning point ofRacak, the Serbs were
summoned to peace negotiations in Rambouillet, in France.
Milosevic stubbornly refused to negotiate.
This shows us that the international comrnunity is on the side of good, and the
rogue forces in the regional conflict stand in opposition to what is good, free and
democratic. There is a tension between the international community, who stand
ail together in une with human rights, against evil and tyranny. The conclusion is
clear:
NATO had no choice but to start bombing Yugoslavia. Masses of
Albanians were deliberately driven out according to a
preconceived plan called “Operation Horseshoe”. finally,
Milosevic gave in, and NATO liberated the Kosovars from thefr
oppressors. Conclusion: from now, humanitarian intervention
constitutes a principal mission for NATO, as the military arm of
an international community henceforth committed to the
protection of human rights.7
To summarize the point of the narrative, two prominent assumptions emerge:
first, the conflict occuned within the region’s own borders with no outside
interference; and secondly, the conflict can be dealt with within the dichotomy of
action or inaction where action refers to miiitary force and inaction refers to the
equivalent of ‘doing nothing’ or ‘standing by’.
Inherent in the flrst idea, and one which I will challenge, is the idea that
domestic policies are distinct and separate from international policies. Further, it
Tbid, 5.
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C’ assumes that the domestic policies of conflict regions, in this case Yugoslavia, are
threats to peace, democracy and human rights, while the international actors
support and prioritize those values.72 These fundarnental assumptions help
underline the context for the project ofhumanitarian intervention. Yugoslavia is a
particularly relevant case study because it paves the road for (especially
unilateral) military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Absent from the
discourse is an analysis ofhow the prograru of economic liberalization and
restructuring ofthe state implemented by international institutions like the World
Bank and the IMF during the pre-war period contributed to conditions of the
ethuic tensions which formed the basis for explosive civil war.73 The analysis put
forward by people like David Chandier, Anne Orford, Michel Chossudovsky,
Susan Woodward, Jarnes Petras and Steve Vieux suggest that the policies
implemented were established to better enable servicing foreign debt, despite the
fact that those policies were “ftaught with political implications”74 What this
means is that these policies included changes resulting in recentralizing political
and economic authority from republican govemments and banlcs to federal ones.
This in turn created the conditions for the kind of social instability that led to
heated nationalism and grumblings about civil war.75 Further political
ramifications of IMF policy included the ‘May Measures’ of 1988 which required
the destruction ofthe social system ofworker participation in firm decision
making, removing safeguards from large scale unemployment and the slashing of
72 Orford, 86.
Orford, 89.
Woodward, Ballcan Tragedy, 50; James Pefras and Steve Vieux, “Bosnia and ffie Revival of US
Hegemony”, NewLeft Review, vola (1996): 11’.
Orford, 90.
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CJ public spending76. Chossudovsky, a critical observer of IMf policy summarizes
the major incidents leading to the destruction ofa nation in his article,
Dismantiing Yugoslavia, Colonizing Bosnia:
The IMf package unquestionably precipitated the collapse of
much ofYugoslavia’s well-developed heavy industry. Other
socially-ow-ned enterprises survived only by flot paying
workers. More than haif a million workers stili on company
payroils did not get regular paychecks in late 1990. They were
the lucky ones. Some 600,000 Yugoslavs had already lost their
jobs by September 1990, and that was only the beginning.
According to the World Bank, another 2,435 industrial
enterprises, including some of the countrys largest, were
slated for liquidation. Their 1.3 million workers, haif the
remaining industrial workforce were “redundant.”77
With wages falling, social programs collapsing, unemployment running rampant,
the then Yugoslav President Borislav Jovic warned that “Citizens have lost faith
in the state and its institutions [....] The further deepening ofthe economic crisis
and the growth of social tensions has had a vital impact on the deterioration ofthe
political-security situation”.78 Orford critically observes that “[3]oth directly and
indirectly, the IMF reshaped Yugoslav politics throughout the I 980’s and early
Y 990’s”.79 Wbile the nationaÏist climate had become clear, the IMF continued to
reshape the economic and political structures, aggravating an already potentially
explosive situation. These measures, which go beyond the economic conditions
exclusively ofthe society, imposed by the international financial institutions, caïl
into question their position of neutrality and their role as champions of human
rights and democracy.
Orford, 91; Detailed analysis from Woodward, 96.
Chossudovsky, “Dismantiing Yugoslavia; Recolonizing Bosnia,” Covert Action, no. 56 (Spring,
1996): 4.
78 Ibid.
Orford, 90.
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(J” Arnong the concems about the champions of democracy and human rights,
those advocates who wouid later corne to the rescue, are the diplomatic
interventions before the onslaught of war. Interventionists tend to see the role of
major powers as absent or at least minimal prior to the outbreak ofwar. Jarnes
Bissett, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1990 challenges this
assumption. He attributes much ofthe blame of the Balkan crisis to the West
through its deliberate and calculated interference. The failure of the Lisbon
Accord represents but one of the many diplomatic frustrations which Bissett
believes provided the spark necessary to inflame the crisis into depths ofwar.
The deal drawn up in Lisbon would have given the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats more or less what they got at Dayton afler four years ofwar, and a death
toll hovering around 100,000. Ah three leaders had signed the deal, but afier a
meeting with then Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, the Bosnian Muslim leader,
Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his signature.8° War broke out one week later.
Bissett sees this move as a key factor in the onslaught ofthe war. Ironically,
Izetbegovic got less in Dayton than what he had bargained for in Lisbon.
Diplomatic interventions show that powerful Western leaders have the ability to
impact a state’s internai affairs in profound ways. That is not to say that the
ethnic bloodshed, war crimes and other atrocities were the responsibihity of other
govemments—accountability remains with those responsible for their actions, but
it is to say that the idea that powerful Western states are actors, participating and
affecting the course of internai affairs in ways that are rarely recognized both in
80 Warren Zimmerman, interview by David Binder, “US policy makers on Bosnia admit errors in
opposing partition in 1992”, The New York limes, 29 August, 1993.
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C our analysis ofhumanitarian intervention and in our general understanding of
ethnie conflicts. We tend to understand the problem in poiar terms: action
(military force) or inaction (standing by). Neither portrays the complexity ofthe
onslaught and continuation ofwar accurately.
On a different continent, with far more dramatic resuits I will compare
how we understand the Rwandan genocide, in terms ofthe narrative frame insofar
as we understand it, and how we construe our (Western) role in that conflict. Any
discussion about policy making and the development ofhumanitarian intervention
must include an analysis of the utter devastation which occurred in Rwanda. Our
moral imaginations now include flot just the gas chambers of WWII, but the
extent to which weapons like machetes can inflict such unspeakable human
tragedy. Any investigation of how to treat the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention must include a thorough analysis of how the international community
acted in that context. Such an investigation would not be complete without
drawing some conclusions about our role in that crisis.
Again I will begin with a portrayal that captures the essence ofhow the
war was reported and understood. The media characterizes the Rwandan
genocide as having started with the plane crash of Hutu presidents, President
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira ofBurundi on 6 April of
1994. The resuit of that plane crash was the genocide of 800,000 Tutsis by the
Hutus. Generally, the media depicted the RPF as the liberators of the oppressed
Tutsis. The RPF was seen as conducting a war of liberation by a Tutsi led
guerilla army. The West is seen as guilty of inaction and apathy in the face of
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evil. Samantha Power answers the question “What did the United States know?”
this way: “. .the precise nature and extent ofthe slaughter was obscured by the
civil war, the withdrawal ofU.S. diplomatic sources, some confused press
reporting, and the lies ofthe perpetrator government”.8’ Her analysis includes a
formidable critique ofU.S. inaction during the crisis, from which she concludes
that the United States has not only a right to intervene (unilaterally if necessary),
but a moral obligation to do so.82 former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros
Ghali made numerous daims that the Rwanda genocide was to a great extent, the
fault ofAmerican foreign policy pointing to the adoption ofU.S. PDD 25
(Presidential Directive Document) in which the United States declares flot only
that it will not send its own troops to the conflict, it will actively persuade, using
diplomatic pressure, other states flot to intervene either. 83 In this way Boutros
Ghali criticized the US for flot just returning to a policy of non-intervention, but
for imposing that policy on other UN members. Common to all ofthese critiques
is that the international community is guilty and responsible for the genocide in
Rwanda due to its inaction, which is to say, for not using military force when it
was apparent that the conditions for genocide were apparent and the onslaught of
death was imminent. And this is indeed part ofthe picture. But it neglects some
other parts ofthe story, the telling ofwhich challenges the normative frame of
humanitarian intervention.
Power, 354.
82 Power, 510.
83 Bouos Boutros-Ghali, InterL.’jew with Frontiine conducted Jan. 21, 2004.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html
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(Z’ To try to unravel some of the complexity which provoked the outbreak of
that war, let us start with the onsiauglit ofthe conflict. Ffrst, the invading army
into Rwanda, portrayed as a liberating force, was uniformed as Ugandan forces,
although they were for the most part, ethnic Tutsis. Their act ofmutiny was not
punished or criticized either by the Ugandan government, or the international
cornrnunity, although the mutiny came from high ranks. for instance, Paul
Kagame was the head ofmilitary intelligence in the Ugandan Armed Forces. He
had also been trained at the CGSC (U.S. Army command and Staff College) in
Leavenworth, Kansas, afier which he led the RPF.84 In general, this invasion
went unnoticed in the international press. Afier crossing the border that invading
army changed uniforms from the Ugandan Army uniform to what it presented as
“The Rwandan Patriotic Front” or, the RPF. The RPF got their military supply
from the UPDF (the United People’s Defense forces inside Uganda) and Uganda
was militarized by the United States. According to a report submitted by Africa
Direct, to the UN Tribunal on Rwanda,
from 1989 onwards, America supported joint RPF-Ugandan
attacks upon Rwanda. . .There were at least 56 ‘situation’
reports in State Department files in 1991...As American and
British relations with Uganda and the RPF strengthened, 50
hostilities between Uganda and Rwanda escalated. . .By
August 1990 the RPF had begun preparing an invasion with
the full knowledge and approval ofBritish intelligence.85
An unsettiing account of the Rwandan genocide cornes from Peter Uvin, who
meticulously delineates how, and to what degree, aid groups, representing the
Michel Chossudovsky, “The Geopolitics Behind the Rwandan Genocide: Paul Kagame Accused
ofWar Crimes” Global Research (November 23, 2006) Reineved from
http://www.globafresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3958
85 Africa Direct, Submission to the UN Tribunal on Rwanda, www.unius.co.ukJafrica
directjtribunal.html
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international comrnunity ignored much ofthe political and social activities which
produced the conditions for impending genocide. for example, he explains how
the institutionalization ofracism began with white colonizers who deveioped a
system of ethnie classification, involving methods such as measuring nose and
skuii sizes, and how, most importantly, this system was kept intact by
postcoionial govemments and continued to exist until the 1994 genocide, “greatly
facilitating its execution”.86 Uvin recounts that “Alison des Forges [...]laments
[...]that ail foreign aid agencies accepted the continuation ofthe ethnies Ids and
did not pressure the government to abandon them—not even in 1992, when it
became clear that they were being employed to target Tutsi for harassment and
extermination”.87 He further sets out to show how the international development
system plays a role in contributing to the conditions for the massacres by
identifying a concept of”[. . .]‘structural violence’ thus drawing attention to the
fact that such structures and processes are violent because they needlessly and
brutally limit people’s physical and psychological capacities”.88 These examples
show that making the locai/global distinction with its corollary evil/good
dichotomy not as evident as the advocates ofhumanitarian intervention make it
appear. Uvin maps out how, and to what degree, the international community
were part of a system which ended in, not just genocide, but genocide that was
“the product oforder, authoritarianisms. . .and one ofthe most meticulously
86 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT:
KumarianPress, 1998), 35.
87 Ibid., 37.
88 Ibid., 110.
78
(J administered states in history”.89 When we talk about Rwanda, we do so in
mainly local terms, defining it as being distinctly at odds with not only the
international comrnunity, but with the values of the international community, and
we do so as though there were flot a robust international community present in
Rwanda prior to the genocide. Little attention is paid to the relationship between
the large-scale presence ofdevelopment workers and the processes that led to
genocide and the development enterprise.9° The allegation put forward by many
of the authors who followed the Rwandan crisis and who included in their
analysis an economic interpretation ofthe crisis is that i) Rwanda was one ofthe
most aided countries in the world; ii) that bilateral as well as multilateral donors
such as the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB continued to make large amounts
ofprogram aid available, and that; iii) there were a significant number of aid
workers and foreign diplomats living in Rwanda during the 1990’s. Despite this,
littie came out of this comrnunity about the well-documented rise in government
sponsored human rights violations. Uvin records that during this period, aid ftom
neariy ail countries increased, and that many countries continued to provide
military support to the Rwandan govemment: “[...]there was no way that the
govemment could implement any policy, coherent or not, without the assistance
ofthe foreign aid community”.9’ We know from reports submitted to the UN
Tribunal for Rwanda that the United States fimded both the RPf and the Ugandan
89 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Infonn You that Tomon-ow We Witl 3e Killed with our Families
(London: Picador,1999), 95.
Orford makes this daim in Reading Humanitarian Intervention, with reference to Peter Uvin’s
Aiding Violence, as well as Iood Howland’s “Mirage, Magic, or Mixed Bag? The United Nations
Hight Commissioner for Human Rights’ field Operation in Rwanda” (1991) Human Rights
Quarterly 21, no. 1(1991): 5.
91 Uvin, 226 from Orford, 104.
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Ç Army, which supported that side. It was this level of aid that “helped maintain
the strong state necessary to organize and administer the genocide”.92
Chossudovsky writes that “In a cruel irony, both sides in the civil war were
financed by Hie same donor institutions with the World Bank acting as
Watchdog”.93 It is argued that the close relationship between aid agencies and
govemments constituted some degree ofpower or influence over the elites who
held governmental positions. The idea is that when the international community
made an effort to chastise the Rwandan governrnent, the government responded
accordingly. There are two examples cited by Uvin: one dates back to 1991 when
the international community put pressure on the government to release the 8000-
10,000 anested ethnic Tutsis. The govemment conceded to this demand, for the
most part. The second example that illustrates the strength of international
diplomatic action is the international reaction to the NGO human rights report
published in 1993. Afler the World Bank refused to give Rwanda the latter part
of a ban, and after Belgium and Switzerland recalled their ambassadors, the
Rwandan government agreed to investigate the allegations made in the report, and
indeed fewer massacres took place over the following months.94 This gives us
some faith in the ability ofthe international community to exert considerable
influence on the actions of local governments, although it also shows us where
and how the international comrnunity has failed us—more precisely, faiÏed the
people of Rwanda.
92 Orford 104.
Michel Chossudovsky, “The US was behind the Rwandan Genocide: Rwanda: Installing a US
Protectorate in Central Africa” GlobalResearch, May 8, 2003. Retrieved at
globafresearch.calarticles/CH0305A.html
Uvin, 96.
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(Z Chossudovsky makes the daim that the civil war in Rwanda was “an
integral part of US foreign policy, carefully staged in accordance with precise
strategic and economic objectives”.95 Pierre Galand and Michel Chossudovsky
conducted a study from which they drew the conclusion that the civil war erupted
as a result, in great part, ofa U.S. agenda to establish their sphere of influence
geographically where historically it has been dominated by france and Belgium.
It is crucial to our understanding of how we are involved in the conflict to
scrutinize how the acquisition ofmilitary arms is made possible under such
conditions. In a mission report to the United Nations Development Program and
Govemment of Rwanda, Chossudovsky and Galand report that
The Habyarimana regime had at its disposai an arsenal of
military equipment, including 83mm missile launchers, french
made Blindicide, Belgian and German made light weaponary,
and automatic weapons such as kalachnikovs made in Egypt,
China and South Africa [as well as... armored AML-60 and
M3 armored vehicles. Whiie part ofikese purchases had been
financed by direct militaiy aid from France, the influx of
development bans from the World Bank’s soft lending
affihiate, the International Development Association (IDA),
the African Development fund (AFD), the European
Development Fund (EDf) as welI as from Germany, the
United States, Belgium and Canada had been diverted into
funding the military and Interhamwe militia.96
Locating the urgency of the question of humanitarian intervention asks ‘What
should we do now?’ as a response to images ofhorror which strike us at the heart
of our humanity. But to develop international legal policy at that moment or
because ofthat moment neglects the context in which those shots were taken, as it
absolves the international community of our role in the horror. The camera does
not take shots before the crisis: images frozen in time which ‘shock the
Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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conscience ofmankind’ are a resuit of events the conditions ofwhich we are in
part, at least responsible. Where do we, as the interventionists, the liberators,
imagine ourselves, when we pull back the camera to see the wider shot? How
does this affect the role we play in bringing forth peace, security, democracy and
human rights? And how do we account for the role we play well before war
breaks out? Orford answers these questions by making the daim that
• . . focusing on international law and international institutions
that facilitate economic restructuring suggests that the
opposition between collective humanitarian intervention and
inactivity is a false one. The international community had
afready intervened on a large scale in Yugoslavia and Rwanda
before the security crises ernpted, through the activities of
international economic institutions and development agencies.
The international community can be located inside, not
outside, this space of violence... The international communily
is aÏreadyprofoundly engaged in shaping the structure of
political sociaI economic and cultural tfe in many states
through the activities of international econom ic institutions.97
(emphasis added).
This is in part a response to the moral necessity of military intervention. It
demands action of us at moments during which we are flot able to analyze the
greater picture, and the moral, political and philosophical justification for that
action lends legitimacy to it. Legitimacy in turn gets used as the framework upon
which we build the legal case and henceforth, the development of customary
international law. This analysis is an attempt to include the backdrop of civil
crisis, before we insfitutionalize legal reform that would accommodate the
implementation of humanitarian intervention.
Hard line interventionists like Samantha Power may insist thatjust
because the same forces who would do the saving are the ones who were part of
the problem, it does not follow that they should not be part ofthe solution. A
97Orford, 110.
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(J stronger daim is that the moral demands made ofthose whose pre-war actions
may be in part a cause ofthe onslaught ofdeath and destruction are even more
compelling because of flot in spite of, their earlier interference. The challenge
exists for interventionists and non-interventionists alike: for non-interventionists,
the response is a weak one—policy building must be preventative action. But that
does not answer the pressing urge for what is to be done now. Those who support
military force as a solution must include an analysis ofthe greater role the
intervening forces play in a given conflict. Such analysis wouid confront the
good-guys/bad-guys distinction, as weil as expose the action/inaction dichotomy.
Distributing the responsibility more evenly could thus further deter Western
powers from the kind ofinterference which encourages the conditions for war in
the first place. To include such an analysis when determining when and how
govemments should act in a military capacity challenges the unfounded beliefthat
Western liberal-democracies are the champions of freedom and human rights
values, and are the liberators ofthe oppressed and victimized. This is a valuable
position to hold as a mechanism for keeping our governments from abusing their
power as miÏitary soldiers for peace. It exposes our vulnerability to corruption
and il has the potential for addressing the accusation that the West acts as
hypocritical, paternalistic liberators.
By exposing the narrative frame to include our role in foreign conflicts, I
hope to shake the foundations upon which our assumptions about being heroic
liberators is founded. It is an important assumption to expose because as they
narrative frame opens up to include a fuller picture of ail the actors involved in
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foreign conflicts, we begin to see that the logic ofhumanitarian intervention
begins to fail us. Only in a particular context which isolates and demonizes
particular groups does the logic ofhumanitarian intervention work. Sharing the
blame in conflict, seeing the diversity in interpretation ofthe conflict can only
weaken the idea that humanitarian intervention is an effective and appropriate
action, and that violating international law to accommodate such an idea will
ultimately serve the ends ofhumanity.
Part ofhow we understand the narrative frame stems directly ftorn how
conflict is portrayed to us via the media. The next section will therefore be
dedicated to understanding that process by which we corne to make certain
assumptions about what is happening in foreign conflicts, in lands we otherwise
could flot locate on a map, and under the control of leaders whose character we
only know through media portrayal. This section will expose, in short, how we
determine the “dimension of evil”. Central to my explication of this problem is
how Walzer uses the ‘buming house’ analogy. With it, I expect to peel another
layer of unfounded assumptions from the package solution of humanitarian
intervention.
84
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III-fil: Determining the Dimension of Evil: Media and Knowledge:
As we saw earlier, Robertson appeals flot to the legality of an intervention
in his assessment ofmilitary action, but rather to the ‘dimension of evil’ which is
determined by our understanding ofthe crisis through the media. I want to
examine this idea here in an analysis ofthe media, and what role they play in our
collective urge to invoke military force in foreign territory because of
humanitarian catastrophes. Central to this idea is that we, the passive recipients
of news coverage in the Western world, have a genuine, and deep moral urge to
act (even if that means the use ofmilitary force) when we see the massive
suffering ofpeople. In fact, ‘seeing’ is the fundamental premise here. Michael
Walzer talks about this specifically when he says that there is nothing new about
human disasters caused by human beings; what is new is that “the camera crews
arrive faster than rigor mortis”98. And then, he argues, we should act. Act
without the permission of our neighbors, if need be, but if no one is acting, act99.
He likens il to a neighbor’s house burning, when there is no fire department
around. Do you cail a town meeting and give veto power to the three richest
famiÏies around, or do you go in and save the neighbors? This analogy is an
important one, not only because it is central to Walzer’s argument, but because it
is the way interventionists tend to think about, and present the case for, military
intervention. For this reason, the analogy warrants considerable scrutiny, both on
its own and in particular with relation to media and knowledge. Walzer’s burning
98 Walzer, Michael, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention” in Ethics ofHumanitarian
Intervention ed., Meggie, Georg (Ontos/Verlag: Frankfurt, Lancaster, 2004), 21.
Ibid., 26.
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C house is flot analogous to humanitarian intervention in a number of important
ways. On the one hand we have our neighbor’s house on fire, and on the other,
we have a humanitarian catastrophe being aired on the news. The first reaction is
empirically immediate (Do you smell something buming?); the second is
deceptively so. Walzer’s analogy, explanation, and justification for unilateral
humanitarian intervention coheres with our moral intuitions about the subject,
which is why arguing against the project ofhumanitarian intervention seems
inconsistent with the moral demands of our conscience. But on the other hand,
Walzer’ s analogy, and indeed the way interventionists tend to think of and defend
their view is incomparable to the buming house.
In the first case, our presence, our ability to respond, our physical
proximity to the emergency demands a response. If we are cowardly, we can
ignore that demand, or if we are brave, we can act. In any case, we are moral
agents, engaged in the moment of crisis. We are there, present, available and
called immediately to action. Humanitarian intervention theory often begins with
the premise that we, in an age of information, modem technology and speed are
also there, in foreign lands. Because we are now present and because of our
knowledge ofthe catastrophe, we must make ourselves available, though military
action conducted by our govemments in our name. Putting side by side the two
cases ta) neighbor’s house buming, and (b) civil war in foreign country, the
response called for is action, and this is how the analogy is made, but here is
where it fails.
86
(J’ The flrst most obvious difference is I did not see the war. What tends to
folÏow for most citizens who do flot necessarily specialize in world history,
international relations and global economics is that we probably do not
understand what the war is about. The fact that we did flot see the war testifies
flot to the epistemological uncertainty of its existence, but rather to the fact that
we do flot see the foreign conflict in the same way that we see our neighbor’s
house. The degree to which we have empirical certainty about our burning
neighbor’s house is essentially different from our knowledge about a
humanitarian catastrophe. The ways in which they differ, and how those
differences are relevant to our analysis will profoundly challenge the conclusions
we draw about the justifiability, by extension, the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention.
Further, what we know or do flot know about the burning house is
important in understanding the degree to which the analogy fails. My
comprehension about the neighbor’ s house does flot warrant Imowiedge about
who my neighbor is, whether he started the fire, what will happen to lis house if I
pull him out, who will rebuild his house. None of that is central to the main
problem ofthe burning house. Ail ofthis is important in foreign conflict.
Again, this is not to make the radical epistemological challenge about
what we can lmow with regard to world events; rather it is to challenge the
assumption that news coverage is reliable in the same way that our first hand
empirical observation about an emergency is reliable. It is to call into question
that the thing in between us and the catastrophe, that is, the media which sees,
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interprets and relays for us. The media is supposed to take a neutral position from
which we can make substantive evaluations and draw conclusions about in the
same way we can when our neighbor’s house is buming. We know about the fire.
But the question is not about whether we know there is a war: we also know there
is a war—rather, the question is what do we know about the war? Wars make
demands onjoumalists to serve the ends ofthe interested (potentially intervening)
parties so the joumalist is tom between two conflicting demands: that they serve
the interest of the potentially intervening state, or they serve the interests of the
viewer who wants to know the whole unedited version ofthe event.
This presupposes that states have interests in the stories being covered.
Ofien we are under the assumption that we have no interest in the stories being
presented: we are impartial (and horrified) bystanders. Bosnia, in particular, lias
aiways been presented in a light wherein the United States had no interest there,
and finally, belatedly, intervened only for humanitarian reasons, and only because
of intense pressure put on them by the media, who acted as the conscience ofthe
world. This version lias been challenged to a great degree by manyjoumalists,
academics and especialÏy United Nations generals serving there at the time.100
SimilarÏy, there is a misconception that there is no interest in Africa, where upon
doser examination, we can reveal many reasons why powerful states want to
exert influence there. At this point, I have already challenged the notion that the
international comrnunity is flot impartial and that it plays no role in conflicts
100 Among some of them, Peter Brock, David Chandier, Diana Johnstone, Id Herman, Susan
Woodward, Ambassador James Bissett, and General Lewis Mackenzie.
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(J except as heroic saviors and this should influence the way we see the media act in
their coverage of foreign conflicts.
We can rely on the fact that if there are images ofriots and streets burning
in Paris in newspapers and on television and on the internet, there are indeed riots
and streets burning in Paris. If there are images of chiidren suffering in the
Sudan, there are indeed chiidren suffering in the Sudan. I am flot putting forth the
daim that we live in a Matrix. We have some retiable knowledge that these
events are occun-ing and that they are very real, very immediate dangers.
However, our knowledge about these kinds of events is different from our
knowledge about our neighbor’s house in significant ways. In the second
instance, someone is doing the seeing for me, shooting the images, and giving me
the context the way that he or she rightÏy or wrongly sees it (if those categories
‘rightÏy’ or ‘wrongly’ even apply). Someone else is seeing the thing and showing
me what they see. That may seem like an obvious and trivial fact, especially if we
have confidence in ourjournalists, but this interpretative element is significant for
our analysis because there are crucial questions about the details of that war
which are going to influence our judgment flot only about the war itself, but what
should be done to help. The questions left to the interpretation ofthe media are
questions such as: Wbat are the causes ofthe conflict? Who is aiding in its
perpetuation? Who is arrning the soldiers? How many people are being killed?
Which people are being killed? With the neighbor’s house, it doesn’t matter how
the fire started, or who started it. It doesn’t matter what your motivation is for
going in to save your neighbor. None of that carnes any weight in the moment of
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(J action, although those are things we can discuss afier the conflict is over. But
how the reporter reports the news is going to influence how we think ofit, and
what we support our governments in doing.
One might think that haggiing over the details about the war are flot
ten-ibly important. I imagine that the urge to stop humanitarian catastrophes is so
great that we have littie patience for ail ofthe details. What advocates of
humanjtarjan intervention are interested in is action to save the vulnerable.
Historians, phiiosophers, politicians and joumalists alike can sit doWn and argue it
out, but who will stop atrocities from occurring and in the end, does it reaiiy
matter who began the fight, as long as we can jump in and do something when
things have gone terribly wrong? This is the challenge for the non-interventionist.
The non-interventionist can only emphasize that without understanding the details
about conflicts, our responses can aggravate bad situations, erode possibilities for
establishing a lasting peace in the region, and heighten tensions globally as a
resuli ofthe intervention. These concems warrant the careflul response ofthe
interventionist who will act with military force and err on the side of action as
opposed to inaction.
Among others, one of the evaluative judgments we must make in watching
the news coverage is what to demand ofour governments. If we are allowing
governments to act on the basis of some moral ground, at the core there resides an
interpretive or epistemological problem with the moral decision maldng ofthe
government. If there are abuses happening in a particular region, there must be a
context for that abuse. We must determine what kind of violations are taking
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(E place, who the victims and the perpetrators ofthe crimes are, how to best alleviate
the suffering of the people, and so forth. As soon as there are competing versions
of events we have the problem of not only whose version is right, but of who
decides whose version is right. Kosovo presents an empirical exemplification of
the conceptual problem. Like our neighbor’s house burning, we know there is
civil unrest in Kosovo. But unlike our actual response to our neighbor’s house,
how do we ‘jump in’? Who are the culprits, what are the origins ofthe conflict,
how do we hah human rights abuses? Prior to 1992, every article in the New
York Times suggested that ethnic Albanians were massively violating the human
rights of ethnic Serbs, that a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing was occurring
as Serbs were being systematically expelled, and the KLA (Kosovo Liberation
Army) was listed with the CIA as a terrorist organization. Afier the United States
took a political position on the break up of former Yugoslavia, the media took an
immediate tum, representing the situation in Kosovo very differently. Before the
launch ofthe 78-day bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo, U.S. Secretary of
Defense reported on CBS television that 100,000 military-aged “may have been
murdered”.101 Afier the bombing, that figure was neyer substantiated, nor was it
even repeated. No international organization had corne up with these figures, but
for some reason, the citizens of countries involved in the intervention were led to
believe that such was the case. Findings from the Kosovo Verification Mission
submitted to the ICTY indicate the total deaths of killed on ail sides range in the
area of 2000. Another figure produced by the American Bar Association,
lOi William Cohen, interview with CBS Face the Nation, May 16, 1999 (Burelle’s information
Services, 1999).
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C sponsored by the State Department, was at 11,000. 102 A Spanish forensic team
thought even this figure grossly exaggerated.’°3 And finally there is the example
ofthe CBC story about a five-year old girl who was murdered.’°4 This story was
retracted when, many months later, the reporter came back to find that the story
had been invented to gain sympathy for the cause. This is to make the daim that
our knowledge about our neighbor’s house buming and our knowledge of conflict
in foreign regions is different in significant ways. It seems to me that if we
recommend military action be taken, we had better have a clear understanding of
what is happening and how to go about fixing it.
To suggest that the media can flulfihl this role is to misrepresent some of
the conflicting roles that the media serve. One of their important functions,
among others, is to entertain, the resuit ofwhich ofien leads to oversimplification
of the context, and from which we are ofien delivered a misrepresentation of
facts. More siguificantly, I think, is an analysis ofwhether the misrepresentations
are made in good faith, or whether they are deliberate. Media critics’°5 as well as
some joumalists’°6 make compelling arguments for why we should be somewhat
skeptical about the media’s ability to be neutral. I have already shown how
international organizations, led by powerful liberal democracies are oflen
102 Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away wllh Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and
Crimes Against Humanity (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 62.
103 Ibid.
104 CBC Television, “The Truth about Rajmonda”, September 8, 1999 quoted in Mande!. Also,
find at www.cbc.calnationallpgminfo/kosovo3/-rajmonda.html
105 Ed Herman, Robert McChesney, and Mark Crispin Miller, to naine a few.
106 Most famously, Phillip Knightley: For an analysis ofhow govemments and militaries control
thefr media, see War: The first C’asuaÏty, 3 ed. (MD: John Hopkins University Press: 2004) and
“Fighting Dirty”, Guardian Weekly, 30 March, 5 April, 2000. Also see Peter Brock, Media
Cleansing: Dir1’’ Reporting: Journalism and Tragedy in YugosÏavia (Los Angeles:GM Books,
2006).
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C entangÏed in complicated ways with regions where conflict abounds. What
cails into question is the reliability I have with regard, flot to the fact that there is a
conflict, but rather how to understand that conflict. If we are to make
recommendations that influence the way international law develops, we require a
level ofreliability which at this point we do flot have.
In light of this media critique, I think it is necessary to look at what
purposes the images photo journalists from war zones serve. Berger’s analysis of
photo images ofhorror locates us at the passive end ofa frozen moment in time; it
is a moment captured, but we, the recipient of the photo are disengaged, rendering
us feeling morally inadequate, impotent to act. That moment is now finished,
passed, and there is nothing we can do about it. We, the viewer are locked in the
moment, paralyzed by it, powerless to act, to change the moment. Orford recaÏÏs
the story about babies getting caught in barbed wire in East Timor as they would
get flung over into UN compounds to escape the treacherous war. But her
response is that
Anyone who was there in person would flot have the horror of
passively watching that scene, but would be able to try and
help the chiidren, covering the barbed wire with clothes,
climbing up to make sure the chiidren did flot get stuck, lifting
them over. Our sense of passivity is a product of the way in
which television images are produced, as is our desire that
violence be used in response. Perhaps the greater our
frustration with our passivity, the greater our need to see
action taken in our name.’°7
The point of the photojournalist must be to evoke some sort of emotional response
from us, and that emotional response must be to demand that our governments act
on our behalf. What we have to evaluate is not only the conditions that made
‘° Orford, 32.
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(J those pictures possible, but our emotional response to those images so that in
acting we do so intelligently, methodicaily, with compassion and responsibility—
not blindly, with distress and panic. The images we see evoke the latter response.
We also see another phenomenon occurring with war coverage. People
often complain flot that we do flot get enough coverage, but that we get too much.
It interferes with other forms of entertainment. I think that it is preciseiy because
ofthe effect war photos have on us that people respond in this way. It is precisely
this paralysis Berger identifies so weii that we reject the images at some
fundamental level. In fact, for ail the high speed technology and equipment we
have, we get an awfui lot ofthe same thing. What we need is flot a lot ofhorror,
but a lot more knowledge. As Sky war correspondent Jake Lynch said about the
Kosovo campaign: “We were given lots ofmaterial but no information”.’08
Compare what Phillip Knightley sees as a war correspondent with what Walzer
sees as the revolution that has shaped our moral imperatives: this observation is
made by Knightley,
The revolution in communications technology; the satellite
phone—the star ofthe war; instant TV links from the front to
the studio and between correspondents in the field; electronic
transmission of still photographs; and—the latest arrivai at the
front—the internet; ail were available to provide the public
with an unprecedented overview of the war. The ordinaty, the
literate citizen would be able to know more about the conflict
than any war in histoy.. .Instead we drowned in wave afler
wave ofwords and images that added up to nothing.’°9
(emphasis added).
And this one by Walzer,
It may be possible to ldll people on a very large scale more
efficiently than ever before, but it is much harder to ldll them
in secret. In the contemporary world there is very little that
108 Knightly, “fighting Dirty”.
109 Ibid.
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() happens far away, out ofsight or behind the scenes;
camera crews arrive faster than rigor mortis. We are instant
spectators ofevery atrocity; we sit in our living rooms and see
the murdered chiidren, the desperate refugees. Perhaps
horrific crimes are stiil committed in dark places, but flot
many; contemporary horrors are well-lit.11°
Rather than discourse, revealing competing points of view which might actually
help us understand, and thus engage in the solution, we get the kind of images that
leave us feeling so morally bankrupt that we pass the problem on to others:
namely, the governments or international institutions who represent us. In this
way, we can absolve ourselves from the guilt we feel, having been subjected to
images of cruelty. But this is flot to meaningfully participate in our liberal
democracies; it is to abandon our right to extend influence and apply pressure on
our govemments to act and to be responsible for their actions; it is to defer our
rightful authority onto others. That is the effect of photo journalism.
The two foundational issues I have dealt with have to do with what I see
as the essential problems for the legitimacy ofhumanitarian intervention. The
idea for the justification ofhumanitarian intervention can only work within a
parficular narrative frame and that frarne can only be understood in terms of an
objective, neutrally situated media. If the narrative frame as we understand it, and
the vessel through which that frame an-ives are both challenged, the already
tenuous idea ofhumanitarian intervention becomes even more unstable, and its
justification harder to produce. More seriously, I argue that both these challenges
to humanitarian intervention render the idea hopelessly untenable. If the world
were as simple as comic book heroes and villains, we could accommodate a
110 Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention” in The Ethics of
Humanitarian Intervention ed., Georg Meggie (Frankfurt: Ontos/Verlag, 2004), 21.
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vigilante justice otherwise only acceptable in the fantasy world of childhood
imagination, but as advocates of international law and justice acting in the
interests ofhumanity, there is no room for such an idea.
Having dealt with the foundational problem with the legitimacy for
humanitarian intervention, I mm now to more particular daims for legitimacy,
from which some activists for intervention derive justification, and I will
challenge each one as they are defined.
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C III-iv: The preservation of the practical and moral Iegifimacy of
international law:
This argument maintains that in cases of extreme human suffering, there is
a necessity to act using military force, even in the face of Security Council
opposition, if we are to maintain the integrity or the spirit of the Iaw. Wil D.
Verwey puts it like this:
If international law, at the present stage of its development and
taldng account the present level offunctional capabilities of
the UN System, were to provide no room for genuinely
selfless, morally-dictated last-resort humanitarian intervention
in extreme cases where the Security Council is unable to act
tirnely and effectively, it might lose control over, or even
become irrelevant to the solution of, some of the greatest
human dramas in the world. In such cases, prohibiting
intervention by individual states [..j might become so utterly
immoral as to undermine the basic fundamental, if not the very
idea oflaw.’1’
I anticipate a real problem with this daim: international law has to provide
“room” for “genuinely selfless, moralÏy-dictated” humanitarian interventions.
International law is not equipped to provide moral exceptions to rules as is
suggested above simply because there is no mechanism which would allow for it.
The stability for an international society of states is guaranteed through the legal
principles of sovereigu inviolability, sovereigu equality, and non-intervention. If
we draw a separate category which makes exceptions to the norms which are
supposed to guarantee international peace and stability, at best we jeopardize
international law, or at worst, we bring an end to it, but I cannot see how we
would “preserve the practical and moral legitimacy ofit” by breaking it. The
‘humanitarian exception’ creates a special category ofstates who are presumably
flot only morally superior to other states, but also who are above the law, for the
Verwey quoted in Humanitarian Intervention, DUPI, 99.
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C law, at times, wiii flot appiy. The difficuity in Verwey’s daim is to decide who
wili make the ultimate final judgments about exceptionai cases.
In the previous section, I have shown how the flindamentai assumptions
inherent within the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ include a separation of
good and bad: those on the side ofjustice and fteedom, and those seeking to
destroy it. In my analysis, I included a critique of the foie the international
community plays prior to and during regional conflict, with a view to introduce a
conceptual shifi in our understanding ofthe global dynamic of seeming closed,
non-Western, regional conflicts play. This daim by Verwey puts back into place
the separation of us and them: good and evil. In this critique, I want to look at the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (or, the ICISS)
in ternis ofhow they place our (Western) responsibiiity to protect in conffict
areas.
The synopsis ofthe ICISS summarizes the basic principles ofR2P in two
ways: State sovereignty implies responsibility and while that responsibility lies
within the state itself, when a population is suffering, and the state is not able or
not willing to hait or avert the suffering, the international community must take on
the responsibiiity to protect those nationais. The report produced by this
commission allows for the exception Verwey seeks in his appeal to preserve the
integrity of the law in whatever way necessary. The responsibility to protect
refers to the responsibility of either the state in question, or ifie greater
international community to protect individuals in times of crisis. But while it
prioritizes prevention in principle (“Prevention is the single most important
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C dimension ofthe responsibility to protect”)”2, it offers nothing in the way ofa
mechanism for (a) ensuring that this principle is realized, or (b) holding those
responsible whose policies or actions have contributed to the conditions ofthe
crisis. While the report admits that
Intra-state warfare is ofien viewed, in the prosperous West,
simply as a set of discrete and unrelated crises occurring in
distant and unimportant regions. In reality, what is happening
is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and state
formation ffiat is transforming the international order itself.
Moreover, the rich world is deeply implïcated in the
process. Civil conflicts are fiielled by arms and monetary
transfers that originate in the developed world, and their
destabilizing effects are felt in the developed world in
everything from globally interconnected terrorism to refugee
flows, the export of drugs, the spread of infectious disease and
organized crime.”3 (emphasis added).
The report goes on to frame this in terms of “acute dilemmas” and yet continues
to recommend military intervention, despite worries that “it can be difficuit to
avoid doing rather more ham than good”4 in the words ofifie report itseÏf. In
my view, the commission fails to make the necessary and appropriate connections
that would secure peace and stability, and uphold the integrity, both the spirit and
letter, of international law. It first recognizes how porous borders are, and within
it, the implications ofthe international community in regional ethnic conflicts; it
adheres to the principle ofboth sovereign integrity and prevention; and then it
continues to recommend military action so that we minimize “the risk of
becoming complicit bystanders in massacre, ethnic cleansing, and even
genocide”, despite that military action might do more harm than good. I attribute
this inconsistency to a failure to fully appreciate or recognize the tendency ofthe
112 R2P, (3), Elements, A. p., xi.
113 ICISS, l-20.
‘ ICISS, 1-22., 5.
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C West toward hoctica1 patemalism, rooted in the histoca1 habit of
colonialism. By uÏtimately punishing the victims, instead of helping them, the
West is absolved of its responsibility before and during conflicts. In this way,
making exceptions to the law in order to preserve the integrity ofthe law fails its
stated goals. The next daim to legitimacy made by interventionists is the appeal
to the “lesser evil” principle. R appeals to the Robert McNamara school of
thought where ‘sometimes to do good, you have to do evil’.”5
115 The fog 0f War: Eleven Lessonsfrom the Lfe ofRobert S. McNamara, DVD directed by Errol
Moi-ris (2004; Berlin, Germany: Sony Picture Classics, 2007).
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III-v: The fesser evil princîple—Emergency Rule:
This justification—that is, doing wrong to prevent greater wrongs is
connected with the first justification about preventing mass scale human rights
abuses by military force as the only option to do so. It is supported by concem for
the protection ofthe life and dignity ofthe individual in international Iaw. It
adheres to the beliefthat somefimes to do good one must do some cvii. While
this appeals to the sensibility of many people, a counter daim can be made just as
weÏÏ, without really being able to assess the truth or validity of either. Take what
Kant says, for example: “[A]1l these supposedly good intentions cannot wash
away the stain of injustice from the means which are used to implement them.”6
Or, Mo Tzu “If the rulers and officiais and generals ofthe world sincerely desire
to promote what is beneficial to the world and to eliminate what is harniful, they
should realize that offensive warfare is in fact a great harm to the world.”17
I think one wilÏ determine which premise is true may depend ultimately on
how much faith one has in the ability of war to ‘do good’. And it will rely on
whether or not one believes that force can be used benevoÏentÏy. I would like to
show two things: first, I will map out how we have moved toward a lesser-evil
principle (in support of war as a method for resolving dispute), and in so doing,
illustrate the way in which interventionists have re-written war in a way that
makes it acceptable to liberal minds; second, I want to offer a feminist
116 Immanuel Kant, “Section III: Cosmopolitan Right,” in Kant’s Political Writings ed., H.S.
Reiss. (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1991) 173.
117 Mo Tzu, “Against Offensive War,” in Basic Writings ofMa Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han fei Tzu,
ed. and trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 60-6 1.
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interpretation ofthe negative effects ofwar or humanitarian intervention in
practical terms.
The ‘lesser-evil’ principle has gained much ground since the end ofthe
Cold War. As Chandier observes “The transformation of the public and political
perception ofmilitary action is reflected in the fact that the social democratic Lefi
have been more in favour of military engagements by Western forces over the last
ten years than the conservative Right.US There are two major trends that indicate
our changing predisposition toward a mental and actual readiness for war as a
means for solving conflict: the first exists at the international level. Central to our
international institutional policy-making is the inclusion of documents, like R2P,
outiining the conditions for military intervention. Aside from policy-making
legitimizing the use of force, the UN is in the process of restructuring its military
operations to 5e permanently ready for war.119 The second trend is that on the
level ofpeace activism, peace movements have been replaced by NGO’s and
other professional associations.120 The fact that in the first eighteen months of
power, the UK Labour govemment dropped more bombs than the previous
Conservative one did in eighteen years, that the leading advocates ofthe Kosovo
war all had social democratic backgrounds, and that NGO’s like MSF, Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have offered not only support, but ofien
pressured governrnents to the launch wars in the last 15 years, ail testify to the
way in which war discourse has been redefined through an ethical agenda. This
118 David Chandier, from Kosovo to KabuÏ: Human Rights and International Intervention (Ann
Arbor: Pluto Books, 2006), 157.
119 Ibid., 157. This is a devastating cry from Kant’s cosmopolitan vision: “Standing armies wiIl
gradually be abolished akogether” in Kant ‘s Political Writings, 94.
120 Chandler, 157.
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prioritizes war as a method for resolving conflict and it goes against the post
WWII trend, as well as against the Paris Pact of 192$ for the renunciation ofwar
as a method for resolving dispute. This trend adheres to the principle that human
rights can be achieved through war. The conceptual shifi made by liberals is that
War has corne to be defmed through the discourse ofhuman
rights and ethical intervention as either an attack on vuinerable
people, that is, human rights abuse, or as an attempt to protect
the human rights of the vuinerable. The redefmition of war
and rnilitary intervention has made one kind of conffict
irrational, ‘degenerate’ and uncivilized and another moral and
ethical.’2’
One clarification that needs to be made when weighing the benefits and costs of a
military operation for a humanitarian goal is to distinguish ‘humanitarian
intervention’ from ‘war’. Some authors sharply distinguish one from ffie other
while for Coady, military operations aie one and the same no matter what we calÏ
them.’22 I distinguish between declaring a ‘humanitarian intervention’ and
declaring a ‘war’ onÏy in ternis of public intention, but flot in terms oftheir effect
with regard to its potential for destabilization, death and destruction. Hehir’s
reason for distinguishing the two also has to do with justification, and he daims
that it is more difficuli to justify a humanitarian intervention than a war. 123
The reason these distinctions are important is because I am trying to
distinguish between whether there is such a thing as a ‘humanitarian war’. I
propose to determine whether the costs outweigh the benefits; whether it is
efficacious; and finally I want to explore whether there are conceptual difficulties
121 Chandier, 169.
122 C.A.J. Coady, “The Ethics of Armed Hurnanitarian Intervention” Peaceworks No. 45, (August
2002): 7.
123 Coady refers to Brian Hehir’s distinction in “Intervention: From Theories to Cases” Ethics and
International Affairs, 9 (1995): 7.
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with the idea. The consensus (in the West) seems to be in terms of seeing good
war (humanitarian intervention) as moral, just and necessary, and most
importantly, as a method for resolving conflict, reducing human rights abuses, and
restoring justice. Bad wars (‘degenerate’) are those ‘other’, non-Western
conflicts, and are an expression ofthe “cultural and civiÏisational failings ofthe
people ofthat region”.’24 This way of frarning post-Cold War conflict fails to
consider the analysis from any geo-political or economic perspective. It neglects
to consider social struggie, and further, it deprives the investigation of any
consideration ofthe international power relations affecting regional conflict. The
analysis is purely psychological: its level of comprehension, is Hollywood in
nature. Conflict in non-Western states has been described as evil, irrational,
uncontrollable, whereas for Western powers, war is the civilizing force, killing
innocents only as an unintended consequence ofrestoring human rights.
There is a tendency to see oui- (Western) forces as the advocates of
freedom and justice. If we did not believe that, we would flot be able to support
militai-y action for the purpose of doing good. There must be an underlying belief
that flot only can force be used benevolently, but that if it can, we (Western,
liberal-democratic states) surely must be able to be ifiose enforcers. The literature
on humanitarian intervention accepts this presupposition overwhelmingly. Some
critiques, however, look at the possibilities of armies doing good in ways that
challenge this belief in profound ways. In “The Politics of Collective Security”
Orford provides a detailed account ofhow discourse on human rights abuses and
124 Chandier, 169.
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C solutions for regional conflicts has neglected gender-differentiated effects of their
‘solutions’. Her extensive research shows two things: the universality of male
interests is taken for granted by international lawyers; and that as a resuit, women
are rendered less secure by actions authorized by the Security Council in the name
of collective security. Perhaps most shocking is that
the persistence of complaints made by women alleging that
they have been raped or assaulted by thefr “protectors” in
Bosnia, Cambodia, and the Gulfsuggests that peacekeepers
and peace enforcement forces are no less likely than members
of other military forces to rape and assault civilian women and
women soldiers.’25
I think the reason it is shocking is because we have naturaliy assumed a good-guy,
bad-guy paradigm in our minds and when the merits ofhumanitarian war are
weighed and argued, part ofthe equation is not that we are capable ofthe kinds of
human rights abuses we seek to hait. If we believed that, we could flot develop
poiicies that demanded military intervention.
The empiricai evidence demands that we reexamine our assumption about
being the advocates ofhuman rights and about being able to restore those rights
through force. Some examples to this effect are as follows: In December 1993,
Aldo Ajello, the commander ofthe U.N. mission in Mozambique received a ietter
of complaint from the International Save the Children Alliance stating that U.N.
military personnel had bought sex from hundreds of girls, many ofwhom were
orphaned or abandoned during the war. In response to sexual assault complaints
and the dramatic increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Yashuki Akashi, the chief
of the United Nations Transitionai Authority in Cambodia, and later the head of
125 Offord, Anne, “The Politics of Collective Security” in Michigan Journal ofInternational Law
17 (1995-96): 377.
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U.N.’s peacekeeping operation in Bosnia repiied that: “. . .l$year-old, hot
blooded soldiers” have a right to drink, enjoy themseives, and chase “young,
beautiful beings ofthe opposite sex”.126 Beyond the empirical evidence that
points to particular case studies, of which these few exampies are certainly flot
exhaustive, is the work of Clausewitz, who details the fact that ail of our good
intentions go astray when real soidiers are put down on the ground to fight wars,
the unpredictability of which caimot be accounted for in theory. As Clausewitz
puts it, war is uitimately about the use of force, and while phiianthropists may
imagine that there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming the enemy,
doing so without great bloodshed is impossible. In war, he says, errors from good
intentions are the worst kinds oferrors.’27 This is a fact of war that Clausewitz
refers to as “fog” and McNamara later quotes in a film about that very subject.’28
I tend to argue against military force to achieve peaceful ends.
International legal scholar, Professor Oscar Schachter, says authoritatively that
[n]either human rights, democracy or seif-determination are
acceptable legal grounds for waging war, flot for that matter,
are traditional just war causes or righting wrongs. This
conclusion is not only in accord with the UN Charter as it was
originally understood; it is also in keeping with the
interpretation adopted by the great majority of States to the
present time)29
Let us consider this from a Kantian perspective, aithough I recoguize that to do so
is flot to assume a unified Kantian perspective. While I invoke what Georg
126 Gayle Kirshenbaum, “Who’s Watching the Peacekeepers?” Ms., May-June 1994, p. 12 quoted
in Offord, 378.
127 Clausewitz, 127-132.
128 The film is then called “The Fog ofWar” because McNamara quotes Clausewitz when
describing the events of wars he lived through.
129 Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theoîy and Practice (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), 128.
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(E Cavallar nicely cails Kant’s warning against “moral terrorism”30, with reference
to a war with good intentions, others like fernando Teson, Sidney Axinn, Howard
Williams will defend humanitarian intervention using a Kantian perspective and
argument. My reading of Kant is simply that war is neverjustified by good
intentions, like the implementation ofhuman rights. This, I believe, goes against
the most fundamental tenets of Kant’s moral and political philosophy. Many
interpreters of Kant, however, (like Teson, Axinn, Williams, and to a degree
Cavallar) believe that the duty of non-intervention is incompatible with the basic
tenets of Kantian moral theory. The difficulties that arise for interpreters of Kant
who believe in the efficaciousness ofa humanitarian intervention are that there
exists a conflict between the value ofmaintaining the dignity ofhuman life, and
the evil ofwar. Those who oppose Kant’s conceptual difficuÏties with the ‘good
intentioned war’, like Williams, approach the question from a teleological and
consequentialist perspective, which confronts and conflicts with Kant’s
conceptual framework. Kant would argue that we can always find good
arguments for the use of violence on the grounds that it is in the best interests of
the world.’3’ Indeed we have aiways done so. But Kant is unequivocal in his
response. Ris clarity and brevity puts an end to dispute when he says “Woe to the
legislator who wishes to establish through force a polity directed to ethical
ends.”32 This is what Cavallar interprets from Kant to mean “moral terrorism”,
although Cavallar too has some problems with accepting the unconditional duty
‘° Georg Cavallar, Kant and the Theo,y and Practice ofInternational Right (Cardiif: University
ofWales Press, 1999), 130.
131 Kant, 173.
132 Kant, Immanuel, Religion within the Limits ofReason Alone, ftans. Theodore M. Greene and
Hoyt H. Hudson (New York, Harper & Row, 1960), 87.
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C of non-intervention. He begins with Kant’s own exception, wherein Kant
suggests it “would be a different matter if a state, through internai discord, were to
spiit into two parts, each ofwhich set itselfup as a separate state and claimed
authority over the whole”.’33 Cavallar refers to an interesting distinction Hauke
Brunkhorst makes between state and popular sovereignty.’34 The latter takes
precedence over the former, he wiÏl daim, and therefore may justify an
intervention according to Kant. I wouid respond on side with Reisman who
makes two objections: first, we must oppose interventions because the selectivity
invoived in choosing one state over another leaves the project open to abuse, and
that secondly, we do not know when “a considerable part of the population” is
exposed to massive human rights violations.’35 While Cavallar believes we can
go beyond the text of Kant to reinterpret his political phiÏosophy in order to make
it relevant to our context, I believe Kant’ s moving appeal has much force and
must be considered even within the context ofhumanitarian crises:
Now, moral-practical reason within us pronounces the
following frresistible veto: There shah be no war, either
between states, which, although internally Iaw-govemed, stili
live in a lawless condition in thefr external relationships with
one another. for war is not the way in which anyone should
pursue his rights.136
It is aiways difficult, however, to make any ‘unequivocal’ statements
about the interpretation of Kant. Teson demonstrates this when he makes
compelling arguments to show a Kantian interpretation for the necessity of
133 Reiss, Kant ‘s Fohitical Writings, 96.
134 Cavallar, 89.
135 W. M Reisman, “Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law,” American
Journal oflnternationalLaw 84, (1990), 866 quoted in Cavallar, 185.
136 Reiss, Kant ‘s Pohitical Writings, 174. ffrst italics Kant’s emphasis,
second, mine).
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C humanitarian intervention. The spirit in which I interpret Kant is that in which the
ultimate goal wouid be to resolve methods of dispute without resorting to the
power enforced by violence, but by appealing to a much deeper, meaningful and
lasting power, that is, the power ofthe legislator from within. In other words, if
we have a true belief in human rights, then the way to enforce the enactment of
such values is flot to bomb people into submission, but rather to appeal to reason.
And while the latter method takes much longer, the fact of the matter is that the
former method does flot work. At best, ‘humanitarian interventions’ can hait one
form of violence, replacing it with another, and then leaving the new power
imbalance to perpetuate violence on a reverse side. Instead ofletting crisis
situations corne to a level of gravity so severe that one is lefi in a panic, and in
which any action is a choice to be made between ail evils, we should examine the
possibilities of dipiomacy in which state interference (in a positive, and non
military sense) stifles the fires that explode. A Kantian vision of cosmopolitanism
encourages the use ofa stronger, more durable power. That power appeals to
reason, flot force.
In more cases than not, the fact ofmilitary intervention has meant brutal
invasion in the name ofhumanity. By labeling the action ‘humanitarian’ we are
subject to the moral tenorism Kant alludes to when he describes ifie Ïegislator
using force to estabÏish ethical ends. It is conceptually contradictory to accept
that war is waged for humanitarian purposes. Kant had a problem with it, and that
problem remains today, despite appeals to humanitarian crises. Howard Williams
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C challenges the Kantian conceptual difficulty with waging war for peace in his
study of Kant’s political philosophy:
A reformer and republican more passionate than Kant might,
indeed, recommend intervention in the name ofprogress, and
if such intervention were a success who would fail to applaud
it? This is a difficuit problem to which it is impossible to give
an unequivocal answer.’37
One ofthe reasons it is impossible to give an unequivocal answer is because it is
as yet stiil an unrealized hypothetical situation that we have not seen. This
(perhaps disputable) observation must influence the way in which we understand
the problem of humanitarian intervention.
Whether war as a lesser-evil principle is a valid justification is really
something we can decide in terms ofhow the idea appeals to our sensibilities.
Those who tend toward this justification must be prepared to account for, at least
in some way, the problem ofthe unpredictability ofwar, the damage it does, and
its future cost. The lesser-evil principle makes some assumptions about the
efficaciousness ofwar, and this is flot something to be dismissed. The genuine
questions that emerge then point directly to what circumstances would allow for
wars which would be both effective and cause the least amount of damage. These
are not easy questions to answer.
One ofthe inevitable facts of interventions are their violation ofstate
sovereignty (ofien treated by interventionists as many lesser evils). The next
section will then deal with what it means to interventionists and non
interventionists alike to deal with the problem of the violation of state
sovereignty. Advocates of intervention will argue ffiat in fact there is a de facto
137 Howard Williams, Kant’sPoliticalFhilosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 247.
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sovereignty being upheld with military action ftom a foreign state. I will treat
that problem accordingly.
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(D III-vi: The de facto integrity of the core of state sovereignty:
This very important justification rests on the assumption that while at the
heart of state sovereignty is the territorial integrity and political independence of
the state, that right is derived from the citizens of that state. This is precisely the
daim that Walzer makes when lie says that the duties and rights of states are
nothing more than the rights and duties ofthose who compose them. Grotius
conceived the individual and her natural rights as the core of law, and to which
the fundamental principles of good faith and soÏidarity are universally applicable,
regardless ofnationality or status. This principle ofnatural law was applied to the
international sphere, and thus the Law of Nations derives its core premises.
Accordingly, the nation state was developed out of the necessity to guarantee the
security of the individual. It follows that the legal rights ofthe state are bound
within the mandate of securing the inherent and basic rights of the individual.
Viewed in this light, the international right to state sovereignty simultaneously
endorses and restricts its powers: a threat to the security ofthe citizens who
together comprise the state permits the suspension of that conditional right. This
argument relies on the assumption that the purpose ofthe United Nations is the
security ofpersons. wiffi a view to develop and maintain global peace. And while
the UN was established to do this via the governance ofintra-state conflict, the
majority of conflicts are inter-state, so if their purpose is to protect the individual,
it is increasingly the case that the culprit ofthe crime ofwar fails on the heads of
the individual’s own govemments, therefore the point of the UN is to protect
individuals from their own govemments. This, the argument follows, means that
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humanitarian intervention does flot in fact violate state sovereignty—rather, it
helps maintain it in accordance wiffi its original intention. Any serious critique of
humanitarian intervention must be able to address this reading of state
sovereignty.
Strictly (legaliy) speaking, sovereignty refers to the legal independence of
ail states or international organs. Rostow defines it lilce this:
The formai structure of the international state system is built
on the principie that each state is autonomous and
independent, and bas the right in its internai affafrs to be free
from acts of coercion committed or assisted by other states.
This mie is basic to the possibihty of international iaw.’38
According to the International Law Commission’s “Drafi Declaration on Rights
and Duties of States” (1949) articles one and two distinguish external and internai
sovereignty as being respectively “the right to independence and hence to exercise
fteely, without dictation by any other State, ail its legal powers, including the
choice of its own form of govemment” and “the right to exercise jurisdiction over
ils territory and over ail persons and things therein, subj ect to the immunities
recognized by international law”.’39 Legally speaking, then, the problem of
humanitarian intervention rests within its inherent breach of the principle of
sovereignty. Humanitarian intervention must be able to reconcile, on a legal
basis, de tege tata (what the law is, explicitly) with de legeferenda (what the law
ought to be). The ability to do so lies in its capacity to provide a moral
justification for what the law ought to be, stemrning from a universal conception
138
• Rostow, “In Search of a Major Premise: ‘What is a Foreign Policy For?” (Aprii 1971), 239-
242.
139 International Law Commission (ILC) ‘Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States’
(1949), GA Resoiution 375 (W).
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C about the iaw of nature, with regard to basic secuty of ail persons. It is with this
in mmd that Aristotie said “One part of what is politicaliy just is natural, and the
other part legal. What is natural is what has the same validity everywhere
alike”.’4° It is this that cosmopolitans refer to with respect to a universal or
common morality.
Before addressing this daim, I want to review the literature on what the
stated purpose of sovereignty is, because if it is a principie worth defending, it
must have some ment to it above and beyond the principle itself. What makes
this principie worth defending, and why is the challenge of it met with such
suspicion and reticence by many? Finally, afier sketching out some ofthe
objections to the violation of state sovereignty, I wiil offer a new interpretation of
the concept of sovereignty, and how it should be understood in terms of
globalization.
One of the probiems with the violation ofthe principle of sovereignty is
that the mechanisms or means used to implement the desired ends are somewhat
contradictory. First, the challenge to sovereignty that is, the exercise of the most
basic sense ofultimate authority over a particular territory, is integral to the
purported intentions ofthe kind ofpolitical institutions we want to instaii.
further, it is only through sovereignty that such institutions are developed and
implemented. In this sense, the means (military intervention) are at odds with the
ends (the guarantee ofhuman rights, which can only be implemented through a
sovereign state’s institutions). The idea that a military force can go in and hait
massive human rights abuses without any political interpretation of the situation,
140 Aristotie, Nichomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20 (1 134b).
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C and therefore, without any particular plan for a post-intervention period, makes
the possibility for the effectiveness ofthe intervention unlikely. Admittedly, the
ICISS recognizes that “. .intervention sometimes means taking sides in intra-state
conflicts. Once it does so, the international community may only 5e aiding in the
further fragmentation ofthe state system”41. The only way to guarantee peace is
through the binding international human rights covenants, and the only way to do
that is through the sovereign exercise of ratification of international treaties.
Human rights records according to OSCE indicate that states whose sovereignty is
finnly grounded are more likely to be respected than in states whose sovereignty
is tenuous.
Secondly, the idea that international actors can construct democratic
governance goes against, in a sense, what democratic governance is really about.
“Democracy is,” says Stanton, “among other tbings, a means for resolving
confiicts in a society on an ongoing basis”.’42 Within that structure we identify
institutions like, for example, regular, free and fair elections. The Western liberal
tradition emphasizes procedures that ensure effective participation which in turn
is designed to ensure public accountability ofelected officials. Sustainable
democratic institutions can only prevail in societies where wining or losing an
election will not cause them harm. Thïs problem is illustrated through the army
coup against President Jean-Baptiste Aristide ofHaiti less than a year afier he
won internationally recognized and certified elections. There must 5e a
reconciliation of and a mechanism balancing the mediating role of sovereignty
C 141 iciss, L22., 5.
142 Kimberly Stanton, “Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation for Human Rights”,
Harvard International Review 16, no. 1 (Fali, 1993): 15.
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with the nature ofthe democratic learning process: “The road to change is not
through force, but by encouraging practices consistent with democracy and
respectful ofhuman rights”.’43 What Stanton hopes to achieve with this analysis
is a reinforcement of the ratification of international covenants, from which we
can derive daims that are valid in international law in national courts. By
institutionalizing international human rights practices on the legislative, judicial
and enforcement level, the auffiority is asserted on the local level as opposed to
the international one, where that kind of implementation is purely theoretical.
This also ensures that interventionist aims do not have imperial aspirations in their
chosen territory of concern. Neocolonialist fears about humanitarian intervention
are prevalent in this daim: “It is well-known that the practice of intervention has
diverged from international law with respect to ‘less civilized,’ ‘non-Western,’
‘developing’ states, leaving intervention linked with imperialism and colonialism
in historical memory”.’44
But I want to further challenge the notion of sovereignty, especially in
terms ofhow it is used (and abused) in this context. Any challenge to sovereignty
must include an analysis ofhow we understand sovereignty in an age of
globalization. further, we must include the meaning and significance of
‘sovereignty’ in an age where globalization is not only a fact, but an irreversible
one. That sovereignty is contingent upon so many other economic as well as
cultural factors is but one clarifying point through winch we are challenged to see
states flot as individual separate entities in winch conflict erupts, void of any
143 Stanton 16.
144 Stanton, 16.
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(J international interference or knowledge, but rather a web of intricately woven
designs, already challenging the idea that we live segregated, each of us on our
own islands.
The notion of strict sovereignty is in fact a mythical one: no such thing
actually exists. Interference with one another’s borders happen at many levels:
economic trade, environrnental degradation; political philosophies; refiigee crises;
and media are only a few of the ways in which our borders are more maïleable,
less solid than international law recognizes. The oniy time interventionists talk
about the need to trump the right of sovereignty is in terms of military action. But
sovereignty is trnmped through ail kinds of other more subtle measures)45
Sovereignty is already conditional upon many factors which influence, interfere
and restructure traditional notions of its inviolability. I have already made the
argument that so much of intra-state activity is dependent and influenced by
international actors, thus already reducing what it means to be sovereigu (in the
sense of ‘independent’).
Intervention is already a fact, but military intervention is not its logical
fallout, especially given the arnount of influence the international community is
already able to yield. If the international community is able to yield enormous
influence, as I have shown that it has, then my suggestion, which may sound
naive, but which I believe is far more effective and less dangerous to global peace
and stability, is that that influence be used in a non-military capacity to reduce the
risk of conflict.
145 The film, Genocide By Sanctions, DVD, directed by Gloria La Riva (New York: People’s
Video Network, 1998) is a devastating portrayal of the impact of US foreign policy on Iraqi
chiidren.
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C” I believe that this idea is the truly radical one, whereas humanitarian
intervention is treated as though it is radical and innovative. It is radical because
sovereignty is an idea that ensures the rights for equality for ail member states of
the world, not just the strong ones, whereas justifying military force is a fact of
history. There is nothing new or interesting about it. Even using human rights as
the justification for the use of force is flot a new or radical idea. It lias been used,
and it has been abused throughout history. But putting pressure on our
governments to use the power they aiready have to impede conflict, instead of
encourage it is the radical idea. It allows us to maintain the sovereign equality it
took so long to achieve and it delegates responsibiiity for ail members of the
global community to participate in active, non violent way with the genuine
cosmopolitan intention to ensure peace and stability. Sovereignty is not the thing
that should be attacked because it is flot the core ofthe problem.
The next daim to legitimacy refers to the principle of deterrence. Its
justificatory appeal remains within the frame of the humanitarian narrative in that
it presupposes a number of key factors about the nature of conflict being strictly
intemal, without considering extemal influences or the impact of the international
comrnunity. As such, it will be criticized along the same unes ofthe general
theme throughout this critique.
11$
cD III-vii: The deterrence principle
The deterrence principle relies on the belief that the practice of
humanitarian intervention will discourage weak states from conducting systematic
violations ofhuman rights, and that absent such a policy, human rights violations
would likely increase in problem areas where separatist groups emerge or ethnic
tensions exist. In general, this position holds that adherence to human rights is a
precondition to state stability and that weak states would be forced to comply if
examples were set by humanitarian interventions. This in tum contributes to
global peace and security.
On a very practical level, this theory may backfire: As explained by the
Danish Institute of Intemational Affairs,
By increasing the frequency of humanitarian intervention and
sharpening the rhetoric about absolute rights for individuals
and groups that overrule traditional notions of sovereignty
there is a risk of altering the calculations of and encouraging
rebellion among minorities and other groups who are targets
of government oppression.’46
But because there exists a disproportionate amount of media coverage and
government attention to regions which are more or less of strategic importance,
the risk is that weak states couÏd be in humanitarian crisis situations, suffering
further fragmentation, with no recourse to help. The fact that humanitarian
interventions are recommendations, and not obligations, and fiirther, because
military action is selected on the basis of strategic importance or political alliance,
plans by rebel forces to gain attention tbrough violence may work against them.
146 Humanztanan Intervention, DUPI, 102.
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C This kind of deterrence-setting can cause more friction than the intended
consequence of stability.
Also, adhering to this principle requires an abandonment of the principle
of equality between states, and to do so would be, in my opinion, a terrible
setback in the gains international law has made in developing a theoretically
egalitarian international society of states. Further, this principle gives too much
legal and military power to the already disproportionately powerful states who
wouÏd be the interveners or the example-setters. To make the daim that there is a
risk for abuse is to neglect the reality which extends beyond ‘risk’. Rogue states
in this case are onÏy weak ones. Even if we show, through international legal case
study where, when, how and to what degree a powerful nations like the United
States had defied international iaw, thereby qualifying them as ‘rogue states’, they
would flot be subject to a military intervention on the basis of example-setting to
the rest ofthe world. Stronger, intervening states will neyer 5e subject to this
kind of scnitiny and this leads to an inherent inequality amongst states. A cynical
way of framing this argument would be to suggest that the mies of Security
Council onÏy apply to strong (powerful) states, while weak ones are subjected to
ad-hoc law. International legal scholars have set principles of equality in the
explicit letter of the law with a view to reduce the kind ofimbalance that a
‘deterrence-principÏe’ would admit. This principle legitimizes inequality between
states, and treats international law with disdain. The next section wiÏl address the
problem of Security Council paralysis.
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(D III-viii: The ouly response to Security Council paralysis:
Some respond to the problem ofhumanitarian intervention by suggesting
that because rogue states can calculate and thereby abuse the Security Council
system by relying on votes one way or another, while getting away with abusive
practices in their state, the only way to resoïve this problem is to act despite
Security Council paralysis. This is a familiar argument made by human rights
activists frustrated by the inability ofthe Security Council to make any definitive
moves in times ofurgency. The idea thus furthered in that the Security Council is
flot able to fulfihi its function as an executive power which is in effect, to maintain
international peace and security.
In response to this, weighing the alternative may prove to be just as
unpalatable, and it may further jeopardize the already fragile international security
system we have in place. Making exceptions for the use of force afier working 50
hard as an international comrnunity to prohibit it, may not only mean a step
backward in the development of international law, it may create a loop-hole for
the prohibition of the use of force when non-humanitarian interests dominate.
Further, dividing the Security Council in this way (acting despite the invocation
ofthe veto) can upset the legal order established post WWII, dividing the great
powers, and creating the kind ofhostility at the international level which could
lead to greater global instability: “Side-stepping the Security Council and
endangering the relationship between the great powers for the sake ofhuman
rights enforcement might produce consequences for the whole world far worse
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than inaction in the face of humanitarian disaster”.’47 Following that, with the
undermining ofthe authority ofthe Security Council, we would really have no
central authoritative figure to whom we tum to address issues of security and
peace. This would be to ultimately undermine the whole project for peace post
WWII—that is, the beginning ofthe end ofthe United Nations. The next section
will deal with what it means to raise the intolerance for human rights abuses in the
sense that military action will elevate our standards for human rights throughout
the world.
C
________
147 Humanitarian Intervention, DUPI, 102.
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(J III-ix: The enforcement of high regional standards by use of humanitarian
intervention without Security Council approval:
The idea advanced here is that if a group of liberal-democratic states raise
the bar for the security and human rights ofindividuals higher than what the
international legal standards have set, they should flot be bound to the laws of the
lower standard. Basically, it means that individuals in conflict zones whose lives
are at risk are failed by the global community who are adhering to the lowest
common denominator.
Inherent in this idea is the presupposition that the liberal-democratic states
are morally superior, precedent-setting states, whose example rogue states are
bound to follow, lest they are punished by the use ofmilitary force by the
stronger. By this point, I think I have adequately shown that the participation of
so-called liberai democracies in foreign conftict compromises their position of
moral superiority. Further, what this view advances is the creation of a new law,
a parallel set ofrules, enforced by the more powerful states. In my view, this
would be to put at risk the existing legal order for another set ofrules, deveÏoped
and enforced by, let us cail it, the political elite. I think this would cause great
damage to our international legal order which seeks to include the world as a
global community in the advancement of law for the protection of ah the peoples
ofthe world. The United Nations, afier ail, is composed of”we, the people”, flot
“we, the ehites”.
Positing the daim that humanitarian intervention is truly based on
humanitarian grounds, we must observe some ‘realist cautions’ as delineated by
Coady. There are three that he notes. The first refers to the danger of moral
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(J superiority, wherein flot only does one suffer from an inflated moral sense of self,
but one becomes blinded to one’s own moral flaws as a resuit. Under this
distortion, regions or groups ofpeople are categorized under ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
exciuding complex subtieties required for the astute political and moral judginent.
Coady writes “Sanctification of oneseif goes hand in hand with demonization of
the other, and such rigid dualism is an obstacle to a sober ethic of international
responsibility.”48 Realism, he goes on to say, requires that we recognize evil
wherever and whenever it occurs. He notes that the monsters of today are our
friends of yesterday, and may be our allies of tomorrow.
The second moral trap delineated refers to the moral oversimplification of
seeing human rights violations without any context. While concem for human
rights weighs heavily on us, this concem must flot blind us from the history and
context within which they occur. “Outrage”, daims Coady “is no substitute for
insight. A legitimate concem for principles needs to be anchored in the factual
realities within which the principles have to make sense and be applied”.’49
Thirdly, we must caution against implicit imposition of values on others. Quite
simply there are some values that may flot have ment on a universal scale, while
those we regard as a moral minimum must be approached with caution and care.
The idea that we, in the West, can posit the standards for the rest ofthe
world follows the trend of colonialism, and moves away from what I would cail
genuine cosmopolitanism. The problem wiffi some visions of cosmopolitanism,
and the reason they are regarded with such suspicion is indeed because they ofien
Coady, “The Ethics ofArmed ...“, 16.
t49 Poid 16.
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sound more like masked coionialists than advocates for members of humanity
which include ail members, and flot just the ones who see things as we do. The
idea that we can raise the standards for the rest ofthe human race is therefore
inherently suspect, and should be treated with caution, especiaiiy when raising
those so-called standards requires using military force. Having deait with the last
daim for legitimacy generally used, and as delineated by the Danish Institute of
International Affairs, I will now conclude this section with a view to introducing
the way in which a reinterpretation of cosmopolitanism will further challenge the
way humanitarianism is used as a justification for military force.
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C’ III-x: Conclusion: The Viabiity of Humanitarian Intervention
The cmx of the matter is about humanitarian interventions and their
tenability. It seems that the principle challenges much ofwhat international legal
theory has worked so hard to achieve. The impulse behind international legal
movements, like the Kellogg-Briand Pact condemning recourse to war is the
maintenance of security and the preservation ofthe sanctity of human life. But
the powerful impulse motivating humanitarian intervention is (as we shah cail it)
a cosmopolitan principle that we should help fellow human beings ofthe world,
regardless ofborders. Both the insistence ofthe inviolability of sovereignty and
the insistence that we traverse sovereign borders are motivated by the same thing:
human security.
The motivation of the solidarist trend to support humanitarian
interventions are worthy enough, but the theory neglects to recognize the
importance ofpohitical context and the power dynamics within which such actions
are taken. Failure to appreciate the context within which any humanitarian
catastrophe occurs renders us vulnerable to grave errors in judgment, especially in
terms ofpost-intervention phase. Further, it supposes that the good intentions of
the citizens of Western states, from where military intervention is likely to
emerge, are a genuine reflection of the intentions of the governments representing
them. Pluralists see the problem in terms of agreeing to a basic number of rules
(sovereignty and its corollary, non-intervention) as a way of safeguarding the
world from the ravages ofwar. The solidarists then face the challenge of
developing (especially unilateral) mihitary interventions reflecting a cosmopolitan
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C wiil or law an expression ofthe whole, because surely any cosmopolitan
conception must include the whole, and not just the powerful.
At this point I have deait with the probiems of motive, intention, and
inconsistency; I have treated what I think are the major conceptual and
foundational problems with humanitarian intervention with an analysis ofboffi the
narrative frame and the problem of media and knowledge. further, I have
outlined some of the practical justifications used to legitimize the use of force for
humanitarian reasons. Now I tum to what I believe lays at the heart of
interventionism—that is, the cosmopolitan frame. That humanitarian intervention
is conceptually and theoretically problematic is a fact to be lamented by
interventionists, and perhaps celebrated by non-interventionists. What I want to
contribute with my critique ofthe subject is that at the heart ofhumanitarian
intervention is flot a genuine cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism must be
reexamined with a view to giving back to the peopie what has been
misappropriated for ofien political purposes. Cosmopolitanism redefined as such
aliows people to simultaneously maintain the integrity of their local identity and
warrant the respect attributed to ail members ofhumanity qua human beings.
In order to make this critique ofhumanitarian intervention a valuable
contribution to the discourse of its legitimacy and tenability, it must speak to the
cosmopolitans of the world. It must appeal to the advocates of a so-called
cosmopolitan world order. The challenge will be to critique some ofthe
assumptions cosmopolitans have been known to make, and yet to maintain the
integrity ofthe idea of cosmopolitanism. It is not my intention to impede the
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C progress of cosmopolitanism. Rather, I hope to contribute to its redirection in
order to strengthen the ment of its foundation.
Central to my argument will be that instead of defining cosmopolitanism
from a Western world view, and instead ofthen imposing that definition on the
rest ofthe world, cosmopolitans must make both a moral and conceptual shifi in
terms ofunderstanding the plurality of perspectives in the world. In this
argument, I challenge the cosmopolitan to redefine him or herself, instead of
defining the other. To do so, I will begin with outiining why cosmopolitanism is
important for both interventionists and non-interventionists alike. I will then
provide a brief historical overview of some of the conceptions of
cosmopolitanism, paying special attention to some of the problems that emerge
from it. From there I will move on to what I caïl failed cosmopolitanism,
exemplified by Diogenes, in order to introduce a competing conception of
patriotism. My analysis ofpatriotism will be to show how it can play an
important role in correcting some ofthe flaws cosmopolitanism is susceptible to.
In so doing, I provide a brief analysis of what patriotism does include, what it
should flot include and how to develop a mechanism for testing it against the
common charge of irrationality and exclusivity. This will provide the backdrop
for what I cail a cosmopolitan patniotism, from which I aspire to derive at a global
conception which challenges the merits ofhumanitarian intervention, and instead
provides the challenge for cosmopolitans to engage in a conceptual shifi that will
allow us to rewrite the narrative frarne from which we currently justify such
interventions.
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C’ Chapter W:
Cosmopolitanism: Competing Conceptions
IV-i: The importance of cosmopolitanism for both interventionists
and non-interventionists:
The historical context for the idea ofa ‘cosmopolitan legal order’ can be
found in the Ancient Greek conception that there exists a universai law of nature,
to which everybody is bound. This idea can be traced back to Aristotle: “One part
ofwhat is poiitically just is natural, and the other part is legal. What is naturai is
what has the same validity everywhere alike.”5° The Stoics continued the
tradition with their theories about the Law of Nature being something inherently
built within the structure of the universe, and something as such, naturally
directing ail rational beings. This knowledge was conceivable a priori, and
therefore both universai and applicable to ail human beings. This section wiil
reveai some probiems with this original conception, higfflight its historical
progress, offer some contemporary illustrations of the idea, and most importantly,
examine the idea against the emerging conception ofhumanitarian intervention,
with a view to show its incompatibility with it.
Up untii this point, I have mapped out the dominant conception of
humanitarian intervention, with a view to expose some ofthe core problems
inherent within its legitimacy. I have tried to show that central to our
understanding and acceptance of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is a
misconception about an ‘us’ and ‘them’ frame. A consistent strand which runs
through this argument is that rather than focus on how to go in and ‘help’ others
using military force, we need to critically re-examine our relationship to the
150 Aristotie, 20.
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‘other’ prior to and during conflict. By including our role in the greater analysis
we seek to develop a mechanism where we genuinely hold responsibility for our
actions in the atrocities that occur. Only then can we develop international
policies whose aim is to reduce the possibilities for conflict, through peaceful
measures, while maintaining global stability. This is the context within which I
develop a cosmopolitan vision which I believe supports true, universal goals. The
vision I sec as currently dominated in the literature, that is, promoting
cosmopolitan militaries for cosmopolitan purposes is one which I believe subverts
its own intended goals.’5’
The notion of cosmopolitanism is foundational for both interventionists
and non-interventionists alike, because we have the same goals: to ensure global
stability and peace for ail members ofhumanity. What motivates our collective
analysis, our project, and our contributions of differing conceptions of
cosmopolitanism is a fundamental respect for and love ofhumanity. What
complicates this effort is the fact that we do have different conceptions of
cosmopolitanism, and more importantly, different ideas about how to implement
our notions about cosmopolitanism. At this point, our common understanding of
cosmopoÏitanism is vague enough that it couÏd serve different purposes, or
competing political agendas. The idea that a cosmopolitan ethic is both possible
lSt These ideas are generally found in the work of William Smith, 2007 (particularly in the project
“Cosmopolitanism and military intervention” with Robert fine); Daniele Archibugi,
“Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention”, in Alternatives, (vol. 29 no.l 2004);
Loarraine Elliott and Graeme Cheesman, “Cosmopolitan ethics and militaries as ‘forces for good”
in forcesfor Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 215t Century (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2005); or, “Cosmopolitan theory, militaries, and the deployment of force”,
(Department of International Relations, RSPAS, Canberra: Australian National University, 2002);
or, Mary Kaldor New and Old Wars: Organized violence in a global era (Cambndge: Polity Press,
1999).
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(J and worthy is flot in dispute. Expressions ofa cosmopolitan ethic exist in
abundance and we see examples of it everywhere. World wide efforts to maintain
peace and end hunger are manifestations of a cosmopolitan ethic, no matter how
cynically we evaluate our efforts and progress. I do, however, contend that the
idea expressed in its most general terms is ofien manipulated to serve political
ends. Stiil, cosmopolitanism is a worthy and as Kant would argue, necessary goal
for our continued survival and I believe it is best expressed through the
irnprovement and development of current international law, and flot in the
development ofhumanitarian intervention. Troublesorne is the idea that
cosmopolitanism as a moral idea is sornetimes hijacked to suit the needs of
advocates ofhumanitarian intervention, although nothing about it represents the
collective wiIl of the international comrnunity. In the first section of this chapter,
I will engage in the dubious task of defining cosmopolitanism, but as I do so, I
will corne across the more problematic areas of cosmopolitanism, flot the least of
which is to understand the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanisrn.
As such, what will follow is an analysis ofwhat patriotism is with reference to
cosmopolitanism.
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o W-il: Defmmg Cosmopolitanism:
While a survey of the literature on cosmopoiitani
sm will provide a broad
range of interpretations, some general principles f
ind their way to the surface of
the discussion thereby shaping, more or less, a norm
ative frame. It is from that
frame that we use to deveiop and enrich our commo
n project and universal dream.
Its negative formulation, found in any standard dic
tionary focuses on what
cosmopoiitanism is not: parochial, nationalistic, a
nd prejudiced. More vague is
what it aspires to be: a universal morality. Schola
rs make reference to ‘world
citizenship’ which “implies membership on the p
art of ail individuais in a
universal community of ail human beings as mo
ral persons”52. Cosmopolitan
thinkers identify generally three basic premises w
hich constitute
cosmopolitanism: the first refers to ail human b
eings as the ultimate units of
moral and political concern; the second is that a
il human beings possess equal
moral status; and the third is that persons are su
bjects of concem for everyone,
and in that sense, no one cari escape the obligatio
ns they have to respect the equal
moral status of ail human beings.’53 Nussbaum re
fers to cosmopolitanism as the
recognition ofhumanity “wherever it occurs, an
d to give its fundamental
ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first
allegiance and respect”54. Or put
another way, a cosmopolitan ethic “entails the a
cknowledgement of some notion
152 Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005), 11
153 Ibid, 3.
154 Mar±a Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism
” in for Love of countiy: Debating the
Limits ofPatriotism, ed., Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Pr
ess, 1996), 7.
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of common humanity that translates ethicaliy int
o an idea of shared or common
moral duties towards others by virtue of this humani
ty.’55
The conceptual daim made by cosmopoiitanism is
that ail human beings
enjoy equal moral worth in a single global community, ofien poeticall
y referred to
as ‘the community ofhumanity’. There is an importa
nt distinction between legal
and moral cosmopolitanism that authors like Brian B
arry and Patrick Hayden
note, we should flot confuse the latter with an institu
tional prescription.’56 Moral
cosmopolitanism refers to the conceptuai idea that
“ail persons stand in certain
moral relations with one another by virtue of the
fact that they are members of a
universal community”.’57 The latter refers to a po
liticai order based on the
implementation of equal legal rights and duties
of ail citizens of the world. The
moral daim is a conceptual one, whereas the leg
al one is a practicai imperative.
The latter makes demands on us which some in
terpret with international legal
reforms—i.e., the legalization of and justification for actions li
ke humanitarian
intervention. It suggests that we reevaiuate ou
r traditional understanding about
the inviolability of state sovereignty in order to
fulfihi the cosmopolitan demand.
It is interpreted to mean that cosmopolitan law is
above traditional law protecting
territorial integrity. It is stili not clear, however,
what the correct interpretation of
the moral cosmopolitan is in legal terms. Kant i
s always considered a moral
cosmopolitan, yet there is much debate about whe
ther he advanced the principle
ofmiÏitary intervention, which many contemporary cosm
opolitans, like fernando
155 Lu, 87.
‘ Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmo
politan Critique”, in Global Justice: Nomos
XLI(1999) 35; Hayden, 3.
Hayden, 3.
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Teson develop. While Teson daims that a correct interpretation of Kant
necessitates the application ofmilitary intervention in humanitarian crises, flot ail
Kantians agree’58. Defending one daim against the other depends ofien on which
part of Kant one chooses to focus on, and how one reads Kant. His inconsistency
on this question reflects some ofthe profound difficulties accompanying the
institutionalization of a conceptual ideal of this kind. In a world riddled with the
kinds of tensions Kant could flot have anticipated, the problem of defining,
interpreting and fiirthering a conception of the cosmopolitan ideal becomes that
much more urgent. The need to develop a normative ftamework empowering
states to act as global police is the realization of a particular cosmopolitan
conception on a legal level. But it is flot a universally accepted ftamework for the
realization ofthe moral cosmopolitan who wants to advance the goal of global
security and the security of persons. These competing conceptions about how to
translate the (conceptual) moral cosmopolitan ideal into the (practical) legai
cosmopolitan is what makes this project an urgent one.
The idea that we have a universal law under which we can ah live can be
traced to the Stoics. According to the Stoics the source of cosmopolitanism is
reason. The rational capacities of ail humankind unite us in a global community.
Central to Stoic thought was that the more we are able to liberate ourselves ftom
extemal circumstances upon which we have no control, and the more we are able
to rely on our rational capacities, the more at ease we will be with ourselves and
15$ For instance, “Kant on Politics, Peace, and History: Editor’s Introduction” in Immanuel Kant,
‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ and Other Writings on Poïitics, Peace, and Histoiy, ed. Pauline
Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xv-xxiv.
134
each other. The capacity ofreason is that which links ail members ofhumanity in
one group. As Cicero puts it: “For its bonding consists ofreason and speech,
which reconcile men to one another, through teaching, leaming, communicating,
debating and making judgments, and unite them in a kind of natural fellowship
[]159 The development ofthis human capacity for reason can only be realized
within society, and from that smaller unit, we move towards a universal level to
harmonize our interests and find common ways of living together.
What we can appreciate today that perhaps the Stoics were naïve to the
fact that we are flot aiways (or ofien) motivated by reason alone. Other more
subtie influences can, subvert, distract, or direct our attention and the conclusions
we draw may have littie to do with reasonable arguments. This remains a fact of
humanity. Rather then deny or reject that fact, I think that we are able to derive
great value from the diversity of influences that we have which are based in what
I will refer to here as externat non-rational influences. Those extemal non
rational influences may refer to anything from a person’ s particular
idiosyncrasies, to family circumstances, or community values. They are the
nuances which contribute to the shaping of identity. Instead of seeing those other
influences as irrational, we can put them in the category of the non-rational.
Today there is a new tolerance and appreciation ofthe special status of non
rational influences, and a recognition of their contribution to what we refer to, in
part, as our humanity. They are integral, afier ail, to most of what we feei and by
extension, of what we think. To dream of a purely rational world, in which we
derive the same conclusions because we are following the same sets ofrules is not
‘59Hayden, 13.
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only unrealistic, but even adverse to our needs. I
t was a novel idea when the
Stoics came up wîth it but it does flot suit our hum
an needs. It, in fact, denies our
humanity, and lias proven to 5e flot oniy unreliable
, but undesirable. We should
consider this in light ofhow the cosmopolitan project continues
to be shaped
throughout history.
Much of cosmopolitan discourse includes a conc
eption ofuniversal,
common interests, in general, but the specific co
ntent about which causes some
problems. Cicero daims that ... “ail men should
have this one obj ect, that the
benefit of each individual and the benefit of ail
together should be the same”,160
but wams at the same time that “[ijf anyone arrogates it to hi
mself, ail human
intercourse will be dissolved”.16’ The challeng
e for cosmopolitanism is to find
not only definitions of common interests, but
methods of inquiry that are inclusive
and universal at the same time. The weight of
this challenge is significant, for
how can we make daims for the greater comm
unity ofhumanity, and who,
precisely, is maldng these daims on behaif of th
e whole? We must frame the
question in ternis of a universal applicability of
that which we can conceive.
Cicero treats the problem like this:
furthennore, if nature prescribes that one man
shouid want to
consider the interests of another, whoever he ma
y be, for the
very reason that he is a mari, it is necessary, a
ccording to the
same nature, than what is beneficial to ail is so
mething
common. If that iS so, then we are ail constra
ined by one and
the same law of nature; and if that also is true
, then we are
certainly forbidden by the Iaw of nature from
acting violently
against another person.162
160 Cierco quoted in Hayden, 14,
161 Ibid.
162 Ibd
1—,
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C For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism begins with, but is flot limited to, local forms of
govemment. They did flot make exclusive local
and universal communities. We
will see how Nussbaum separates and makes prio
r the universal community of
humanity. Ihis will be a point of contention and
I will argue that this separation
is unnecessary and that making our commitment
to humanity prior to our
commitment to local obligations inadvertentiy
undermines the goals of the
cosmopolitan. I will later show parallels with
the way we conceive ofand apply
new standards in international iaw. When we
examine the legal equivalent in
international iaw, we can see that this separatio
n renders legal reform inconsistent
and that it ultimateiy subverts its own goals. T
his point wili become particuiarly
important when examining the role ofpatriotism
and its relationship to
cosmopoÏitanism.
The pressing question for this inquiiy is to
ask how we understand
cosmopolitanism. What epistemological mec
hanism do we have for revealing
something about that which concems us ail? In
order to show a method for
arriving at defining and understanding cosmopo
litanism, I want to first show what
methods can fail us. The point about this is to
caution against an approach that
will not serve our ultimate cosmopolitan ends:
cosmopolitan ends are aiways
serving the interest ofhumanity. The next sect
ion will deal with Dioguese, our
failed cosmopolitan, or what cosmopolitanism
is flot and I will compare his
efforts with those of Socrates and Kant, the kin
ds of successful cosmopolitans we
want to emuiate today.
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One ofthe more contentious daims I will make is that cosmopolitanism
need flot stand in opposition with patriotism. Before that, however, I will have to
define patriotism, especially in terms ofits relationship to nationalism. Because I
write very positively about patriotism, I will have to acknowledge what happens
when patriotism goes wrong. More importantÏy, I wiÏl delineate some ofthe
circumstances which ignite the evils of nationalism in order to focus more on the
conditions which make violent conflict possible. My work consistently
incorporates an analysis ofthe greater picture in conflict, which will ultimately
guide us in determining how to be good cosmopolitans, and how to implement the
kinds ofpolicies that will be comprised oflong-term effective mechanism to
reduce the risk of further conflict. Defending patriotism as I do, will of course,
open up a slew of other problems more difficuit to treat: the most obvious one of
which will be referred to as the problem ofpatrio tic partiality. I will show how I
think we can treat that problem, and then I wiÏl outiine the benefits ofwhat I cail a
cosmopolitanpatriotism. A cosmopolitan patriot will be defined as the kind of
cosmopolitan who is first a good patriot. In making such a daim normative, I will
certainly confront some valid objections. Without being categorical about it, I will
show how there are some cosmopolitans who are better and worse than others.
Like Diogenes, there are failed cosmopolitans—although I am quite sure ifiat
Diogenes will serve as an exception to that rule. This is in an effort to show how
we know about each other, compatriots and non compatriots alike with a view to
developing an analysis that will help reveal the mechanism for developing
cosmopolitan notions.
13$
C IV-iii: Diogenes: The Failed Cosmopolitan, or Wliat Cosmopolitanism is Not:
Two central historical reference points upon which we must draw to better
develop a notion of cosmopolitanism are Stoicism and Kantian cosmopolitanism.
Any definition of cosmopolitanism oflen begins with or cites one or both of these
sources. Contemporary thinkers on cosmopolitanism interpret and develop these
ideas in sometimes conflicting ways. Martha Nussbaum, for example, defines
cosmopolitanism in opposition with ail forms ofpatriotism, whereas Pauline
Kleingeld defends patriotism as not only compatible with, but a necessary
component ofKantian cosmopolitanism. I tend toward Kleingeld’s position
favourably, whule finding fault and inconsistency with Nussbaum’s treatment.
Stoic cosmopolitanism, although separate and distinct from the Cynics, was
influenced by the Cynics, and in particular, Diogenes whose daim to world
citizenship is ofien cited to represent a cosmopolitan sensibility. I will use
Diogenes to frame the way in which patriotism is ofien framed in opposition to
cosmopolitanism, before dealing with the problem ofpatriotic partiality. The
purpose of developing the notion of patriotism is to show that by defining it in
opposition to cosmopoiitanism, we make the goal of attaining some sort of viable
definition of cosmopolitanism that much more difficuit.
Nussbaum frequently draws on Diogenes to frame the context for
cosmopolitanism. When asked where he comes from, Diogenes is famously
reputed as answering, “I am a citizen ofthe world”.’63 This should reflect in
essence the value of cosmopolitanism in that one belongs not primarily to his or
163 Martha Nussbaum,”Kant and Cosmopolitanism” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant ‘s
Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds., lames Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), 29.
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C her own local community, but rather to the greater community of humanity.
Nussbaum interprets Diogenes to mean that he
“insisted on defining himself,
primarily, in terms of more universal aspirations
and concems”.’64 Diogenes
would flot have made a good candidate for comm
unitarianism, nor wouid he have
made a very good cheerleader for the local game
. What that really means is that
he was flot bound by local affiliations. His aspir
ations were greater, higher than
what the common obligations of the state citize
n would entail. But l intend to
show (and later I will show where Kant may have agreed
with this daim) that
Diogenes in fact fails as a citizen ofhis own s
tate, and as a resuit, he also fails as
a citizen ofthe world. The idea expressed by
Diogenes is that he refused to be
bound by the social laws and customs ofhis pa
rticular community. Instead, his
allegiance would be to the greater community
ofhumanity. However, I would
argue that Diogenes’ refusai to be bound by loc
al laws and customs is in fact a
failure on his part to 5e an active, participating
member ofhis community. The
extend to winch he fails, therefore, as a citizen
in his own community, is the
extent to whjch he fails as a world citizen. The two are rela
ted in that the success
ofthe global cosmopolitan citizen depends on
the success ofthe local one, lest
daims to world citizenship lack genuine mea
ning and commitment. Diogenes
exemplifies tins well, and I draw on him to sh
ow flot only what cosmopolitanism
is flot, but where we can go wrong in treating it
irresponsibiy. The utter lack of
commitment Diogenes has toward lis commu
nity and bis complete disregard for
social customs (winch le rendered trivial and banal) make
it difficuit for me to
imagine that he had any feeling for the whole of
humanity. Afler ail, it is our
164 Ibid.
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C local affiliations from which we derive a sense ofresponsibility and feeling for
humankind, and it is through the concrete actions on the local level that we can
develop notions and feelings about and for ‘humanity’. Kant wams ofthis
tendency toward the abstract as opposed to the concrete in his work Metaphysics
ofMorals VigiÏantius. He daims that “it cannot but be the case that, because of
too much generality, he scatters his affection and entirely loses any particular
devotion”.’65 Lu puts it quite succinctly in an essay aptly called The One and
Many Faces ofCosmopolitanism when she addresses critics of cosmopolitanism
for claiming that, like Diogenes, cosmopolitans are attached to nothing, in
replying that “A person without roots or allegiances is certainly doomed to
superficiality, but a cosmopolitan, with multiple roots and bound by diverse
compelling obligations, almost certainly is not”.166
Our conception of global obligation is not bom out of a vacuum, but rather
is derived from a very particular, concrete relationship with local affiliations.
That local affiliation is subjective, situated, particular. That particular
understanding inspires and drives our larger (cosmopolitan) goal. In effect, it
defines our cosmopolitan goals. It might explain why a cosmopolitan intellectual
in Iraq critiques the project ofhumanitarian intervention, while a cosmopolitan
intellectual in New York defends it. They both have affiliations and
commitments to humanity, but their particular experiences infomi them of
different things, different realities. This conceptual order is fundamental to our
165 Kant, MM Vig, XVII, 2.1, 673 quoted from Kleingeld in, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Patriotism”
Kant-Studien 94. (2003): 311.
166 L 98.
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C understanding not only of the project of cosmopolitanism, but also how it
translate into international law.
Diogenes, it seems, had feeling for neither his own comrnunity not the
greater one, rendering his daim empty, void ofmeaning, and even irresponsible.
His commitment to humanity brings to mmd Oscar Wilde’s quip: ‘I love
humanity, I just hate people’. Only in the sense that we love particular human
beings can we extend this feeling toward those whose names and faces we do flot
know. The value of cosmopolitanism, then does flot stand opposed to patriotism
(that is, a sense of duty and a feeling of love toward one’s own local community)
but rather, because ofit. From this local sense ofbelonging can one extend
oneseif to the greater goal of world citizenship. $kipping the first step renders the
second empty, without content or meaning. We would be destined to be like
Diogenes, grand in words, little in action. Unlike Diogenes, the Stoics did flot
insist on withdrawing from public life in the local community to realize their
cosmopolitan goals. Rather, they derived the source oftheir inspiration from
contributing and adhering to the laws oftheir community. Participation in public
life was an obligation for the citizen, and the argument advanced at the time was
that one could only develop one’s rational capacities on a universal level by being
an acting, thinking, participating member ofone’s local community (city state, or
polis). Socrates exemplifies the sentiment of cosmopolitanism expressed within
his local community much better than does Diogenes because ofhis genuine
commitment to humanity based on, but not limited to, his particular community.
Charles Taylor offers insight when he takes the Aristotelian view that “Man is a
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C ...social ammaÏ, indeed a political ammal, because he is flot seif-sufficient alone,
and in an important sense is flot seif-sufficient
outside a polis”.’67
Cosmopoiitanism, according to the Stoics, is th
at “the basis for human
community is the worth of reason in each and ev
ery human being”.’68 Reason is
“a portion ofthe divine in each of us”.’69 Indeed
, what we are looldng for in a
definition for cosmopolitanism is that which
connects ail of us as members ofthe
greater community of humanity. If we can dai
m that reason is that which
separates us from other kinds of animals, it is r
eason which connects us to each
other. And if what the $toics daim is at ieast partly t
rue (that reason is what
makes us divine) we can argue that the absence of reason
is what makes of evil. I
say partly because both reason and feeling c
ontribute to our humanity, and just as
reason is shared universal tool (aibeit applied in a varie
ty of ways), so to is
feeling. Whiie we have different conceptions
of what is good and evil, we ail
have a conception of good and evil. Our col
lective response to crueÏty is both an
individual and shared response, contributin
g to our common humanity, or
cosmopolitanism. Lu summarizes the poin
t like ifiis:
Different ethical approaches may value diff
erently moral
goods sucli as fteedom. humanity, commun
ity and security,
but in acknowiedging that ail these goods ca
n be destroyed by
crueity and fear, ethical perspectives may b
e united in their
condemnation of cruelty and fear.’7°
It is not reason alone which unites us, nor f
eeling alone, but the
interconnectedness ofboth reason and feelin
g which enables us to understand
Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Langua
ge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), 190.
16g Nussbaum, Perpetual Peace, 30.
169 Nussbaum, Perpetual Feace, 30.
170 Lu, 96.
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(J concrete (thick) morality on a conceptual (universal, ‘thin’) level. What struck
Hannah Arendt at the Eichmann trials was flot so much the presence of evil, but
the absence of thought. Understood like this, reason is a moral choice, and it is
what makes us worthy. li is the tool with which we become human, and
becoming human is about joining the club (the greater community ofhumanity).
Zeno interpreted this to mean that we can ground a common idea oflaw—that
resonates with something universal, and something universal begins to sound like
a truly cosmopolitan conception. Cicero claimed that every human being should
promote the good of every other human being just because s/he is human: “And if
this is so, we are ail subject to a single law of nature, and if this is so we are
bound flot to harm anyone”.’71 This would be the controlling factor in stabilizing
patriotism, not allowing it to conflict with the values of coimnunity ofhumanity,
allowing us to examine with reason (and feeling because it too is capable of
scrutiny) the values we have inherited through our traditions and communities.
And this, indeed, is what allows comrnunities to grow and change: our ability to
examine our own local values, test them against reason and feeling, and derive
conclusions about their worth. Ail people do this in the sense that ail
communities are vibrant, living organisms, changing as we grow. I have shown
that reason is flot the sole tool ftom which we derive our understanding of the
world, But it foms, the conmion part ofour humanity, with other things like
emotion, compassion, ideas about justice or the good life, varying as those ideas
might be. Where the local community informs and constitutes the ‘thick’ or
171 Cicero quoted in Nussbaum, Peipetual Peace, 31.
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substantive part ofour local (patriotic) identity, reason refers to the ‘thin’,
cosmopolitan part of our identity.
The next step is to show why patflotism and cosmopolitanism need not be
incompatible. In order to do that, I need to play with the definition ofpatriotism
open it up a littie bit, and include the richness and diversity it is capable of
entailing. It seems our conceptions ofboth patriotism and cosmopolitanism are
oflen oversimplified or too rigid. CosmopoÏitanism as world citizenship is too
vague and abstract for our practical day to day experience, for practical
application. It fails to include what it means for you and I, citizens ofa particular
place at a particular time to be ‘world citizens’. On the other hand, self-identity
limited to patriotism is too rigid and exclusive. It lacks the imagination and
plurality necessary for rich moral life. Therefore, an analysis ofwhat patriotism
means in this context is necessary. Most important in this critique is the idea that
it is unnecessary to identify and define oneseif either as a patriot or as a
cosmopolitan, to the exclusion of each other. I will answer that by defining
patriotism in a way that can appeal to the sensibility ofthe cosmopolitan, without
alienating the patriot. In so doing, I will also show that the patriot is more than a
mindless, flag-waving drone. In order to strengthen this argument, I will have to
address the problem ofthe negative side ofpatriotism—that is, extreme
nationalism. I will show that it is not ‘love of country’, or ‘patriotism’ that is the
problem in as much as it is a set of conditions which bring out the worst in people.
In order to develop this idea, I will offer a brief description of a way to look at
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patriotism that coheres with our experience of it in a positive way. The next
section is devoted to showing what this means exactfy.
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C” IV-iv: Defining
In this section, I wilI address flot only what I mean when I use the term
‘patriotism’, but how, if at ail, it is different from nationaiism. Further, I need to
consider how a patriot of one state deals with patriots of another state: tMs will b
e
to distinguish universalistic from particularist conceptions ofpatriotism. In this
section after offering a series of distinctions in the way we define ‘patriotism’, I
isolate some core problems with the definition ofpatriotism—that is, how we
understand and practice loyalty, and how we understand the term ‘love’. I wi
ll
introduce the problem ofpartiality in the next section, because any defens
e of
patriotism needs to address the problem ofhow partiality can be explained
,
justified, and especially accommodated in a cosmopolitan ethic.
First, I will use Kant’ s categorizations to iilustrate the different kinds or
levels of patriotism and in order to show the complexity within that term.
Pauline
Kleingeld identifies three types ofpatriotism in Kant’s work: civic patri
otism,
national patriotism and trait-or quality based patriotism. Civic patriotism
refers to
the active participation ofmembers in a community. Civic nationalism is
also
associated with Emest Renan who deflned it as “a voluntary association of
individuals” where “. . . individuals give themselves a state, and the state is w
hat
binds together the nation”.
172 According to Kant, citizens are flot necessarily of
the same ethnic origin as their govemments; they are able to criticize the
govemment; they are flot properties of govemment, nor does the governme
nt see
them as property. National patriofism refers to membership of a nation. In
this
i72 Jocelyn Couture, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour, eds., Rethinking Nationalism (Calgary:
University ofCalgary Press, 1996), 2.
147
(E case, common national ancestry should lead to patriotism. Finally, trait, or
quality-based patriotism refers to love for one’s country given the experience of
particular traits or qualities that it happens to have. Herder identifies what might
fail under Kant’s category of national patriotism which is a nationalism based on
common language, culture and tradition. In this case, the nation precedes the state
and it is a collective body, transcending the individual. Herder thought that if
people shared the same language, culture and history, they also shared the same
ancestry, lineage and blood.’73 Today we see that this is not necessarily the case.
$ome authors, like Jeffrey Johnson, radically distinguish patriotism from
nationalism, attributing ail the negative things we normally associate with
nationalism to that terni (ethnic superiority, xenophobia, etc.) and then attributing
all the positive things like love and devotion to one’s community to patriotism.
According to Johnson, “Nationalism is a distortion and perversion of
patriotism”74. He compares Gandhi’s vision ofpatriotism as a love ofthe local
which extends to the global and ‘nationalism’ as defined as “a closed set of
sentiments that manifest itseif in a fanatical fixation—a narcissistic and
exclusionary focus—on one’s own tribe or country while denigrating other tribes
and countries”75. In essence, lie is simply separating what is good about
patriotism from where it can go terribly wrong by labeling the latter ‘nationalism’.
Kai Nielsen, on the other hand, uses the term ‘nationalism’,’76 when he talks
about what Johnson calis ‘patriotism’. A cursory reading of standard dictionary
173 p0j 3.
‘ Jeffrey Johnson, “Cosmopolitan Pati-iotism” New Thinking 1, no. 1 (Winter, 2003): 23.
‘ Johnson, 20.
176 Kai Nielsen, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism”, The Monist, 82, no.3 (July 1999): 446.
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(J references to both nationalism and patriotism aiways includes “love of country”
for which a citizen is prepared to make sacrifices if need be, as the main defining
characteristic, but definitions for nationalism also include its negative tendency,
such as “excessive patriotism” or “chauvinism”. This is what we normally think
of when we hear rallying nationalistic cries. For the sake of consistency, I will
use the term ‘patriotism’ but I must include (by conflating) the term ‘nationalism’
as it is used by many authors to define what I am referring to as (the more positive
sibling) ‘patriotism’.
Jeff McMahan, for example, defines “nationalism” vaguely as “a cluster of
beliefs about the normative significance of nations and nationality”.’77 He
construes two strands of nationalism—one positive and one negative. The
positive construction includes virtues such as loyalty, commitment and self
sacrifice, while the negative includes the incapacity of those qualities to 5e
exercised equally to non-members by definition. Due to the fact ofbeing a
members-only club, nationalists develop their virtues with reference to exclusion
of others. The partiality their members are afforded comes at the expense of
foreign nationals in that for patriotism to exist, there lias to be foreign, non
nationals if we (the patriotic group) are to be deflned in any concrete way. More
specifically, he attributes the beliefs ofnationalists to include, among other things,
that the continued existence and flourishing of thefr own
nation is a fundamental good, that the members of the nation
ought to control thefr own collective affafrs, and that
membership in the nation makes it not only permissible but in
many instances morally requfred to manifest loyalty and
partiality to fellow members.’78
‘ JeffMcMahan and Robert McKim, eds., The Morality ofNationalism (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 108.
nii, 10$.
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He distinguishes between two types ofnationalists: those lie callsparticularist
from those lie calis universatists. The fomier group, in its most radical
manifestation, refers to entitiement and exclusion of these beliefs of only the
group in question, at the exclusion of foreign non-nationals who might have the
same patriotic feelings toward their own communities. There is no real reason to
defend or argue against that view as its irrationality disqualifies it from any
meaningfiul contribution to the discourse on the subject. The universalists, on the
other hand, include in their conception of nationalism that ail people have the
same rights tliey do in terms ofvaluing their own communities and attributing to
them a speciai status. This view merits some serious consideration because it
probably most appeals to those patriots who see themselves as part of a greater
community ofliumanity, with a particular affiliation and identity, for which they
care deeply, but because of which, they do flot want to deny other, like-minded
patriots from enjoying equal status.
Discourse on patriotism makes inescapable references to ‘loyalty to’ and
‘love of one’s country. Loyalty and love, although generally viewed as positive
characteristics, can cause some deeply problematic moral issues, depending on the
recipient ofthe loyalty and love. The two terms seem to presuppose many things
in our common understanding oftliem, and those things refer most innocuously to
stupidity, blindness, exclusion and intolerance of other. I want to evaluate some
ofthe assumpfions we make when we refer to conceptions ofboth loyalty and
love, aÏthough in order to make our personal experiences of loyalty and love
analogous to patriotism, I will have to distinguish between romantic love which is
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ofien incomparable to patriotic love, and makes different requirements of us. I
will however, use the analogy even in romantic and familial loyalty and love to
illustrate and distinguish a constructive, positive way of expressing those values,
versus a destructive and negative way to do so. This is not to say that the negative
assumptions we make about loyalty and love are unwarranted. Indeed, the reason
we make them is because we are ofien guilty of applying these misconceptions in
our practical experience of using them. This is, however, to deeply evaluate the
meanings of loyalty and love with a view to challenging our misuse or abuse of
the terms, and more importanfly, to see how revealing these assumptions might
help us overcome some ofthe problems we have with patriotism.
To do so is to identify what the requirements of loyalty and of love are.
This means specifically delineating what the defining qualities and characteristics
about loyalty and about love are insofar as we understand and use those terms. It
is to question the important assumption that loyalty to something, for example,
necessitates the exclusion from another thing. We use these terms in reference to
different things: loyaÏty in romantic relationships normally constitutes at least
some exclusion from engaging, for instance, in other romantic relationships, but
the same is not necessarily truc, for example, with ffiendship. Romantic loyalty is
more specifically about fidelity, referring more to something like conjugal
faithfulness, and it is flot the same as being loyal in a broader sense. Romantic
fidelity, as distinct from more general types of loyalty, makes special
requirements of us because ofthe special status romantic affiliations have.
Exclusion from engaging in other romantic relationships does flot present a moral
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( problem because we tend to recognize the special status ofthose relationships,
and we understand what is required of them. However, that deals with loyalty
pureÏy on only one level. What are the other ways with which we understand
‘loyalty to’ and ‘love of which apply even to romantic relationships, despite their
special status?
Being loyal to someone, for example, does flot necessitate lying for them
if they have committed legal or moral wrongs. Loyalty is flot a substitute for
honesty and it can be expressed in many different ways. Loyalty can be
expressed by valuing common goods that enrich human life—not only the kinds
ofgoods that enrich only one person’s and their lover’s life. Instead ofperceiving
one’s commitments to another in terms of a restriction from other values, at the
exclusion of more universal ones, we can better interpret loyalty to mean a loyalty
towards someone as one value within a greater set of values, neither confining nor
impeding values pertaining to the greater good ofhumanity. Loyalty, in this
sense, does not accommodate the aiding and abetting of immoral crime and such
behavior. Further, loyalty does not mean thinking uncritically, unreasonably, or
not at ail. Loyalty, like love, conceived in its greatest capacity includes critical
observation, reasonable analysis, thought, activity, and commitment. Practiced
the right way, it contributes to moral growth, character building and knowledge.
The best friend, the best parent, the best spouse, will not cheat for his/her friend,
child, lover, but rather participate in acts ifiat will enable the ffiend, child, lover to
grow, and become better by realizing and appreciating those values that make up
the whole, not just the part belonging to us. It is the harder, more courageous
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manifestation of loyalty than the one immediately satisfying the temporary need.
And just because we do cheat for our children and lie for our loyers, that does flot
mean that this is how to rightly enact loyalty or to fulfiul the essence ofits
meanings. It simply points to acts that are less courageous and less moral than we
hope, but it does not diminish the aspiration toward the better example. This is
how commitment, love and loyalty to the particular help contribute to the greater.
Acts of loyalty on the local level must not oppose our commitments to the global
level because to do so would be to devalue what is closest to us for immediate
gain. This is where we misuse the terms of love and loyalty that are normally 50
equated with exclusion and denial of other.
Comparing love and loyalty on a familial and romantic level with the same
values on a national level serve only to show us how we can enact those values in
ways that are constructive and good, just as we can, during moments of weakness,
or due to weakness in character, enact those same values in very destructive and
morally bankrupt ways. Being loyal to someone is not a good in itself, it is a
good because ofhow that action is being realized—with thought, care, reason,
and feeling as opposed to loyalty that is hateful, irrational, and blind. This
distinction serves to clarify how patriotism could be (and indeed is) misconstrued
negatively, but the distinction also helps to show how patriotism is a positive and
constructive thing.
Patriotism is misconstrued in the way that love oflen is as well. The
literature on nationalism seems to treat ‘love o? as unruly, irrational, and in
opposition to reason. On the one pole stands reason and universalizable
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principles, and on the other side we pit love, passion, unstructured emotions,
nationalism. The division is flot only oversimplified, it devalues the possibilities
ofwhat love can achieve, while overestimating reason. Love can be a blinding
and irrational force, but it can just as well be a form of knowledge, an avenue to
understanding. Compassion and empathy are forms ofknowledge best achieved
through feelings like love. It can give us special access where reason fails. The
relationship between love and reason is far too intricate to separate in such black
and white ternis.
Patriotism is but one ofmany self-expressions and I argue that having a
sense of patriotism does not preclude having other kinds of affiliations and
commitments. Charles Jones defines patriotism is quite standard “love ofone’s
country and one’s compatriots, and patriotic loyalty”), but then adds “the patriot is
someone who believes that he is justified in extending greater concem to some
persons—compatriots—than others”.’79 But that would be to suggest that the
patriot really has only one identity—the one stemming from the state, and has no
other identity. We must be careful of oversimplifying the patriot just as we are
critical in our understanding of the more abstract notion of cosmopolitanism. I
have only just introduced some ofthe problems with both cosmopolitanism and
patriotism, with the understanding that if we take the cosmopolitan out ofthe
clouds, and pull the patriot out ofthe parade, we might actually arrive at what
would be a self understanding that coheres with our actual experience about what
it is to be both a patriot and a cosmopolitan. This is to make the not-so-radical
179 Charles Jones, “Patriotism, Morality and Global Justice”, in Nomos XLI: Global Justice, eds.,
lan Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (New York: NYU Press, 1999), 127.
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daim that we are rarely only patriots, and (impossibly) only cosmopolitans. The
former informs the latter, the latter is grounded by the former. But, before I
continue unraveling the complexities and problems with patriotism, I will draw
attention, in light ofthe greater project, to how we view patriotism, and how we
practice the uses ofthat term, especially in terms ofhow and to whom we
attribute the negative or positive connotations of it. I will introduce the idea of
attributing the status of good and bad to patriots, and I will address what that
means in the context of the cosmopolitan. I argue that there are standards and
double standards which are applied according to a particular world view which I
will challenge.
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W-v: Good and Bad Patriots: Standards and Double Standards:
I have shown that being a patriot is something that one can do well, using
reason, feeling, and imagination to weigh and measure one’s responses to the
state, or one can do badly, limiting one’s expression in the world to occur through
a single conception of the world—i.e., the patriotic one. Good patriots would be
those who have a love of and commitment to their country in a positive and
constructive way. Bad patriots are irrationally passionate about their countries
and are incapable or unwilling to use reason and feeling to assess the policies of
their govemments. They would have false beliefs about superiority and they
would be exclusionary or particularist in their conception ofpatriotism.
Many critics ofpatriotism (or, in this sense, nationalism) divide patriots
into categories that are both interesting and alarming. Good and bad patriots are
so classed not in terms of a particular criterion, like a detailed analysis of what
constitutes good patriotism or bad nationalism, but according to geo-political
divisions, furthering the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. In his seminal work,
Orientalism, Edward Said exposes the kinds of assumptions we make as we
divide up the world into east and west. Relevant to this analysis is his observation
that “Orientalism was ultimately a political vision ofreality whose structure
prornoted the difference between the farniliar (Europe, West, “us”) and the strange
(the Orient, the East, “them”).”8° I will show how we have flot sufficiently
challenged our old colonialist practices in judging foreign cultures, especially in
terms of understanding their conflicts. This supports my daim that one of the
problems in appealing for humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan frame
180 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 14.
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as it is currently shaped, is that it involves a fundarnental misunderstanding of
other cultures and people. How we assess foreign conflicts, and how we
understand patriotism, will help us reveal the assumptions that we make when we
decide how to implement a ‘cosmopolitan order’.
When discussing patriotism, there exists a double standard, which remains
unchallenged in the discourse on nationalism. Canadian patriotism is not at issue.
The ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy exists in blatantly racist terms. What follows in
an excerpt on the debate about nationalism, and it represents the views of a series
of scholars without challenging the ethno-centric values,which, as good
cosmopolitans, we are trying to move past:
Many scholars of nationalism do ackuowiedge that some
forms of nationalism are less erratic than others. Hans Kohn,
John Piarnenatz, and Anthony D. Smith ail distinguish
Western from lastem forrns ofnationalism. Kohn sees
Western nationalism as essentially a rational and liberal
way of tfflnldng grounded in the notion ofhuman rights.
Eastern nationalism is its opposite: it is mystical,
ethnocentric, and grouuded in tribal feelings. for
Plamenatz, Western nationahsm characterizes cuiturally
deveioped nations that can, from a position of self-confidence,
approach each offier on an equai footing, seeking cooperation
on the basis ofmutuai respect. Bastem nationalism
characterizes primitive nations who, motivated by feelings of
inferiority, adopt beihgerent polices. Smith speaks of
Western nationalism as civic and political, and offasteru
nationalism as ethnic and genealogical.181 (ernphasis added).
This excerpt is, on the one hand, especially worrisome and, on the other, very
revealing. It is won-isome because it appears in a context which is flot challenged,
but it is revealing in that it expresses what seems to be an inherent belief on the
part ofWesterners: we are indeed more advanced, civilized, and rational than
Easterners, perhaps including other non-Western groups as well. This
181 Yael Tamir, Rethinldng Nationalism, 69.
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assumptions leads to more serious repercussions: we do flot monitor the actions of
Western peacekeepers when they are in foreign lands and we do not question who
the vicfims of humanitarian intervention will be. In seeing ourselves as the more
civilized and more rational faction of a deeply uncivilized and irrational world,
we tend to see ourselves as the saviors ofthose in crisis. But other than a direct
appeal to racist assumptions, nothing actually justifies this belief. It is simply
ethnocentrism which we tend to cloak in cosmopolitan terms. Inherent in these
kinds ofpresumptions are potentially abusive practices, which may be the
unintended result of genuinely mistaken beliefs.
Further, and most importantly, the way in which we characterize nations
as irrational and tribal will influence the way we think about international policies
and the way we conceive of cosmopolitanism. If “our” (Western, liberal
democratic) patriotism is rational, self-confident, egalitarian, and “their”
patriotism is ethno-centric, primitive, and mystical, then surely we will dismiss
any contribution “they” would have in terms of a cosmopolitan ethic, and the
burden would be put upon “us” to devise an ethical and legal cosmopolitan world
order that would in effect, create two different sets ofrules: ones that apply to the
rational and liberal states and ones that apply to the ethnocentric and tribal ones.
This not only creates a world order which is structurally, practically, and
theoretically unequal, it leaves no room for a mechanism by which we remedy
that inequality. This means that in effect, we are less likely to understand the
people, the conflicts, and most importantly the solution to the problem because, in
part, oftheir inferior status to ours in this ‘cosmopolitan’ system or order. It is
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therefore easier to justify humanitarian interventions because by dehumanizing
the people of the regions in which we intervene, we think less about civilian
casualties, or the devastating consequences of war.
When Eastern and Western patriotisms are distinguished as respectively
irrational and rational, what is at the foundation of this belief is the fact of
conftict, which is understood (incorrectly) strictly in ethnic terms. Because these
conflicts are read only along ethnic unes, an “erratic nationalism” is attributed to
them. What these East-West divisions really assume is that there is something
inherentïy backward about Eastern nationalism that does flot take into
consideration the context within which conflicts arise. If Western nations have
flot launched into civil strife lately it is not because our nations are more
advanced, it is because nothing in our socio-economic conditions would alÏow for
such a thing. The beliefthat ‘we’ Westerners could flot launch into the kind of
death and destruction we saw in the Baikans because we are somehow inherently
better or more advanced is precisely the kind ofracist belief that many
cosmopolitans unconsciously hold.
In the next level ofanalysis, it is necessary to show when it is appropriate
engage in patriotic feeling as well to account for patriotic pride in a healthy,
evaluative way. The West is believed (by Westerners) to be Ïess erratic in their
patriotism which is empirically difficuit to support if one travels though the
American mid-west on July 4. In any discussion on patriotism, therefore, it is
important to include what it is to be reasonably patriotic. It will also be important
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to account for who is included as being reasonably patriotic, or put another way,
who is included in being a good patriot.
Patriotism is flot so much a problem in ternis ofwhat it can include
(loyalty, love, commitment), but rather it is problematic in terms ofhow it is
practiced. Now, I have argued that there are good and bad ways to practice
patriotism, but I oppose the daim that we can divide nations into the kinds of
general characteristics that we have seen some scholars create. further, I believe
that evaluating patriotism in terms of geo-social, political regions, as opposed to
concrete guidelines furthers the cynical belief on the part ofweaker nations that
the West is interested not in human rights, but in global domination. Concrete
guidelines can illuminate when patriotism is good and constructive and when it is
bad and contrary to our cosmopolitan goals. To protect ourselves ftom that kind
of accusation, we must be prepared to evaluate the kinds of assumptions we make,
and their potentially devastating repercussions.
Stiil, patriotism evokes images of flag-waving, and this is sometimes (in
some contexts) distasteful. When it is appropriate and when it is not, will be
evaluated with reference to what I cail theproblem ofpride. I will apply a
criterion for evaluating the circumstances in which it is appropriate or not to show
patriotic feeling. I will use as my basis, once again, a standard to which we must
adhere when we evaluate our patriotic feelings. As I have consistently claimed,
feelings are one avenue toward knowledge and nothing impedes us from
analyzing emotional responses. Nenad Miscevic treats this problem in
NationaÏism and Beyond when he makes an analogy between being a member of
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the white race and being a member ofa national community.182 I will address that
problem by illustrating when and where it is appropriate to talk in terms of pride
and I will delineate a criterion upon which we can make those decisions.
C
________
182 Nenad Miscevic, Nationalism and Beyond: introducing moral debate about values, (Budapest,
Hungary: Central University Press, 2001), 3.
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IV-v: The Problem of Faise Pride
Miscevic asks us to imagine someone saying he/she is “proud ofbeing
white”83. With this introductory analogy, lie sets out to show why nationalism “is
almost as problematic as racism” and goes on to argue that “our attitude to
national exclusivity should become more like our negative attitude towards the
racial kind”184. There is no doubt about the moral reprehensibility of racism, but
this does not speak to the soundness ofthe analogy. Many critics ofnationalism
use it, although I want to again underline that I am dealing with tamer version of
patriotism, as opposed to extreme patriotism—what Johnson refers to as
‘nationalism’. However, to make sure that we do not go wrong with patriotism, I
must treat this analogy as a legitimate challenge. If we replace the word ‘white’
and substitute it with a nationality what is reprehensible about pride in a race,
Miscevic argues, is the same thing that makes pride in nationality distasteful.
This problem refers to what I have described as the problem ofmaking false
assumptions about superiority, or put differently, the problem ofpride. While a
variety of authors have deah with this in different ways,’85 I want to focus on the
issue of ‘pride’, what it is, and when it is appropriate.
It is difficuit, for example, to imagine someone being proud ofbeing white
without interpreting that to mean that they are making daims to superiority at the
same time. The reason for that fact has to do with an historical narrative about a
cultural indoctrination of white supremacy, the violence inherent in that and of
slavery. Imperialism, oppression, hateful practices are amongst some ofthe parts
183 Miscevic, 3.
184 Miscevic, 4.
185 McMahan, 126.
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C ofthe historical naffative that would make one recoil from making daims about
white pride. But what if someone said they were proud ofbeing black? What
makes that daim substantively different? McMahan makes an exception for
members of oppressed groups who have been the victims of discrimination,
although he does so in terms of racial partiality. I will be dealing with what it
means to be proud, when that is appropriate, and why Black pride, is one example
where pride is appropriate.
The foots of black pride, represented in slogans like “Black is beautiflil”
are derived ftom struggle and determination in the face of discrimination and
oppression. White pride is inextricably associated with theones ofnatural
superiority, upon which a justification for discrimination is based. If a person is
able to speak about black pride, and indeed, this is flot only acceptable but
encouraged, then the problem Miscevic sets out is flot with being proud of one’s
skin colour, but radier with being proud about a history of discrimination and
hatefùl practices. There is no place for white pride today because there is no
struggle against which the white race lias had to fight in order to survive and
advance. That is flot the same situation for those who have been oppressed and
discriminated against.
To further probe the issue, we must put ‘pride’ under the microscope.
What justifies an Italian in saying “I’m proud ofbeing Italian”. That, in a sense is
like being proud of an accident. What does that do to the ethnic Greek who was
adopted by an Italian family whose name changed from Vasilios to Tony. People
are, of course, proud oftheir accidents. There must, however, be a distinction
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between what is acceptable from what is flot, and criteria upon whicli to base that
distinction. Why, for example, should one be alarmed if a rich, white American
mari were to stand up and say “I’m proud ofmy colour, nationality and gender”,
whereas if Audrey Lorde stood up to say “I’m proud ofbeing a black American
poet” it would flot evoke the same reaction. This lias to do with the fact that
Audrey Lorde has contributed to a greater struggie to succeed and become who
she is, through effort whereas the American male really did flot have to do
anything to become what he is. The point ofpride is Ïocated where one
contributes to their community in a meaningful way. The poet, too, is proud of
her accidents, and had nothing to do with being bom female and black, but
because of lier struggie to maintain an identity and pursue goals in an otherwise
hostile environmnt to lier gender, colour and profession. Rich, white men do flot
have to defend, assert, protect their identity, property, or in general, basic liuman
rights in the way that Black women poets do.
To go back to the Italian patriot again, without going into the problem of
etlinic purity, because it really lias no place here, the problem is to determine
when and why a person feels pride for their nationality and when, if ever, that is
morally permissible. The Italian patriot might find herself waving a flag and
beeping lier hom afier the Italians win the world cup in soccer. Nussbaum may
shudder, and my critics may ask in what way did Maria contribute to the Italians
winning of the world cup? In what way did she struggie, like Audre Lorde, and
go against the odds to contribute in a meaningful way to what it means to be
Italian? The response has to do with imagination, feeling and belonging. Being
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part of a community, aibeit accidentaiiy, inciudes feeling pride with regard to its
achievements and conversely, shame with its failures. As Appiah observes, the
patriot is the first to suifer when his or her country fails him!her’86. The non
patriot simply does flot care, and that is a serious problem.
Hitler most notoriously failed the people ofhis state when he advanced his
conception of racial purity. If the German non-patriot feels nothing when faiied
by his or her state and if that non-patriot appeals to the notion of cosmopolitanism
to explain lis or her lack of feeling toward community, then that citizen has failed
his or her state in the same way that the leader has. It is the example ofDiogenes
ail over again. This argument relies on the beiiefthat to be a contributing member
of a cosmopolitan world order, one lias to have been able to participate in some
meaningful way to one’s own local community. feeling shame for the failures of
one’s state is the first step toward making a positive contribution to its revised
conception and rebuilding. The non-patriot can say “I just don’t care about this
place” and then leave, but that lack of feeling and subsequent inaction will impair
that person’s ability to contribute to the advancement of a cosmopolitan project.
We participate in our communities in various ways, so whule the toilet
cleaner, who has neyer succeeded injoining any soccer club, may feel greatjoy at
his country’s team wiiming the cup, he is justified in feeling so, as he is a member
ofthat greater club. Stiil, this does not put him at odds with the even greater club
of humanity. We continue to participate in the realm of competitive sports, and
good sportsmanship teaches us the limits to our support for the home team.
Beating up the winning side does not show good sportsmanship, for example.
186 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots” for Love ofCount;y, 26.
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Whiie our membership te community is accidentai, it is that accident which
defines us, and this definition does net compete with our definition ofwhat it
means to be a human being—such as being a member ofthe greater community of
humanity. It is important te underline that this definition neyer necessitates
exclusion from, or superierity over, any other club member. It can, and it ofien
does, but it should net, and its definition does net reïy on any such exclusion.
Miscevic conflates two distinct ideas: nationalism and racism. He likens
one te the other claiming that there are no real grounds for nationalism, caliing
what nationalists refer te as their identity as “imagined community”. Imagined, it
is—to a certain degree, but I fail te see the prebiem with imagination, and fear
venturing into the world of epistemological soundness when it cornes te defining
either a people, or better yet, hurnanity. Cultural identity makes reference te
tenueus ideas. They are subject te interpretatien and revisien. Whiie it is true
that we beleng te particular cemmunities by accident, but we interpret them in
imaginative ways and these interpretatiens are expressions ef the whele. These
interpretatiens are that which define us.
The preblem efpride must be evaluated in the same ways that ail feelings
are evaiuated—tested against reasen, inforrned by ernpathy and compassion.
Pride, tee, must be reasened eut: why am I preud? Do I have any reasen te 5e?
If the test fails, disappeintment, regret and suffering are the apprepriate respenses.
Many efthe greatest patriets in the United States spend an enormeus ameunt ef
time, energy and devotion arguing against, and revealing seme ef, the more
sinister American fereign pelicies efthe last fifly years. They de se because ef a
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fundamental belief in what their country stands for. Pride in this way can
motivate action for the greater good. In the case of what I cali genuine American
patriots (as opposed to the morally bankrupt flag-waving drone), pride motivates
tremendous effort to redirect foreign policy which shames the country, and
especially the patriot. This is the patriot who questions what it means to love
one’s country, and who responds to those questions deeply, sincerely, and at great
cost to oneself.
To further push the boundaries of this daim is to ask if this feeling of
pride requires something more, like a loyalty and attachment to Canadians (if one
is Canadian) above and beyond other non-compatriots. Does making the daim
require that we love and care for our compatriots more than non-patriots? If so,
this is going to be a problem—not the least of which is that we do flot know most
ofour Canadian compatriots.’ This is to address the problem ofhow a theory
could demand of us that our loyalty and love of the place from which we hail,
necessitates that we prefer those living within the geographical borders of our
own country. Such a daim will challenge the idea that to be good citizens of the
world, or cosmopolitans, we should be good patriots first. My response will
include an analysis of where patriots go wrong exactly, with a view to broaden the
theory, offer some solutions to those kinds ofproblems that seem more intuitively
correct. In this next section, I will offer up a theory about when, and under what
circumstances, if ever, patriotic partiality is morally permissible or necessary.
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W-vi: The Problem of Patriotic Partiality:
There are two strands of nationalism or pafriotism with which many
people are uncomfortable, and for which reason notions ofnationalism are
regarded with suspicion ami distaste. Nationalism becomes a moral issue when it
assumes exclusion of other, and as a result, creates partiality. It is commonly
thought that having a commitment and obligation toward our immediate
community negates or precludes our gTeater obligations to the community of
humanity. The belief which seems to contradict the idea of impartial justice
integral to cosmopolitanism, referred to as patriotic partiality—(that is, that
people may favour their own compatriots over non compatriots)’87 is framed in a
slightly deceptive way. It is flot that we do or do flot favour our compatriots over
others, nor that we should or should not favour them. It is simply a descriptive
fact that we have an immediate feeling for and compassion toward that which is
closest to us, and this fact in no way needs to conflict with our commitments
toward humanity. We have a multiplicity of affiliations and identifications which
enrich our lives. Tragedy, as Nussbaum observes, is the irreconcilable conffict of
two or more ofthese obligations. Good people, she explains, tend to have
multiple values (which I am equating with commitments). Bad luck is the conftict
ofthese values, and this is why the moral life is fragile.’88
When I say that we tend to have feeling toward those closest to us, I am
referring to the kinds of people with whom we have relationships. The flrst, most
Kok-Chor Tan, “Cosmopolitan Impartiality and Patriotic Partiality” in Global Justice and
Global Institutions ed., Daniel Weinstock (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2007),
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Martha Nussbaum, The fragitity of Goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy rnd
phiÏosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 7.
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obvious example is having special obligations toward famiiy, and this is referred
to as familialpartiality. But just because a person cannot help having (for
example) special feeling for his or her own chiid, that fact (neither prescriptive
nor derived from choice) does flot preclude having compassion for, and a
commitment toward ail chiidren—partly as an extension of feeling for one’s OWfl
child. Chiidren, of course, have special status in the moral permissibility of
partiality because we have moral (and legal) obligations toward them. Partiality
toward one’s family is usually regarded in the literature on nationalism as
incomparable with partiality toward one’s compatriots because of the intensity
and depth of familial relations.
I am not making the daim that familial partiality is like patriotic partiality.
Clearly they are different. However, I am suggesting that having special
obligations and duties to our own families does flot preclude (by necessity) other
kinds of obligations. Rather, I am maldng the stronger daim that because of our
local obligations, we have stronger incentive to fulfiul the moral demands of the
greater community ofhumanity. The commitment to people of the world is
derived from or inspired from the commitment one has leamed in one’s own
community, and we camot skip that step, so to speak. This is to develop the
argument that to be a good cosmopolitan, one should be a good patriot first. This
is by no means to make the reverse daim, which is that ail patriots are
cosmopolitans. However, I will show how good patriots will tend toward
cosmopolitanism. Just as we have failed cosmopolitans, we also have failed
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patriots, whose reasoning and moral imaginations fail short of fiulfihling the
obligations we have toward humanity.
What makes patriotism problematic for ethics is flot that we prefer our
compatriots, identify with them, and care for them, it is rather that we are
supposed to do so more than for non-compatriots. But I do flot think this is true,
even if at first glance the definition ofpatriotism seems to suggest that it should.
To separate and examine each issue, let us look at what it means to prefer
compatriots over non compatriots in very practical terms, and in what cases it is
or is not morahly permissible to show partiality to compatriots. To prefer
compatriots to non-compatriots on the basis on nationahity alone and as a general
rule seems inherently racist, and nothing about patriotism requires it. That we
identify with, understand, and conmrnnicate well with compatriots is a fâct about
shared language, culture, history, and politics. Canadians get, and laugh at the
Molson’s “I am Canadian” ad, just as hard as the Quebecois laugh at “Je suis
Quebecois, Tabernacle!” version. Any number ofexamples will serve this point,
and the daim is morally neutral. It is the point at which one exciudes non
compatriots as a general rïtÏe where one’s patriotism can get ugly. Shared
language is part of shared meaning, and it is therefore a natural part of self-
expression which is ofien served in one’s comrnunity well, and which can be
enriched and developed in the presence ofother non-compatriots. To reject
people on the basis ofnationality is like rejecting them on the basis of skin colour.
It is racist, and as such, deplorable. But that is not what patriotism is. While
C
...patnotism includes “love of’ in its deflmtion, and “love of’ assumes
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“preference”, it does flot preclude a love of other non-compatriots as well, perhaps
in a different way, and different only insofar as the relationship, and therefore,
understanding ofnon-compatriots is different.
The second problem posed by patriotic partiality is the one that has to do
with caring for and helping those in need. The question refers to who is partial to
whom, for what reason, and the answer demands a moral justification.
Governments of a state are partial to their own citizens evidenced by the fact that
we put substantially more money in health care and social welfare, the arts, and
education of our own state, than we do in foreign aid. This seems to me
justifiable because it is an instrumental decision, based upon the purposes and
goals ofthe govemment—that is, to organize the money collected from its
citizens in a way that benefits them. However, when the govemment is able to
fulfiil that function, a patriot would flot be incoherent or inconsistent with
him!herself to put pressure on the government to use a portion of our money for
the aid ofnon-compatriots who need it. Nothing in patriotism precludes this.
This brings us to an important recognition in the partiality ofpatriots, when it is
invoked, and if it can bejustifled.
In order to introduce the element of ‘crisis’ situations, I want to go back to
the family analogy, despite having already attributed special status to it, and
despite conmion sense dictating that we are partial to the needs ofour own
children before the needs ofother chiidren. Does the fact ifiat familial partiality
(owing to our families before other people) allow, for example, me to give my
child rnany presents for Christmas. knowing full well that other chiidren, like my
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own, who by accident ofbirth are bom in places where they lack the basic
necessities for survival? We can say for certain that the allowance for familial
partiality does not necessitate that I spend ail ofmy money on Christmas gifis and
flot on aid despite the special-obligation stemniing from the special-relationship
status that I have with my chiidren. To make the question harder, does familial
partiality even allow for that? In answering this question, I will move on to what
patriotic partiality allows for and demands. Quite simply, there is no moral
justification on the grounds of familial partiality to over-indulge one’s chiidren on
the grounds of special reiationship status and because one can afford to do so.
Familial partiality, like patriofic partiality must be assessed in terms of a
particular criterion which includes more than membership for its allotment. In
crisis situations. we determine how best and most effectively to distribute our
resources in ways that consider flot only nationality, but other things as well. The
patriot is flot obliged by some universal moral code to prefer his/her compatriots
in times when others might be in more dire need than his/her compatriots. This
speaks directly to the daim I made earlier that patriotism is flot the only
identification from which we derive our self-understanding and a conception of
our place in the world. If the only self-identification were a patriotic one, then
nationality would lie the only criterion upon which one would determine how to
distribute one’s funds. If patriotism was the founding, but only first, identity,
upon which others were built, then one could look around the world and assess its
needs in more constructive ways.
C
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Earlier I referred to good parents, good friends, good spouses, distinct
from bad ones as analogous to good and bad patriotism. Bad parenting, like
cheating for your child, is akin to supporting bad policies in your country simply
because your govemment came up with them. In the same way, distributive
justice for the patriot includes an analysis for determining how best to act in our
globalized world, where we know that our actions affect the lives of other human
beings. Think about what the over-indulgent parent teaches the child at gifi
giving occasions: over-indulgence and consumerism are acceptable practices even
in a world of extreme economic inequality. This person flot only fails as a parent,
but hlshe fails as a person because by only recognizing the importance ofhis/her
child, hlshe fails to recognize the importance of other chiidren. This is not to say
that a parent must care equally for ail chiidren as that goes against not only
common sense, but our capabilities as parents. But not recognizing others’ needs,
when one’s own needs are flot lacking, is not at all patriotic. It is inhumane. That
person’s humanity is slightly diminished in refusing to recognize the gravity of
other children’s suffering. Nothing in this story is patriotic.
This does not resolve the problem completely. I must now address the
problem of choosing between the needs of the compatriot and non-compatriot
when both are in need. On one hand one may argue that the poorest peopÏe’s
needs in developing countries are aiways higher than the poorest peopie’s needs
in our societies. On the other hand, some may argue that we have an obligation to
help our local compatriots who are suffering because one’s suffering in rich
countries, while relative, is no less significant than the suffering of poorer non-
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C compatriots. I do flot thinic a fonu1a for patriotic pa±ality could give us
universal laws that are applicable in ail cases. When Jones and other scholars
daim that patriotism involves extending greater concem to compatriots than to
non-compatriots, 189 do flot see why we must be so categorical about it. We
may, when situations arise, care more for compatriots, but there are many
instances when good patriots send their money to far away places in a crisis
situation, and nothing about their patriotism is necessarily hindered because ofit.
If the definition of patriotism includes categorically that ail patriots must prefer
their compatriots over and at the exclusion ofnon-compatriots, than the daim is
too hard to defend—it is, in fact, unjustifiable. But such a vision ofpatriotism is
simple and unimaginative. It shuts doors instead of opening them. Patriotism
does not preclude reason, feeling, imagination and compassion, ail of which we
use in determining how to act in the world. No formuia for how to be a good
patriot could ever really fulfiil the act ofbeing a moral agent, situated in a
particular place, in unique circumstances, at one time or another. Many factors
will be considered when determining one’s role both as a patriot and as a citizen
ofthe world. At this point I might be accused oftalking about something else—
something distinctly sounding like a ‘cosmopolitan’ patriotism. Indeed, I am.
Those skeptical ofpatriotism will challenge the defender ofpatriotism to explain
how the cosmopolitan patriot can account for raw and ugly nationalism—that part
ofpatriotism which can and ofien does go very wrong. The theory of
cosmopolitan patriotism may sound on paper praiseworthy, but that theory does
C
Charles Jones, Global Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 112.
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C flot acount for the fact that patriotism oflen means, in people’s acmal experience
of it, exclusion, and xenophobia.
To a certain degree, I have already begun to address this by taiking about
the importance ofhaving flot just a patriotic identity, but many other ones as well.
The next section will analyze the conditions under which a person sees him or
herselfpurely in ethnie terms. The relevance ofthis analysis is to show that in
fact it is flot patriotism that is at the heart of the problem, but rather the conditions
under which people become unreasonable, or the conditions which force them to
engage in the inhumanity of war. If war were only about ethnicity, critiques of
patriotism would be right in arguing against it. But I will show that there are
reasons why patriotism tums ugÏy, and if we can uncover ffie reasons, then we
will find better ways to engage in conflict resolution, rather than through further
conflict. The next section will address the problem ofhow and why patriotism
can go wrong with a view to understanding, anticipating and conecting the
problems ofpatriotism, before it spins out of control.
C
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IV-vii: The Frame for why Patriotism goes Wrong
If a patriotic identity was the single identity from which one’s self
conception starts and ends, then the dangers are profound. As JeffMcMahan puts
it it would be “the mark of a drone to accept with docility or without reflection a
ready-made, mass-manufactured, one-dimensional conception of oneseif.
While this does exist I see people, for the most part, as far more complex than
that. People’s sympathies and bonds may start with, but certainly do not end with
the national one. If we treat our national identities as one step toward our other
identities, then we develop as richer, more complex individuals, from which
finally, a cosmopolitan citizen can triumphantly emerge. It is specifically a
triumph for the cosmopolitan patriot because it is a step toward peace:
Membership in and identification wiffi a range of groups may
enrich one’s life, extend one’s sympathies and bonds with
others, and thereby lessen the potential for incomprehension of
and conflict with offiers. Both prudence and an impartial
concem with consequences therefore suggest that it is
desirable for people to cultivate complex, multilayered
individual identities, built around distinctive individual
qualities and multifarious group identifications.’9’
McMahan refers to this as “complex identification” but he specifically excludes it
from the definition ofpatriotism. As he puts it “complex identification does not,
of course, exclude nationality as an element of individual identity; it merely
denies nationality the preeminent importance assigned to it by the nationalist”.192
A contemporary definition ofpatriotism does not necessarily put “preeminent
importance” on nationalism per se, but rather attributes to it the value of the one
out ofmany ways in which we understand ourselves in relation to the world,
190 Jeif McMahan. The Morality ofNationalism, 121.
‘‘ Ibid, 121.
192 Ibid, 121.
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especially vis à vis our global commitments, to which patriotism is but one step.
There are times when patriots define themselves solely in terms of their
nationalities. Waizer is wise to note that this happens when a state or a group is
under attack or feels that it is under attack. 193 Nationals of former Yugoslavia
had a variety ofcriticisms oftheir leader, Siobodan Milosevic, (distinct, separate,
and likely more accurate then the criticisms from the international community),
but in April 1999, the majority rallied in support of their President. They were
under attack. Nationalism in former Yugoslavia had neyer been higher—not
because the people have a genetic or cultural predisposition to nationalism194 but
because they feit unjustly attacked, misrepresented in the global community. The
response was to identify pureiy in terms of nationality. It is not the natural state
of affairs, and an examination of the literature on nationalism shows that it is
especially during crisis situations where nationalism becomes an acute problem.
What is relevant to my critique is the way in which this understanding of
bad patriotism iliuminates some problems with the idea that we can solve crisis
situations using military intervention. More precisely, a military intervention is
more likely to breed flot only acute nationalism, but also a greater degree of
hostility, violence, and long-term instability. Military intervention thus promotes
not cosmopolitan conditions, but rather its antithesis: nationalism, violence,
instabiiity. Ail ofthis leads to greater abuse ofhuman rights. Global actions that
193 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1994), 82.
194 Rebecca West’s magnum opus, Black Lamb and Grey faïcon (London: Penguin Books, 1940)
documents the history of Yugoslavia beginning pre-WWII. Its perspective is invaluable in the
uncarmy way it foreshadows future events by locating the role ofthe Bailcans in past failed global
efforts toward peace. It also provides an atypical view of the region because of the way she
‘reads’ the narrative of the Ballcans from within. West spent years traveling throughout, and
smdying the Bailcan, especially within the context of European geo-politics and history.
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C encourage the worst part ofpatotism must be evaluated with a view to develop
the conditions for a cosmopolitan peaceful world order.
Charles Taylor makes the same ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction when lie talks
about patriotism, attributing the good kind to the Quebecois, and the bad kind to
others who have been engaged in wars, but he then immediately makes an
observation, which I understand to mean that nationalism is the lesser cuiprit than
other circumstances. He observes that
nationalism is an outbreak of emotion that is understandable
when people are under strain because of, say, a disorienting
social and economic transition, especially if this is
accompanied by hard times. So we understand why lots of
Russians voted for Zhirinovsky in the last election, even
though we deplore it, just as we understand why Algerians
voted for the Islamic Salvation Front in their last election.
Now if things had been going better, if people had felt more
secure, or if there hadn’t been so much unemployment and
hardship, theses extreme and dangerous parties wouldn’t have
made the headway they did.’95
This means that nationalism (“love of country”) is not the problem in as much as
economic, geo-poiitical circumstances which put the kind of strain on people that
lends itseif to fear, fear to irrationality, and irrationality to instability. Understood
in this context, it is not nationaiism per se that is the probiem, but the kinds of
conditions that enables extremism to erupt. That extremism could manifest itseÏf
in religion, nationaiity, cuits or just about any other group activity. A terrorist
from New York and one from London may have nothing in terms of ethnicity in
conm-ion. Their reasons for conspiring to engage in terrorist activity then must be
seen flot in terms of an irrationai nationalism, but in terms of the global conditions
out of which biind fanaticism can erupt. The underiying daim here is that
C
_________
195 Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Morality” in The Morality ofNationalism, 32.
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C conflict must 5e understood flot solely in tes of ethcity, lest we miss crucial
parts ofthe analysis.
Kant defends the idea of nationalism within the context of the terni
‘republican’ indicating that the condition for patriotism is freedom, equality and
independence. This exciudes groups promoting intolerance and inequality ftom
the cosmopolitan ideal because they adhere to principles that go against the
greater good of humanity. In other words, they are self-contradictory and
incoherent and are excluded by their own inconsistency. We cannot set a criterion
for ourselves and a different criterion for all other groups without being accused
of setting multiple standards, for which no justification cari be provided.
Therefore patriotism has set limitations, but those limitations adhere to universal
reason, rather than culmral difference. The same reasoning applies to the
principle of tolerance. A patriot cannot be intolerant of other groups without
Seing accused of being inconsistent or self-contradictory. So if cultural
membership (the basis ofpatriotism) is in the Rawlsian sense a ‘primary good’,
then it morally speaking, must be available to everyone, lest it be arbitrary, and
therefore not a primary good. So we can get around the problem ofpartiality by
not making the requirements of the patriot so limited. Jnstead, we see that good
patriots will be good cosmopolitans. Cosmopolitan patriotism is the notion I
develop in the next section.
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IV-viii: Cosmopolitan Patriotism:
Talcing Kant’s idea ofa cosmopolitan patriotism to anoffier level, I would
like to draw on the ideas of contemporary thinkers like Kai Nielsen, Charles
Taylor, Kwame Anthony Appiah to develop the notion of what cosmopolitanism
looks like when it is joined with (or modified by) patriotism. Having already
articulated the different forms of patriotism according to Kant, and having made
daims to what cosmopolitanism is flot (that is, in opposition to theories of
community and local identity), I propose to set some basic guidelines or
qualifications for the cosmopolitan ideal. In what follows, I will defend the
fundamental premises of cosmopolitanism to include social liberalism as defined
by Nielsen to include tolerance, equality, the protection ofliuman rights,
autonomy, with an emphasis not on individualistic liberalism, but rather on the
social nature of liberalism which includes the best possible conditions for human
flourishing for everyone. I will advance the argument that patriotism and
cosmopolitanism must flot only be compatible, but they must be integrally
linked—two sides of a coin, and I will develop these ideas along these unes:
patriotism is a primary good and as such, is extended to all human beings; self
identity is an inherent part ofhuman flourishing and is derived from our local
attachments and affiliations (community); and human flourishing is the necessary
precursor to a democratic society, not just in word, but in practice. In defining
and developing these premises I will show why cosmopolitan patriotism is a
better, more substantive form of the ldnd of cosmopolitanism than the one that
Nussbaum advances, which opposes patriotic sentiment. following that, I will
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show how this form of cosmopolitanism addresses some ofthe dangers I perceive
in a cosmopolitanism without national roots.
The necessity ofbeing a cosmopolitan patriot, instead ofbeing a
cosmopolitan has to do with the best conditions possible for human flourishing,
and the best conditions possible for human flourishing will lead to (hopefully) the
conditions for a truly (rather than superflcially) democratic society, under which
the conditions for a federation of nation states can emerge, as Kant envisioned in
Toward Ferpetual Feace. Taylor, Kymiicka, Nielsen, Appiah, Barber and Berlin
to name just a few, have argued for the need to have a sense of self which stems
ftom local identity. In The Malaise ofModernity Taylor uses the expression “at
sea” to describe what happens to one when they are disconnected from that sense
of local community.’96 The reason why patriotism is integral to cosmopolitanism,
argue Kant, Neilsen, Johnson, is that the local identity is necessary for one to fit
into the global one. While we have a need to belong to the community of
humanity, we have a prior need to belong to a local community. To say ‘prior’
does flot mean that it is just more important, but that it is the condition sine qua
non. It is not possible to belong to the community of humanity without having
this local sense ofwho one is, or so I have argued. I will make allowances for
those who do not identify with the particular, (non-patriots) but I will show why I
think that that is a loss. More importantly, I have tried to dissuade the reader from
making exclusive two kinds of identities which I think not only go well together,
but are also integral to one another. Because that local group telis us who we are,
we can then participate with and belong to the greater group. This argument rests
196 Charles Taylor, The Malaise ofliodernily (Concord, Ont: Anansi. 1991), 30.
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C upon the belief that oup identity and cuifliral membership are needs for ail
human beings. Neilsen paraphrases Berlin when he says “Without our distinctive
national identities we wouid be lost: there is no standing outside these
comprehensive cultures and living and life”.’97 And if these are human needs,
then they are the conditions without which we cannot grow, develop and fiourish.
Growth, development and human flourishing are the conditions for thought, and
thought is the condition for a truly democratic society. It is no wonder that Kant
saw no conflict, but instead a necessity for a person to be a patriot and a
cosmopolitan at the same time. The end goal was enÏightenment, and
enlightenment would surely lead to perpetual peace as “. . .reason, as the highest
legislative power absolutely condemns war”.198
Most importantly, the necessity of grounding cosmopolitanism in a
particular nationalist setting is to enable the individual to fiourish in order that
s/he may become a thinking, acting and participating member of her local and by
extension, greater community. Taylor calls self-identification an “essential
condition” for a free (non despotic) regime.’99 Self-identity is the first step to
knowledge, and it is achieved and developed within a particular setting—first
within family, then local community, and so forth. A strong foundation enables a
person to fiourish in order that hlshe may become a participating member of
society. In other words, this foundation creates the conditions for a truly
democratic spirit.
197 Nielsen, 455.
198 Reiss, 104.
199 Baynes, Perpetual Peace, 222.
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(J’ Taylor aptly cails his briefresponse to Nussbaum’s daims about the moral
ambiguity on patriotism, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism” in which he makes
the daim that ftee, democratic and egalitarian societies need strong identification
on the part oftheir citizens.20° Democratic societies can only work, argues
Taylor, “if most ofits members are convinced that their political society is a
common venture of considerable moment and believe it to be of such vital
importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a
democracy”.20’ This participation requires a sense ofbonding among the people
working together. And this is indeed where Taylor sees the danger today: “A
citizen democracy is highly vulnerable to the alienation that arises from deep
inequalities and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among
abandoned minorities”.202 The only way to achieve this is to demand great
solidarity among compatriots. Taylor goes on to argue that we do not serve the
purposes ofhumanity by neglecting our commitments to our compatriots, but
rather our failure within our communities results in failure toward humanity.
Procedural liberalism and a politics of neutrality hinder the development
ofthe loyalties that are necessary to motivate citizens into participating
democratic society. The failure of democratic societies in tum negates the
conditions Kant speaks about in creating a peaceful federation of nations. Often
what strikes us about Kant’ s daim that citizens in a repubuican (what we would
cail ‘democratic’) society would neyer agree to participate in war is that it seems
our experience teils us the exact opposite. But in fact, what can be called
200 Tàylor, for Love of Countiy, 119.
201 Taylor, 120.
202 Taylor, 120.
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(J democraticalÏy elected politicians acting on the wilÏ of the people, might 5e the
façade of democracy, covering up the massive inequalities and disconnected
individuals flot truly practicing their democratic rights because of alienation,
atomism, consumerism, among other barriers, as the communitarian critique
would daim. The “souiless despotism” Kant warns about is evident in this kind
ofblanket cosmopolitanism, which is not based in anything concrete, and is
reminiscent ofDiogenes’ daim to world citizenship.
The analogy that I offer is that patriotism (that natural human tendency
toward what is most familiar) is represented in international law by the twin
normative pillars of international society: sovereign equality and non intervention.
International law protects the tendency that one has to flourish in the familiarity
and safety of one’s own community. Soverei equality means that we, citizens
of the world, are ail represented equally at the international level. In that sense, it
is a cosmopolitan ideai. Non-intervention understood in this context, protects
world citizens from the kind of invasion and occupation we see in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Kosovo. Cosmopolitanism, when understood failaciously as an
independent, neutral position, rootless and universal, represents the position of
humanitarian interventionists who risk violating the very human rights they seek
to protect by violating some of its own most basic and fundamental principles—
nameiy, the aspiration to equality for ail citizens. Cosmopolitanism, when
practiced like this, daims its legitimacy from an apolitical, neutral, global world
order, but in fact is situated, particular, and political.
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Liberal nationalism, as defined by Nielsen, includes the key principle that
if group identity and membership to local community are goods for ail human
beings, then it folÏows that the patriot recognizes this good flot only for his or her
own group, but for ah groups. I have already defined this in the previous section
as a kind of”universal” patriotism. It extends to ail human beings. As such, it
passes the Kantian categorical imperative that one can will upon ail members of
the community of humanity the need and desire to belong to and love a particular
community of which one is a part. Recognizing patriotism as a fundamental
human need for belonging and identity demands that this fundamental human
requirement extends to ah human beings. What is ofien mistakenly defined as
patriotism is the desire to belong to a particuiar group as an exclusive right—that
is, without extending that need and desire to other groups, or believing that one’s
particular membership situates them above ail other groups. Having this human
need and exercising it does not pit one against the other, as I have argued
throughout this critique. Rather, it opens the door to recognizing and appreciating
the other. Johnson, who defines patriotism as a love of one’s homeland sees the
relationship between love of one’ s local community to love of the greater
community as one in which the former opens the door to the latter:
Love as an ontological openness allows us to celebrate what
we find ourselves present and available to hic et nunc in such
a way that the mode ofpresence and availability becomes a
foundation that launches us into a wider world of phenomena
that we can also appreciate and celebrate. Love at one level
leads us to love at other levels. Love is an act that opens the
door to other fonns of love that are vital to the creation,
recognition, and development of life. Thus the love that is
patriotism, viewed as an ontologically open act, is a devotion
to and celebration of the place and land that is near and dear to
us that also makes it possible for us to appreciate, and even
celebrate, those places and lands sustafnfng those who are
different than us, but who nevertheless share with us the
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inalienable and fundamental reality of being human.203
(emphasis added).
This conception necessitates an ontological openness ofothemess: patriotism is
ofien associated with the very opposite of that
The relationship I create between good patriots and good cosmopolitans
has to do with the daim that when we are abie to fulfihl our commitments on a
local level we are better equipped to then fulfiul our commitments at the global
level. Socrates is a better example than Diogenes on this account. Many
cosmopolitans draw upon and consider Socrates as an inspirational source. He
too replied that lie was ftom “The World” when asked where lie came ftom,
however what distinguishes Socrates from Diogenes was flot his refusai to adhere
to the laws and customs ofhis state, but rather his utter allegiance to his state, to
the point where he refiised to escape it to save bis own life, even though he knew
that the state wronged him. While Socrates challenged the norms of bis day, and
while lie may be called subversive, radical, and a threat to his government, he
acted within the law, and out of respect for the law, to develop, modify, and
expand its horizons. Socrates’ intention, it can be argued, was to improve his
local comrnunity out of a sense of great love and duty towards it. By accepting
bis fatal sentence, he consciously acted to serve as an example ofwhat can go
wrong wben states go awry. But his act was not one complicit in crime—it was to
serve philosopbical ends, to maice a daim, loud and bold, which no one could
ignore. And, it can 5e further argued that Socrates’ great love of and duty to his
community extended to the community of humanity because the message was not
203 Johnson, 20.
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Ç just for the citizens ofAthens, it was for the whole ofhumaty. However, he
expressed it in terms ofhis local community. In this sense, Socrates was both a
patriot and a cosmopolitan. Not only was that flot contradictory, but his
patriotism and cosmopolitanism were related to one another in an integral and
fundamental way. He was a patriot in the sense that he had a deep feeling of
commitment for his community and a cosmopolitan in that he saw ail human
beings equal in moral worth, based on reason, feeling and imagination. The
authenticity and depth of Socrates’ cosmopolitanism depended upon lis genuine
commitment to his own local community.
The friction between cosmopolitans and patriots seems to be the
separation ofloyalties. The Stoics, unlike the Cynics, do not separate as mutually
exclusive their membership to community from their membership to humanity.
One can draw from the Stoics that not only is there is no reason why one cannot
pursue more universal aspirations and concems at the same time that one
maintains and embraces one’s own local identity, having those local identities
enriches that experience. We should be careful flot to make mutually exclusive
the two clubs of local and universal communities. Nussbaum interprets and
quotes Seneca when she writes that
[...]each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities—the
local community of our bfrth, and the community of human
argument and aspiration that “is truly great and truly common,
in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure
the boundaries of our nation by the sun”.204
204 Nussbaum, for Love of Countiy, 7.
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She then goes on to say that “It is this community that is, fundamentally the
soïtrce ofour moral values” (emphasis added).205 The Stoic daim that we dwell in
two communities is a descriptive 011e. We can understand ourselves as being part
of a smaller and greater community: the smaller refers to our local origins and
teaches us language, custom, and religion, among others, and the larger refers to
the community ofhumanity. To daim, however, that the second community is
the “source” of our moral values would make it prior to the first, which is
impossible. We can only draw our conception ofthe community ofhumanity
from our local communities. It is precisely this point where I think much current
scholarship on cosmopolitanism fundamentally misses the point in ternis of our
individual relationship to the ‘world’. This is to say that we belong primarily to
the greater community and secondarily to our local one. In fact, we belong to the
greater .community because ofthe smaller one. This idea locates the individual,
but does not put him or her at odds with the greater whole. This is especially
relevant in terms of our conception ofhumanitarian intervention because if we
suppose that we are outside of any particular social or moral construction, we are
apt to think that the ideas we have are impartial, global, and by extension, correct.
Without taking into consideration how and from where we derive these ideas, and
what our life experiences are which helped us form them, we are vulnerable to
committing the error ofhypocritical paternalism, well intentioned, but possibly
dangerous.
Defined as a love for one’s community, Johnson characterizes patriotic
love as a precursor to cosmopolitanism:
205 Nussbaum, 7.
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E::) Love is an act that opens the door to other forrns of love that
are vital to the creation, recognition, and development of life.
Thus the love ffiat is patriotism, viewed as an ontologically
open act, is a devotion to and celebration of the place and land
that is near and dear to us that also makes it possible for us
to apprecfate, and even celebrate, those places and lands
sustaining those who are different than us, but who
nevertheless share with us the inalienable and firndarnental
reality ofbeing human.206 (emphasis added).
Nussbaum extracts from the Stoics the notion that class, rank, status, national
origin, location, and gender ail morally irrelevant attributes. If a person daims,
Nussbaum argues, that she is an “X” first (Italian, Canadian, etc.) and then a
citizen ofthe world second, that person “has made the morally questionable move
of self-definition by a morally irrelevant characteristic”207. But these attributes
define us. We cannot think outside ofthem: we are bound by class, rank, status,
national origin, location and gender. We can shape, move, and even deny the
boundaries of those attributes, but we cannot escape them, think outside of them,
render them irrelevant. They do flot make us morally greater or lesser than one
another, but we are the sum and total of these attributes. Rather than call them
morally irrelevant (because whatever they are morally, relevant they are) we can
appeal to the notion of equality in terms of moral worth, and that is clearer, more
precise than to disregard the attributes that define us, locate us, without which we
do flot exist. Or as Himmelfarb puts it,
.we do flot corne into the world as free-floating autonornous
individuals. We corne into it complete with ah the particular,
defrning characteristics that go into a fully forrned hurnan
being, a being with an identity. . .To pledge one’s
“ffindarnental allegiance” to cosrnopolitanism is to try to
transcend not only nationality but all the actualities,
particularities, and realities of life that constitute one’s natural
identity.208
206 Jeffrey, 20.
207 Nussbaurn, for Love of Country, 5.
208 Himmelfarb, for Love of Country, 77.
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However, unlike Himmelfarb, I do not concede that cosmopolitanism is an
illusion. I do flot conceive of cosmopolitanism as a stage at which it is necessary
to “transcend not only nationality but ail the actualities, particularities, and
realities” which define us. It is this misconception of cosmopoiitanism that I am
addressing. It is flot the goal of cosmopolitanism that I reject, as Himmelfarb
does, but rather it is only Nussbaum’s particular construction of the term in this
particular reading with which I find fault. In particular, it is lier tendency to pit
cosmopolitanism against patriotism. While Nussbaum lias since developed and
modified lier position to one less rigid, I inciuded this reading because I think it
represents some general misconceptions about cosmopolitanism, which iead to
other, more serious errors. I offer the notion ofpatriotism as a robust and ricli
conception ofthe deeply and genuineiy committed cosmopoiitan.
Nussbaum is imposing a moral interpretation where it is flot ciear that one
exists. By making daims to national identity, we are not necessarily asserting our
superiority over other nationalities, although, the schoiars wlio offered up an
Eastern!Westem distinction to separate the inational from the rational may be
accused ofdoing so. This act is in part to make the “moraiiy questionable move”
ofsuperiority due to what she correctly cails “accidents”.209 That ail ofthese
attributes are accidents is true. That we make daims about superiority because of
them is sometimes true, but is certainly not necessarily or aiways true. It is
always wrong, and daims of superiority based on nationality go against the
fundamental nature of cosmopoiitan and even reason itself However,
C
_________
209 Nussbaum, for Love of country, s.
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Ç contemporary thinkers defending patriotism like Nielsen, Kleingeid, Appiah, and
Taylor do flot defend any such daim. What we must distinguish then is the
difference between (j) the fact that these accidents define us, and (ii) the false and
morally wrong daim that our differences determine our status in terms of moral
beings in the world—that is, when we do indeed refer to out accidents to make
false daims of superiority.
Our identification with particular and local communities and our
commitments can be described as patriotic, but this does not preclude being
cosmopolitan, which essentially means appreciating other nationalities as well, or,
believing in the value ofplurality. A cosmopolitan city means there are many
differences there, and the differences are flot only tolerated, but embraced. In a
cosmopolitan city, Chinese people eat at Greek restaurants and Italian people eat
Thai. At the end ofthe day, we may ail meet for a drink at the Jazz festival,
where musicians from ail over the world contribute their talent to a spectacle of
diversity. A patriot would, if he/she were consistent, encourage the patriotism of
other nations as well as embrace his/her own. Failure to do so, or exclusionary
visions of one’s own country is irreconcilabie with Kantian categorical imperative
(or even the biblical one) ofuniversal maxims. If I love my country, thrive in it,
and understand myseif and the world through it, I must extend that to ail peopies
ofthe world. In this sense, a necessary component ofbeing a cosmopolitan, is to
be a patriot first. The patriot fails if he/she is not able to extend his/her feeling
and respect for compatriots to non compatriots. Failed patriots are those who
have simplified human moral life to the immediate here and now. They lack
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imagination, compassion, and reason. It is a very human failure, but a failure ail
the same.
This is to say that cosmopolitanism and patriotism are flot mutually
exclusive. If we mm our attention to Kant, by whom many modem
cosmopolitans are inspired, we see an exemplification ofhow cosmopolitanism
and patriotism flot only fail to be mutually exclusive, but how they are linked to
one another. Pauline Kleingeld analyses this relationship in her article “Kant’s
Cosmopolitan Patriotism”, and from it we can draw an understanding of
cosmopolitanism that resonates more honestÏy with our human experience.21° In
her analysis, Kleingeld first defines Kant as a moral cosmopolitan, which refers to
the idea that ail human beings are members of a single moral community, and that
we all have obligations to one another regardless ofnationality, language, religion
or customs. This is in une with what Nussbaum defines as cosmopolitan, but
what distinguishes Nussbaum from Kant in this case is that Nussbaum sometimes
sees this as contrary to the obligations one has toward one’s own particular
nationality. Kant clearly does not. In the Metaphysics ofliorals Vigilantius,
Kant says of “world patriotism and local patriotism” that “both are required of the
cosmopolitan”.21’
Kleingeld examines Kant’s patriotism in terms of its relationship to
cosmopolitanism. In so doing, she asks if there exists a conflict between the two.
Her response is set in the political context of a republican state, which means that
ail individuals are members of a state; that they have an innate and equal right to
210 Kleingeld, 299-3 16.
211 Kant, MM Vig XXVIL2.1, 673-4, quoted in Kleingeld, 299.
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extemal fteedom, and that there is a system in which each everyOne’ s fteedom
can co-exist with each other. Civic patriotism, she goes on to argue, has to do
with the maintenance of a just society in terms of duty. Kleingeld explains:
The duty of civic patriotism is the duty to promote the
functioning and improvement of ffie republic as an institution
ofjustice. It is flot originally a duty to support one’s
compatriots but, raffier, a duty to promote the
institutionalization ofjustice. It is lilcely that there will be
cases in which one’s compatriots receive certain benefits as a
resuit, but this is then flot simply because they are one’s
compatriots but rather because they are one’s members in the
just republic that one ought to sustain and support as an
institution ofjustice.212
Kant shows why it is necessary to have some imperfect (special) duties to the
state, which we do flot have for other states. To deny this would be like denying
just states, in which justice with regard to extemal freedom would be impossible.
That these special obligations do flot conflict with our general cosmopolitan
duties can be shown in three ways: first, our imperfect duties of civic patriotism
are flot prior to our cosmopolitan duties especially if those latter duties are perfect
ones. This is to say that if one’s civic duties were to go against the demands of
humanity, as they might well have done so in Nazi Germany, we would have to
deny our civic duties and adhere to the perfect duties qua human beings. A
conflict in values, or tragedy, occurs when we are put in the position where we
must choose between two (or more). I will use the case of Nazi Germany to
illustrate this point. As patriotic Germans, it would be in our national interest to
choose our obligation to humanity over our civic obligation, because one does flot
want to belong to a member of a local community which is remembered in the
way that Nazi Germany is today remembered. Those Germans who risked their
212 Kleingeld, 309.
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C lives to stand up for justice understood that, and I would argue that they were the
true patriots.
Secondly, civic patriotic duties apply universally everywhere injust
republics. Just republics, Kant thought, tended toward peace, naturally
strengthening individual republics as they need flot focus on preparation of war.
Kant develops these ideas in more detail in Toward Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch. $uffice it to say here that one’s civic duties would
contribute to a greater global peace on a local level. And finally, because both
patriotic and cosmopolitan duties can be compatible, as in the case ofjust
republics, it is flot inherently nor necessarily contradictory to adhere to one’s
duties on a local level.
f inally, Kleingeld assesses the third form ofpatriotism, trait or quality
based patriotism as something which cannot be a Kantian duty because it stems
from a ‘pathological’ love. Pathological love is derived from feeling, cannot be
commanded, and is contingent upon the qualities and characteristics that appeal
differently to each of us. While Kleingeld defends civic patriotism as the only
one which can be consistently applied to cosmopolitanism, she does not prohibit
national or trait-based patriotism as long as they do flot conftict with the values of
moral cosmopolitanism. Ofien patriotism of any kind is Iooked upon with
suspicion because of the acts of aggression and the assumption of superiority
committed and displayed in its name. Nothing in the content ofpatriotism need
necessarily promote those things, and ofien may be in conflict with its own
interests. By that I mean that it is in no one’s interests to belong to a member ofa
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club holding a record ofatrocities. Appiah observes this when he says that
“[. . j
the patriot is the surely the first to suffer his or her country’s shame: it is the
patriot who suffers when a country elects the wrong leaders, or when those
leaders prevaricate, bluster, pantomime, or betray “our” principles”213.
Maintaining values that do flot conflict with the values for the whole of the human
community serves the interest ofthe patriot and it serves the interests ofthe
cosmopolitan. In this sense, the patriot and the cosmopolitan are flot only
compatible, but are integral to one another. It is our ‘cosmopolitan side’ that
provides the tools with which we analyze our patriotic feelings, keeping them in
check.
I have argued that pafriotism then, which is a natural feeling one tends to
have for the community in which one is raised, tempered by reason, that which
links all members ofhumanity in one group, is the foundation for a greater
concept referred to as cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan patriotism, then, refers to
two sides of the same coin. I have insisted on the necessity for a patriotic
foundation for a cosmopolitan vision because I will argue that lacking such a
patriotic basis renders cosmopolitanism flot only empty in content, but dangerous.
Vv7hat renders cosmopolitanism without a patriotic basis dangerous and
irresponsible is examined in my analysis of some of the common fallacies and
misconceptions about the nature of cosmopolitanism. In what follows, I will
expose some ofthose fallacies and misconceptions.
213 Appiah, 26.
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C) IV-ix: The Cosmopolitan Non-Patriot: “White Girl Don’t!”214
Kant’ s argument for defending national patriotism sounds much like what
I was arguing earlier with regard to a love for the general and abstract versus love
for the concrete and particular. Kleingeld describes this argument as grounded in
an empirical psychological premise: practical love “needs to crystallize around or
focus on some particular subset ofhumans towards which one feels an emotional
attachment, because the lack of any such focus threatens one’s efforts to do one’s
duty”215. Ris argument rests on the assumption that if one, like Oscar WiÏde once
said, daims to love everyone, one in fact loves no one. KÏeingeld puts it
succinctly when she says
.because the lack of focus on the part of the Weltliebhaber
[the person without affection and devotion for anyone except
the world or humanity at large] leads to impassiveness, and
because impassiveness constitutes a hindrance to moral
behavior, il is morally required to give one’s moral
universalism a particular focus, more specffically, a patriotic
focus.216
It is important to note that when Kant talks about ‘focus’, lie means to say
that this is not justified in itself, but rather as the basis upon which one can further
one’s practical love in general. In Kant’s own words, the intention cf the patriot
should be that “in being devoted to bis country, lie should be inclined to further
the well-being of the whole world”217. KleingeÏd argues that while there may need
to be a ‘focus’ as Kant describes, it need flot necessarily be that of ethnicity or
even country (whicli are oflen not the same in any case). Kleingeld may be right
when she daims that a citizen may be focused in other ways than patriotic ones.
214 Chrystos, Not Vanishing, (Vancouver: Press Gang Publishing, 1988), 9.
215 Kleingeld, 311.
216Kleingeld, 311.
217 Kant, MM Vig XXWI.2,1, 673-4 quoted in Kleingeld, 312.
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Quite justified is the Canadian who is devoted to a particular community, like
family, work, neighborhood or something else that brings together peopie with
common interests, and flot in terms of ethnie or national borders, in claiming that
she has no devotion to this greater entity called “Canada” and yet is quite
comfortable seeing herseif in terms ofa cosmopolitan. Let’s cali her the
Canadian non-patriot.
The daim that good cosmopolitans are first good patriots because they
have a sense of identity, they have leamed the value of loyalty and commitment,
and they are grounded in a way that will enable them to be more thoughtful
cosmopolitans may sound fine in theory, but the question remains about what can
actually justify this daim. Now take the Canadian non-patriot and put her in far
away places, where she feels quite at home working with foreign people, toward
ail ofwhom she has an affinity. Her life’s work is dedicated to establishing
NGO’s for economic and social development. Would I reaily be abie to say,
“You’re not a very good cosmopolitan” and if I did, what could justify such a
response?
First, I would not make such a boid daim. I have set up the problem in
such a way that makes it very difficult to answer. To resolve the probiem, I will
depict the probiem in two ways: First, let me consider this from Kleingeld’s point
ofview: is it enough to have particular associations, commitments and loyalties,
or do thoseloyalties need to extend to the state? And why did Kant insist the
commitment to human kind needed to start with the state? The first scenario
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refers to a scenario described by Native American author, Chrytos.218 In it, she
illustrates a young aid worker off to rescue impoverished chiidren in developing
countries from their fate of disease and death. In a poem called “White Girl
Don’t”, Chrystos offers a scathing criticism to the “white girl” who has no interest
or care for the deplorable conditions under which Native chiidren live. Her
critique includes skepticism that the American aid worker ever really cared about
people inasmuch as she cared about traveling to exotic lands where other people’s
problems are more interesting, from which she can take a nurnber ofpictures, and
corne back home to show what she has done. Perhaps the critique is unfair. It
depicts someone who is insensitive to local problems and insincere about helping
other people. Stili, it highlights sorne of the problems that we can have when we,
as I put it before, skip the first step. The question is really about how genuine our
cornrnitments are to the greater cornmunity, and whether our local affiliations
have been able to help us get there, understand, and respond in authentic ways.
Chystos’ insight draws on the possibility of the insincerity ofthe cosmopolitan
aid-worker who is more interested in herseif than in the impoverished conditions
of other people. It is a valid challenge to the cosmopolitan, especially because of
the implications some cosmopolitan policies will have on the locals of foreign
territories.
On the other hand is the Canadian non-patriot who daims that her lack of
affinity to her state is motivated by an individualistic understanding which rejects
ail forrns of communjtarian—orjented theories about how we become who we are.
In this depiction I wiÏl try to address whether this Canadian non-patriot must be a
218 Chrystos, 9.
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C bad cosmopolitan necessariÏy. If the Canadian non-patriot refuses to identify with
anything remotely Canadian, it might be harder for her to understand other people
in their own communities. It will be especially difficuit to recognize why people
are so vigilant about protecting their côllective identities when they are under
threat. She may wrongly conceive ofthem as chauvinistic. Appeals to collective
identity and comn-ion historical references may seem to her absurd. This will be
particularly damaging during times of conflict and struggie where there aie
disputes about territory and rights. The non-patriot is going to suffer a serious
disadvantage in trying to understand the passion, the meaning and the attachment
to a particular territory because the non-patriot has none ofthese feelings.
Thankfully, empathy allows imagination, and imagination can contribute to
understanding something foreign to oneseif. In that case, the Canadian non
patriot will flot necessarily fail her mission, but she will 5e somewhat more
challenged in this respect. In terms ofwhether the Canadian non-patriot’s
mission will fail is flot categorical. A person is able to surpass some ofthe
disadvantages ofthe lack ofpatriotism with some effort, creativity and openness.
I have tried to explain why there is so much focus and emphasis on the
necessity of establishing a patriotic foundation upon which a cosmopolitan one
may be built. Earlier I made a daim that the example Diogenes provides us, from
which numerous authors have cited with a view to advance the cosinopolitan
ideal, is a dangerous and irresponsible route. The basis from which I make such a
daim is linked with the moral/legal distinction drawn at the beginning of this
chapter—that is to say that moral cosmopolitanism without some concrete
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C (patriotic) foundation will make it harder to tryto establish a legal framework
applicable to ail people because it wiil lack some sort of basic understanding on
the part ofthe patriot in his or lier context. The necessity for developing a
definition of cosmopolitanism based upon liuman experience gives the necessary
substance to apply to an abstract notion. It helps us understand cosmopolitanism
in a concrete way. In this sense, the more concrete, the more reai a person’s
understanding is in their own particular context, the better equipped they are to
deal with international legal theories that institutionalize moral cosmopolitanism.
Essentially, the daim is to join the patriot with the cosmopolitan, in one body, so
to speak, in order that she may contribute to the difficult transition to legal
cosmopolitanism. Taking this approach will lielp us apply the abstract notions in
a practical, normative way. Without that clarity, the legal cosmopolitan may find
himlherself floating in ambiguity.
o
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W: The Abuses of Cosmopolitanism:
Patriotism is ofien criticized for its abuses and its irrationality. The
criticisms are well founded and because of that, we tend to be cautious about
invoking the uses ofpatriotism in abusive and unreasonable ways. What is rarely
cbnsidered is that cosmopolitanism too is vulnerable to bias and politicization,
rendering it subject to the same kinds of abuses and irrationality to which
patriotism is subject. Because patriotism, in its various forms, is understood as
having a feeling for and allegiance to one’s local community, it is oflen
misconstrued to mean that this kind of ailegiance is pitted against the greater
community ofhumanity. We have seen that making the two memberships
exclusive to one another not only is flot necessary, but that in fact doing 50
undermines the goals ofpatriotism and cosmopolitanism. But because
cosmopolitanism is expressed in universal terms, with noble aspirations, it is less
subject to criticism, especiaiiy in terms ofsome ofthe political and cultural bias.
Because the intentions ofthe cosmopolitan are understood as advancing the
interests of ail ofhumanity, on amoral level, and because we do not find fauit
with that intention, some important assumptions are glossed over.
If we look at the moral aspirations behind Nussbaum’s interpretation of
Stoical cosmopolitanism that “We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs,
and give its fimdamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first
allegiance and respect”219 we cannot, at first glance, see why this would be
morally contestable. But, if we examine the underlying supposition behind this
daim we can point to an assumption ofneutrality which does not exist. We
219 Nussbaum, Peipetual Peace, 31.
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cannot derive human feeling or command respect on the basis of abstract notions.
Nussbaum refers to ‘moral community’, ‘world citizenship’, ‘common goals’, ‘the
world citizen’ as though these things actually exist and we can delineate them, or
point to them. Who are the citizens ofthe world, and what are their values?
More importantly, who decided what their values would be? Did a Tibetan
Buddhist decide that private property would fali under the category of universal
human rights? To say that citizens of the world pledge their primary allegiance to
humanity is a somewhat abstract and fuzzy notion. The community ofhumanity,
or, citizens of the world, are composed of citizens of states. Actual people who
belong to particular nations, and who have specific values which differ according
to the basis of socio-economic and historical facts, and if the citizen of the world
pledges his or her allegiance to the community ofhumanity, then he or she has to
make concrete decisions about people and places in a political world. The citizen
of the world must recognize his or her own place in the grand spectrum of the
world, in order to be transparent and upfront about his or her particular
understanding (hence, biases) about a situation in which he or she is entering.
The cosmopolitan who is grounded will be better equipped to manage the
problematic task of participating in the negotiations of a world order that is
inclusive, plural and egalitarian. The bad cosmopolitan will assume a superior
position based on geo-political unes, and will be incapable of appreciating the
diversity of values, beliefs, and the entitlement of the protection for this diversity.
The risk is that the bad cosmopolitan subsumes anything he feels inferior to his
“neutral”, “universal” conception under the umbrella of ‘cosmopolitanism’.
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The feelings of the cosmopolitan must be as rigorously scrutinized as the
patriot’s, in the sense that the cosmopolitan has been shaped by particular values
and beliefs from which her conception ofhurnanity emerges. Without careful
scrutiny, it is possible (and probable) that the cosmopolitan projects a particular
bias as a universal value, and in so doing, undermine the goals of
cosmopolitanisrn. It does not help the cosmopolitan cause that its main advocates
came from, and continue to corne ftorn nations with imperial aspirations, and that
traditionally they have used force to instili their ‘universal’ values. The
Christianity ofmedieval Europe promoted the goals of cosmopolitanisrn, while
maintaining a strict regirnent of what that definition constituted, and thereby
making it an exclusive kind ofrnernbership. The Ottoman Empire, too, was
cosmopolitan. Currently, cosmopolitanism seems to be a Western, specifically
American, idea, borrowed from the ancient Romans, neither of whom have a
terribly good reputation for preserving the notion of sovereign equality. Lee
Han-is makes this biting observation:
The Roman ideai of cosmopolitanism was in fact the natural
perspective of men who had been brought up to govem and
administer a world empire as opposed to a Greek city-state, a
nomadic caravan, or a village in Scythia. Nor should this
cause surprise—ail imperiai societies find it in their interest to
promote the ideai ofcosmopoiitan values, by which they mean
that of the dominant culture, in contradiction to the clearly
inferior local values ofthose on the outskirts ofthe world.. In
short, by a strange dialectical miracle. out ofthe intensity of
Roman patriotism arose the sublimity of the cosmopolitan
ideal that Nussbaum recommends as America’s proper
educational project”. 220
In order to protect the notion of cosrnopolitanism from this ldnd of attack we must
be carefial, especially coming from richer and more powerful parts ofthe world,
220 Lee Harris, “The Cosmopolitan Illusion”, Poticy Review 118 (April!May 2003): 49.
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flot to impose particular cultural values on a universal frarne and cail it
cosmopolitan. Doing so would certainly undermine our goals, and render invalid
the cosmopolitan daims we put forth, and whicli are so integral to our continued
suwival as a species. This is why I invoke the use àfthe term ‘cosmopolitan
patriotism’, which lias been drawn onby many contemporary thinkers looking to
reconcile the false contradiction between patriotism and cosmopolitanism.
I suggest that the way to protect the notion of cosmopolitanism against
accusations that it is empty in content and political in nature, it flot only should
be, but it must be defined in relation to patriotism—not just as something which
can be reconciled with patriotism, but rather something of whicli patriotism is an
integral part. This is what I tried to show in ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’. This
reading of cosmopolitanism addresses and answers two important problems in the
idea oftraditional cosmopolitanism, as practiced by the Stoics, the Christians of
the Middle Ages, the Turks ofthe Ottoman Empire and currently the Americans.
The idea ofpatriotic cosmopolitanism must include a national identity which is
formed at the community level, and therefore, it recognizes the political nature of
identity and nationhood. Practicing cosmopolitanism with patriotic roots will
help to resolve the serious daim that cosmopolitanism is empty in content, and
that it is neutral in its point of reference. Instead, this mechanism lends content
and transparency to the project. It opens up the notion of cosmopolitanism to
scrutiny, without which words like ‘moral community’, ‘world citizen’, ‘universal
goals’ replace or trump the need for such scrutiny. It makes the ‘world citizen’
subj ect to criticism and it provides the ldnd of analysis from which lie is normaÏly
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exempt because ofthe lofty nature ofhis titie which would inadvertently
undermine our collective goals. This, I shah argue, is more dangerous than blind
and fervent nationahism. Nationalism spun out of control is immediately caught,
vllified, brought to trial. Unchecked ‘cosmopolitanism’ can, as Cari Schmitt
wamed, create the worst ofhuman tragedies in the name ofhumanity.22’ In order
to advance the goals of cosmopoiitanism, we need to subject it to scrutiny,
redefine it, extract from it the best it has to offer, and strip away its lofiy
pretensions. Only then can we arrive at something we can use constructiveiy and
effectively.
221 Cari Schmitt, The Nomos oJthe Earth (New York, Teios Press Pubiishing: 2003), 172-175.
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V: Shattered Cosmopolitan Dreams: The Decriminalizafion ofAggression
At this point I want to retum full swing to the original premise and show
why humanitarian intervention within a cosmopolitan frame is incoherent in terms
of achieving global peace, security and stability. To show that, I must include an
analysis showing how aggression is becoming institutionaily decriminaiized, and
how this does flot serve our cosmopolitan purposes. In this section, I intend to:
(j) define and briefly outiine the history ofthe ‘crime ofaggression’; and
to
(ii) show how and why (traditionaliy iefl-wing anti-war activist oriented)
intellectuais and liberals have aligned themselves with the movement
toward military intervention for ‘humanitarian’ purposes; and thirdly
to
(iii) show how ‘humanitarian’ military intervention has contributed to the
decriminalization of ‘crimes against peace’ (aggression)
Foilowing this historical and empirical analysis, I would like to
(iv) show what conclusions we can draw in orderto develop a conceptuai
frame and understanding for the problem ofhumanitarian intervention.
(y) demand that we engage in a conceptual shifi requiring us to see
conflict in terms of our reiationship to it.
To contextualize what the term ‘crime ofaggression’ refers to, I will draw on
Justice Robert Jackson of the Nuremberg trials:
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is flot only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within
itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
--Justice Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg Trials222
Crimes against peace, otherwise known as ‘the crime of aggression’ is not just a
war crime, but rather the supreme crime: it is the umbrelia under which ah other
war crimes fail under, and the condition (sine qua non) without which ail other
222 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening $tatement before the International Military Tribunal.
Retrieved from http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-7-8- 1/
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war crimes could flot occur. The crime of aggression is the supreme crime
because ail other categories of crimes, including genocide and crimes against
humanity can only happen in the context of existing aggression—i.e., war.
Therefore, crimes against peace, or the crime of aggression has been deflned by
the Nuremberg Principles as the “Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
773
assurances
This principle dates back to 1927 with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, otherwise
known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, which states that
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
thefr respective peoples that ffiey condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as
an instrument of national policy in thefr relations with one
another.224
While the Keilogg-Briand Pact of 1928 tried (unsuccessfully) to make war illegal,
the declaration ofwar was flot yet considered a criminal act for which the
individuals responsibie for it could be held accountable. After a twenty-year
effort, the United Nations Generai Assembly came up with an authoritative
definition of aggression: It states that the first use of armed force by a State in
contravention of the Charter constitutes prima facie evidence of aggression. This
ieaves room for interpretive difficuities. It stipulates that as long as the
aggression is not undertaken in a way which is inconsistent with the Charter, then
it would not be considered aggression. Hence the ambiguity in what one calis
aggression, another calis self defense. It may look very much like the United
223 Gerhard von Glalin, Law Among Nations, 6th edition (Toronto: Maxwell MacMillan Publishing
Company: 1992), 880.
224 Von Glahn, 393.
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States has committed the ultimate crime against peace, or the crime of aggression
in fraq, but if they defend their actions using the argument that they are defending
themselves against terrorism, unconvincing as that may be, an interpretive
argument remains, and the debate continues.
The consequence ofthis was simply that we stopped declaring war. One
new trend is to cali ‘aggression’ ‘humanitarian intervention’. Global despotism,
as wamed by Kant, looms over and threatens the cosmopolitan ideal. The
Kantian conception ofthe cosmopolitan ideal, from which we draw much
inspiration today, is one in which citizens are able to ftourish and fully develop
within the permanenfly peacefiul co-existence of states. It was important to Kant
that this condition was flot temporary, which he refened to as a state of war with
moments ofpeace in between war, because in such a case, the constant
preparation for war, physical, financial, and mental, would drain from our
potential as human beings to participate in and contribute to the greater project of
humanity. R2P documents stipulate clearly the necessity for constant preparation
for war. This goes against the Kantian ideal for the conditions for cosmopolitan
global order.
The Kantian context, to which the cosmopolitan ideal refers has been
hijacked to serve other purpose, intentionally or not. And it is for this reason that
a critique of humanitarian intervention must be articulated within the scope of the
cosmopolitan project, so as not to render its critics advocates of a purely realist
position, which is flot only uninteresting, but it does not contribute to furthering
our cosmopolitan goals. More difficuit is to maintain a belief in, and a desire to
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further ifie goals ofcosmopoiitanism, whiie rejecting the notion that ‘we’ can
‘save’ people using military force, thus defying international iaw, for a higher
moral purpose. It is preciseiy because this dangerous new trend is supported and
pursued by so many otherwise respectable lefi-leaning thinkers, activists, writers,
poets and so forth (the late Susan Sontag, David Rieff, Michael Ignatieff, Elie
Wiesel, to name just a few) that there exists a kind of moral urgency in the
examination ofthe evidence, to draw both empirical conclusions and to delineate
conceptual difficulties with the notion that miÏitaiy intervention can be used to
advance the goals of humanity.
(ii) In order to do this, let us juxtapose the cosmopolitan ideai with what
is currntiy called “humanitarian intervention” and to what otherwise liberal
rninded, human rights activists refer when they suddenly find themselves flot only
adhering to the use of force to promote peace, but aiso siding with otherwise flot
like-minded politicai affiliations. What is threatening to some cosmopolitans
comrnitted to peace is this strange communion between otherwise political rivais.
In order to maintain the integrity of the cosmopolitan ideai, we must strip away
incompatible alliances by examining how each component is defined separately
and in relation to one another. In concrete terms, what role does the emotionaliy
charged, highly manipulative and oflen mendacious book A Frobtem From Heu:
America and the Age of Genocide by Samantha Power play in the effort to
persuade liberally-minded, human rights thinkers to encourage otherwise illegal
(and as I will show, immoral) miÏitary action in sovereign states? Put another
way, how does such exploitative sensationalism, which tries to pass itself off as
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investigative joumalism, uphoid and participate in committing what Nuremberg
called the “supreme crime”—the crime of aggression under which ail other war
crimes occur? Part ofthis project, then, must include an investigation into the
sources behind such daims that justify ‘humanitarian’ bombing so that
conclusions can be drawn based on facts and reason, flot fictionai half-truths.
The ‘humanitarian’ modifier of ‘military intervention’ exploits the noble
aspirations ofthe cosmopolitan ideal, drawing upon it to justify imperiai motives
in power politics. So called ‘humanitarian’ military intervention decriminalizes
aggression, demonizes whole populations, creates hostility and hatred between
peoples, and ultimately creates the umbrella condition under which ail crimes
against humanity can and do occur. far from promoting the rights of citizens
everywhere, it creates the conditions for war crimes, and future wars. Implicit in
the preparation to make the case for humanitarian intervention are moral dualism,
the demonization ofa people, and the creation of public opinion using
propaganda. These detract from the development ofthe cosmopolitan ideal: they
hinder and undermine its goals, and they make peaceful conditions for a
federation of nation states unlikely. Michael Parenti gives us reason to fear the
use ofthe term ‘humanitarian’ when it comes to aggression:
In the span of a few months, President Clinton bombed four
countries: Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq repeatedly, and
Yugoslavia massively. At the same time, the U.S. was
involved in proxy wars in Angola, Mexico (Chiapas),
Colombia, East Timor, and various other places. And US.
forces are deployed on every continent and ocean, wiffi some
300 major overseas support bases -- ail in the name ofpeace,
democracy, national security, and humanitarianism.225
225 Michael Parenti, “Introduction” in $trange Liberators, iii.
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Diana Johnstone makes the daim that in particular, the bombing ofYugoslavia
marks a tuming point in history with regard to the expansion ofU.S. military
hegemony. Normally resewed for Central American countries, U.S.
interventionism had moved into Europe, inviting alongside with it Germany to
participate for the first time since World War II in foreign military intervention.
What is crucial about these acts were flot so much that they moved forward with
the ease that they did, but that they had the support oflefi-leaning liberals, who,
taking their cues from the media, encouraged and fiirthered these goals of military
intervention. Diana Johnstone puts it this way:
Apparently, many people on the left, who would normally
defend peace and justice, were fooled or confused by the daim
ffiat the “Kosovo war” was waged for purelyhumanitarian
reasons. The altruistic pretensions ofNATO’s Kosovo war
served to gain public acceptance of war as the appropriate
instrument of policy. This opened the way for the United
States, in the wake of 11 September 2001, to attack
Afghanistan as the ojening phase of a new, long-term “war
against terrorism”.22
(iii) What is important to notice is that two things are conjointly
occurring: (i) the decriminalization of aggression by (ii) making aggression
acceptable on humanitarian grounds. Aggression is flot humanitarian, no matter
what way one looks at it. And this is flot really a problem for humanitarians
anymore, flot at least in the way the problems are being ftamed and treated. This
is what the Observer writes about Afghanistan:
UNICEF reported last week that 100,000 more chiidren wilI
die during this winter.. if bombing ofthe country
continues .
. One hundred thousand more deaffis if bombing
goes on. A greater good is squandered if it ceases. . .The only
fruly humanitarian outcome for Afghanistan’s staiwing now
requfres the downfall ofthe Taliban govemment. 227
Ç 226 Jobnstone, 1.
227 The Observer, quoted in David Chandier, ftom Kosovo to Kabul: Hunan Rights and
International Intervention (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 51.
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Robert Hayden makes this point when he says: “Attacks against civilians are
probably inevitable in any supposedly humanitarian intervention” and “. .the
decision to attack a sovereign state is, iogically, a decision to attack the civilian
population of that state” and therefore, he concludes that “the greatest triumph of
the human rights movement, “humanitarian intervention,” is revealed as its
greatest defeat, because it transforms what had been a moral critique against state
violence into a moral crusade for massive violence by stronger states against
weaker ones”.228 The evidence is in the resuit: the ‘humanitarian’ bombing of
former Yugoslavia, a 78-day campaign, inciuding the dropping of 1,100 cluster
bombs, each containing 220,000 bomblets, killing anywhere from 500-1800
civilians, as well as hitting fine hospitals and over 300 elementary and secondary
schools. Miiitary forces aiso targeted and destroyed the entire public
infrastructure, causing $4 billion worth of damages on bridges, houses, buses,
electricai plants, and hundreds of acres of forests.229 Amnesty International
reported that flying of 38 000 sorties (NATO aircrafi) at 15 000 feet, “made
adherence to international humanitarian iaw virtually impossible”.23° Aggression,
the umbreila crime under which ail other crimes against humanity occur, cannot
be made humanitarian, no matter how many times it is claimed to be so. John
Laughland made this important observation:
228 Robert Hayden, “Biased Justice: ‘Humanrightsism and the International Criininal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia,” Cteveland State Law Review 47, no. 4 (1999): 571.
229Cohn, 121.
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“Kosovo: One Year Later” retrieved from www.stratfor.comJCIS/speciakeports/special26.htm;
“NATO violations of the laws of war during Operation Allied Force must lie investigated,”
Amnesty International (25 July 2000), retrieved from www.arnnesty.org/news/2000/4/002500.htm
212
We now thinjc ofNuremberg mainly as the trial ofthe
Holocaust. This is flot how the architects ofNuremberg saw
matters. Exhausted by up to six years of all-engulfmg war, the
allies were mainly preoccupied wiffi the fact that Nazi
Germany had plunged the whole world into conflict. for the
judges at Nuremberg, the primordial war crime was to
start a war in the first pLace. Ail other war crimes flowed
from this. Akhough naked aggression has aiways been illegal
under customary international law—as is attested by the
numerous and no doubt spurious legal justifications made
throughout history by belligerent states for ffieir actions—
Nuremberg was innovatory in its clear legal formulation that
the planning and execution ofa war ofaggression constituted
a criminal act in international law. It was for this crime, and
not for crimes against humanity, that alI the Nazis at
Nuremberg were judged.” “This is not justice: The Hague has
replaced Nuremberg’s jurisprudence ofpeace with a license to
the west to kill.”.23’
The extensive use of depleted uranium in the former Yugoslavia,
constituting a violation under international law, has been extensively
documented.232 Its use fails ail four rules derived from the whole ofhumanitarian
law regarding weapons. The use of DU constitutes a violation of law under the
greater category of aggression, which, as John Laughland states in the above
explanation, is the principle lesson ofNuremberg. Any steps toward its
legalization renders the whole Nuremberg experience futile, and dangerously
inane. This futility is evident by the dismissal ofthe allegations brought forth by
Michael Mandel: Joining together with other Canadian law professors and
lawyers and the American Association of Jurists, Mandel filed a complaint against
231 John Laughiand, “This is flot justice: The Hague has replaced Nurembergs jurisprudence of
peace with a licence to the west to kiil,” TIze Guardian (London), February 16, 2002. Retrieved
from http://www.globafresearch.ca’articles/LAU2O2A.html
232 Gregory Elich is but one ofmany who describe the use and effects of DU in his book “Strange
Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit” (Florida: Llumina Press, 2006):
“Missiles stmck storage tanks at the petrochemical plant, sending over 900 tons ofhigffly
carcinogenic vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) surging into the air. By sunrise, clouds of VCM
poured through the town. registering as high as 10,600 times the permissible lirnit for human
safety, and billowing clouds from the plan were so thick that residents were unable to see the
sun..
. for months afterwards doctors in Panchevo recommended that women avoid pregnancy for
the next two years, while those who were less than nine weeks pregnant were advised to seek
abortions due to the high probability ofbirth defects.”, 152.
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C’ NATO leaders with the ICTY, which alleged that 68 individual NATO leaders
had committed crimes under the junsdiction ofthe ICTY. These included crimes
against humanity and crimes against the laws and customs ofwar. They would
have alleged crimes against the peace - or aggressive war - as well, but the United
States had seen to it that the crime of aggression was flot included in the mandate
of the ICTY. The tribunal dismissed the complaint without serious investigation.
Amnesty International later confirmed that NATO had comrnitted war crimes in
Yugoslavia. What is interesting to note here is that the international court tribunal
for war crimes has neglected to include in its mandate what the Nuremberg Trials
revealed to us as the principle crime: they failed to include the crime of
aggression as part of their mandate. When a court neglects to include the supreme
crime of aggression in its mandate, it cails into question its universal applicabiliy,
its genuine intention to persecute war crimes, and its cosmopolitan effort to
contribute toward a peaceful global order.
(iv) Ail this implores the reader to question why a traditionally lefi
leaning, or liberal-minded, human rights upholding citizen would support and
further encourage its government to act in such a capacity. Justification for
military intervention in a sovereign territoiy is normally based upon the rescuing
ofa people from gross violations ofhuman rights. In this way, it is caÏled
‘humanitarian’ and supported extensively by many groups, including lefi-leaning
liberals. The act of genocide wôuÏd no doubt fali into the category of ‘gross
violations ofhuman rights’. If an international tribunal would call an act
‘genocide’ then we would bejustifled in thinking that we (the West, more
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powerfiul nations with military capabiÏity) should act, or should have acted to
prevent such atrocities from occurring. It would be difficuit to imagine a group of
cosmopolitan-oriented people from thinldng it is a duty, moral if not legal, to act
in such a case. Johnstone makes this observation:
The attack on Serbia was endorsed by politicians and
intellectuals identified with the lefi, who exhorted the public
to believe that the United States and its allies no longer made
war to advance selfish interests, but might be coaxed into
using thefr military miglit to protect innocent victims from evil
dictators.233
The war in former Yugoslavia was a propaganda war, as much as it was a brutal
military one.
The frame for any humanitarian intervention only works in a Manichean
world of good and cvii. This narrative for humanitarian intervention is crucial.
We caimot justify military aggression unless we speak in terms of us and them,
good and bad, and if the world were so easily divided up that way, then there
wouÏd be no problem for intewentionists. On doser examination we can see that
no conflict is so easily divisible, no conflict so easily understood. One of our
greater mistakes is to set the frame in such a way that it requires, demands swifi
military response. That frame is to paint the conflict in flot onÏy terms of good
and evil, but also in terms ofour Western innocence and uttèr shock at unfolding
events. Rwanda is flot an example of a failure because there was littie or no
foreign military action. Rwandais a failure of our humanity because of ail ofthe
things that the West, the liberal democratic states, organizations and institutions
did to aid in the escalation of violence and conflict. When international
organizations praised for prioritization ofhuman rights are opening providing the
233 Johnstone, 2.
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financing for the killing on both sides of the conflict, nothing can be more
devastating for our moral conscience. That every rich Western nation sold arms
to the Jndonesians for 25 years ofbrntal idiling in East Timor must compel us to
make a conceptual shifi in our understanding of world politics.
(y) This conceptual shifi changes the frame, asks different questions of us,
makes different moral demands on us. The radical position ofthe 21st century is
flot the legalization ofhumanitarian intervention. The radical position ofthe day
is to make the conceptual shifi from us and them, good and evil, to one where we
recognize, aclmowiedge and take responsibility for our actions in ways that
increase our chances for a more stable, peaceful, cosmopolitan world. It is to
challenge the picture which has been presented. Making such a shifi puts
demands on us that are harder. They require the citizens of liberal, democratic
societies to question, rather then accept superfîcial accounts of complex conflicts.
It requires citizens to make their govemments accountable for their actions, rather
than give them a military license to engage in otherwise hostile aggression. This
conceptual shifi is radical because it forces us to understand conflict flot purely in
regional, ethnie terms, but rather within a global sphere which includes an
international economic analysis as well as a global geo-political analysis. This
conceptual shifi forces us to seriously challenge our perception of our role as
liberators and heroes in a deep and meaningful way. It forces us to admit that
international organizations have flot prioritized human rights, and it requires us to
ask hard questions about why. Unearthing the many layers ofnot only regional
conflict, but also ofthe international role in regional conflict shakes the
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n foundations upon which the idea and the implementation
intervention cari work. Once that foundation has been sufficiently chaÏlenged or
shaken, the idea ofhumanitarian intervention becomes incoherent and
nonsensical. But only when we admit that the essential problem with
humanitarian intervention is the way we have set up our understanding ofthe
context, can we begin to actually imagine other possibilities for peace. Described
and developed in the current narrative, we cannot but corne to any other
conclusion that that humanitarian intervention is the only solution. A radical
conceptual shifi allows for not only a deeper, more complex understanding, but
engaging in such a level of analysis opens the imagination for developing real
solutions, lasting solutions for the problems of conflict. It is meaningftil response,
and one where we genuinely maintain the integrity of the cosmopolitan proj ect:
the protection and security ofhuman life, and the maintenance ofits sanctity. The
only conclusion that can be drawn is the very incrnpatibility of humanitarian
intervention with cosmopolitanism. I will summarize the ftame ofthe argument
then, accordingÏy in my next section which draws together ah of the arguments
showing the incompatibility of humanitarian intervention with cosmopolitanism.
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C’ V-i: The Incompafibffity of Cosmopolitanism with
Intervention:
The ethical aspirations behind the idea of humanitarian intervention within
a cosmopolitan frarne is generally seen as a radical idea for progressive change
based on assumption of universality, empowerment of the oppressed, abused or
excluded citizen, and finally, a human-centered ethical approach. But within the
context of cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention, our conception of
humanitarianism has been transformed by the ways in which aggressive
militarism works and the ways it has forced us to rethink our ideas of ‘helping’.
I have argued that we have made several mistakes in assessing and
framing regional conflicts. first, we see ourselves as the only possible liberators
offoreign conflict; second, we assume a kind oflegitimacy on the basis ofhuman
rights salvation; third, we dichotomize the world into good and bad; and fourth,
we assess foreign conflicts along strictly ethnic lines. In assessing and frarning
conflict in this way, we have absolved ourselves ofresponsibility in foreign
conflicts; we have done so by neyer quite reporting how the West or our
international organizations are party to genocide and other war crimes. With our
assumed innocence, shock and horror, we see ourselves as the only option to
saving the world from death and destruction. We can only do this by
misrepresenting the conflicts, and by failing to question the humanitarian
intervention paradigm.
By misrepresenting the reality and nature of conflict we fail to appreciate
the complexity of the causes of conflict. By imposing a legal cosmopolitan world
order, which subverts existing international law, based on a moral idea of
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cosmopolitanism, which remains empty and unchallenged, we risk applying
methods for conflict resolution that may aggravate the conflict, produce negative
long term effects, and heighten human rights abuses. Regional conflicts in non-
Western regions are rarely purely ethnic in origin. To frame it as such flot only
does short-term damage, (the military intervention itself), it destabilizes the global
comrnunity and sets the stage for further conflict, when the loosing side gathers its
strength and a new generation of soldiers to right what they will perceive as the
wrong done against them.
Supporting humanitarian interventions assumes that intervening states
prioritize human rights over other interests. It gives an enormous amount of
credibility to international organizations who do not warrant it necessarily. We
need to scrutinize flot only our own Western powers in terms of their interests in
conflict regions, but also the role ofthe international comrnunity in general to see
what role they play prior to and during conflict. Humanitarian intervention based
on a cosmopolitan right does flot actually guarantee that the people who are in the
most in need will be helped. The cosmopolitan right is flot a cosmopolitan duty,
although recommendations are made in R2P that we see our collective obligation
as rescuers as a duty, but the recommendations from that document are an attempt
to bypass the difficulty of trying to defend the right to enter foreign sou. The
recommendations stand, with no binding force, which means that Western
(powerful) states choose where to and where flot to intervene on the basis flot of
need, but on the basis ofinterest (mixed motives). Nothing in this makes the idea
of intervention cosmopolitan. “Cosmopolitan” law would flot only apply to
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places where powerful nations have sorne interest, it would apply universally, as
its name suggests. Even in theory, we cannot change that because that would
mean to demand of states their intervention when it is flot in their interests, and as
we have seen, this is generally regarded as flot only unrealistic, but sometimes
inexpedient. The difficulty in these daims is to abandon the only conceivable
idea many people have to help people in crisis. Most are not prepared to reject
the idea ofhumanitarian intervention, even if they are willing to concede the
problems inherent in the idea. The serious task lefi to non-interventionists is to
corne up with an alternative to hurnanitarian intervention. I have argued that what
we need to do is change the way we understand the problem if we are to corne up
with rneaningful solutions which are effective and permanent. With that idea, I
conclude my arguments and show that if we can understand the problem different,
we can devise better pians for a safer and more secure future.
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V-il: Conclusion: Making a Conceptual Shift in our Global Uuderstanding of
Regional Conflicts
The bold daim put forward here is that the principies of state sovereignty
and non-intervention have flot faiied us, but rather we have failed them.
Recommendations toward a global security and peace include accepting the fact
that the possibility of abuse in unilateral humanitarian intervention outweighs the
possible good that could corne out ofit. Following this view, these
recomrnendations are put forth: liberai-dernocracies, the prosperous and free
nations ofthe world must be carefully scrutinized in terms of(a) our willingness
to seli arms, train and equip rogue states with the rneans to conduct atrocities; (b)
that we participate and uphold our own international human rights agreernents,
especially when we develop trade agreements; (c) that we develop and implement
a foreign human-rights policy that applies consistentiy to ail states.
What the problem ofhumanitarian intervention and solution for regional
conflict dernands is a conceptual shifi: it requires the serious exarnination ofthese
problems:
1. The degree to which the international comrnunity is irnpiicated in regional
conflicts before those conflicts explore into full blown war.
2. The degree to which they perpetuate those wars (via the arming and
training ofrebel forces).
3. A full analysis of the international community change or challenge of the
normative frame within which (cosmopolitan) humanitarian intervention is
possible.
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4. An analysis ofthe evidence upon which wejudge intervening states, as
weÏl as elite members the international community to prioritize human
rights over other considerations.
5. An analysis ofthe mechanisms by which we have available for making
our governments accountable for their foie lfl human rights abuses.
Instead of a good-guys/bad-guys dichotomy in place which puts the biame on
smaller, iess-powerfiui states to be controlied by larger, more-powerful states, we
need to engage in a conceptuai shifi in terms of the cuiprits of aggression, and by
extension we must think in terms ofhow we could make our own countries
responsible for our participation in the violence perpetuated in rogue states. If we
are powerful enough to invade states and instiil an occupying force on foreign
Ïands, sureïy we are capable of stopping atrocities before they occur in other,
profoundly less damaging ways.
These explanations are oflen unsatisfactory in the humanitarian
intervention narrative, and the reason they are is because of the necessity we have
to simplify complex issues, and because ofthe moral urge we have to help those
in dire need. But ignoring the core of the problem does flot actuaiÏy help those
who are most in need. Moving in this direction will not secure the lives ofthose
who most urgently require help. This humanitarian intervention frame would
only work if the conditions were really exactÏy as they are presented by advocates
ofit: the house is buming, go in and help. The analogy does flot do justice to the
reality of global politics, or guard against the imperial intentions of not-so
cosmopolitan motives. A failure to shifi our conceptual understanding of the
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world from good-bad, to perhaps the more realistic bad-bad possibility negates
our ability to make real headway toward cosmopolitan law and order. Most
importantly in this analysis is the belief that we cannot progress, we cannot find
meaningful solutions, we caimot contribute to a permanent global peace unless we
seriously revise how we look at global politics.
This project is motivated from a deep belief in the possibilities ofa
cosmopolitan world order, and one that does flot see humanitarian intervention as
a route which will take us there. Cosmopolitanism is not about ‘civilizing’ the
‘other’, about fixing ‘their’ problems, or rescuing ‘them’. Cosmopolitanism as an
idea advocated by interventionists must be challenged in serious ways.
Humanitarian intervention as an idea to promote peace must be abandoned
entirely if we are dedicated to peace and security. The challenge for
cosmopolitans is to engage in a reexamination of its values in order that it could
engage seriously in the process of a peaceful global order. It is to make this
conceptual shifi that will make room for the possibility of change. Without that
conceptual shifi, we cannot imagine other, better possibilities. The reason we
cannot imagine them is because the frame called ‘humanitarian intervention’ does
flot allow them. Only by furthering our understanding, delineating the
complexities in foreign conflict, admitting our responsibilities in our conduct of
global economics, and geo-political foreign policies can we actually participate in
the possibility of change toward a peaceful, coexistence of global order.
Cosmopolitanism is an idea that must be able to make a conceptual shifi about us
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and them. It is flot to see us as the moral example, but to acknowledge the moral
deficiency in us, and to correct it, before imposing military action on others.
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